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Abstract 
This thesis analyses the EU´s external energy security policy through a comparative analysis 
of the energy relations between the EU and important producers of natural gas; Russia, 
Norway, the Mediterranean, Gulf and Caspian region. In order to detect variation in the 
policy, three strategies the EU can pursue in order to enhance its energy security are derived 
based on the debate between realism, economic and institutional liberalism around necessary 
means to strengthen an energy consumer‟s supply security. The analysis reveals that the EU 
relates itself differently to the producers in terms of what strategy it makes use of and the 
effort it puts behind each of the instruments; as such there is variation in the external energy 
security policy of the EU. Overall, the EU has put most effort into those strategies that aim at 
market creation and institutionalisation of the relationship. This was expected given the nature 
of the EU as a foreign policy actor, and the status of energy policy at Community level. 
Nevertheless, the pattern is a bit more nuanced as several political strategic instruments also 
are detected. It was assumed that certain characteristics of the producers, such as regime type, 
level of resource richness, degree of interdependence with the EU and conflict level would 
contribute to an explanation of this variation. Yet, the comparative analysis reveals that they 
are not adequate as explanatory factors, and other factors have been pointed to, such as 
perceptions of supplier role, transit potential, geographical proximity, strategic importance in 
terms of security, crisis management and diversification, along with resource richness to some 
degree at the regional level. The findings indicate that the EU aims to enhance its energy 
security along several dimensions, and that various external factors can contribute to explain 
its external energy security policy.  
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1 Introduction 
 “With both energy consumption and dependency on oil and gas imports growing and supplies 
becoming scarcer, the risk of supply failure is rising. Securing European energy supplies is 
therefore high on the EU´s agenda” (European Commission 2010a).  
 
At the beginning of World War I, First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill ordered the 
shift of power source of the British navy´s ships from coal to oil, implying a need to rely on 
foreign oil supplies, most notably insecure ones from then Persia. In order to secure energy 
supplies, Churchill underscored that: “safety and certainty in oil lie in variety and variety 
alone”, and thus he established a crucial factor for energy security, namely diversification. It 
also became closely linked to national strategy (Yergin 2006:69). Since then the concept of 
energy security has emerged high on the international political agenda from time to time, and 
especially during the oil crises of the 1970s. Today, it is again receiving wide attention, due to 
higher energy prices, regional supply shortfalls and new looming predictions of “the end of 
oil” (Bielecki 2002:236). Moreover, one has seen a broadening of the term security so that it 
encompasses more than a preoccupation with the state and military defence, leading to an 
increasing realisation of the fact that energy security does not stand by itself, rather it is 
connected to the larger relations among nations, and their interaction (Collins 2010:7, Yergin 
2006:69). Energy security has thus become a “hot topic” in the international debate as a result 
of growing concern over the quantity and reliability of state´s energy sources. The existence 
of reliable supplies is a prerequisite for economic activity (Raphael and Stokes 2010:379-
380), as energy is one of the key inputs into all economic processes; “it is a source of power, 
heat and mobility that are indispensable for normal functioning of any modern society” 
(Bielecki 2002:236).   
Simply put, energy security means “reliable and adequate supply of energy at 
reasonable prices” (Bielecki 2002:237) and it is seen in relation to both oil and natural gas. 
Yet, the implications of these two commodities for energy security are somewhat different. 
As oil, natural gas is a non- renewable resource, and it is rapidly gaining geopolitical 
importance in the international energy market. Factors that create the global market for gas 
are abundance, cost reduction and rising demand. It is becoming the fuel of choice for many 
uses, most notably the generation of electric power. However, a high proportion of the gas 
reserves are situated outside the regions where demand growth is expected to be strongest 
(Barnes et al 2006:3). International trade in natural gas is made possible and restricted by 
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cross- border pipelines (Fermann 2009:20). Compared to the oil market, the change of supply 
source is much more difficult. Even though LNG and other unconventional forms of gas are 
now bringing a new dimension into this picture, the bulk of the world´s gas resources are 
transported via pipelines. Moreover, gas is very costly to transport and infrastructure 
connections take a long time to construct. There are also a lot of sunk costs involved in 
developing projects (Hayes and Victor 2006:348). All of these characteristics imply cross- 
border trade, and with this, a renewed attention to energy security and geopolitical 
considerations of the relationships between exporting and importing countries.  
In this situation of increased attention to energy security, one finds the European 
Union, consisting of 27 member states. In view of natural gas, the EU currently has a limited 
number of supplying nations and companies dominating external supply, relatively few transit 
lines and close to all growth in consumption must be imported (Austvik 2009:90). 
Consequently, the energy security focus is security- of- supply, and moreover; “when 
speaking of European energy policy one evidently encounters the issue of management of 
external energy supplies to the EU area” (Aalto and Westphal 2008:7).  As such, the 
European Commission defines energy supply security as “the ability to ensure that future 
essential energy needs can be met…by calling upon accessible and stable external sources” 
(Eurogulf cited in Fermann 2009:23). According to estimates, the EUs natural gas dependence 
on external sources will rise above 80 % against 50 % today by 2030. Even though these 
estimates vary, European consumption is growing, and the transition to a low- carbon 
economy is slowly underway. Hence, the situation has gradually forged the decision- makers 
to realise the implications of the energy security issue. The most important implication for 
this thesis is that the EU has to develop and maintain energy relations with external producers 
in order to secure the continued supply of natural gas to Europe.  
According to a study by the International Energy Agency (IEA) of EU energy policy 
from 2008, some major events since 2005 have made security of supply a chief concern in 
European energy policy. These include the rapid rise of fossil fuel prices since 2004 and the 
interruption of gas supplies from Russia in the beginning of 2006, which resulted in gas 
shortages in a number of member states; a large electricity blackout in 2006 affecting large 
parts of north- western Europe, as well as the continuing threat that disputes between 
suppliers and transit countries such as Russia and Ukraine will affect supplies of oil and gas 
into the EU. The development of the internal market and the commitment to a transition to a 
low- carbon energy system are also cited as important driving forces (IEA 2008:78). The 
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Union has in its recent energy strategy explicitly stated that security of supply is one of the 
three pillars constituting the Union´s energy policy, sustainability and the internal market 
being the other two;   
“A common EU energy policy has evolved around the common objective to ensure the 
uninterrupted physical availability of energy products and services on the market, at a price 
which is affordable for all consumers (private and industrial), while contributing to the EU's 
wider social and climate goals. The central goals for energy policy (security of supply, 
competitiveness, and sustainability) are now laid down in the Lisbon Treaty” (European 
Commission 2010b:2).  
 
These developments point to a growing tendency within the European Union to coordinate 
energy policies and to place a greater emphasis on the foreign policy dimension of energy 
policy. In fact, some have pointed out that external energy relations are becoming the newest 
form of EU foreign policy (Hadfield 2008:333).  This is reflected in the energy policy papers 
of the EU in the last decade; relationships with states or regions outside of the Union´s border 
have been put to the forefront in relation to energy security.  
1.1 Analytical framework 
1.1.1 Focus and research question 
It is within the abovementioned realm that an analysis of the external energy security policy 
of the EU, more specifically as the EUs actions and strategies towards producers of natural 
gas becomes relevant. The producers are first and foremost traditional suppliers such as 
Russia, Norway and the Mediterranean region, but also potentially new strategic suppliers 
such as the Caspian and the Gulf region with which the EU has an energy relation. How has 
the EU developed and maintained its energy relations with these external producers? This 
analysis is motivated by the chance to discover the “typical” EU approach or pattern of action 
concerning an important pillar for its energy policy; security of supply. Moreover, a central 
motivation is to figure out if the EU pays attention to the producer it relates to and if there is 
any variation related to the way it approaches the different producers. The producers 
considered in the analysis are naturally different on several dimensions, and thus underline the 
importance of flexibility: they demand different strategic responses from the EU (Claes 
2009:49-51). As such, an analysis of variation in the external energy security policy may 
reveal whether or not the EU displays this flexibility. The focus of the analysis is therefore 
firstly, what has the EU done in order to enhance its security of supply? Is there any variation 
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in the EU´s strategy? This will be answered through an empirical analysis of the relationship 
with Russia, Norway, the Caspian, Gulf and Mediterranean Region. Secondly, can an 
eventual variation in the EU´s strategy towards the producers be explained by certain 
characteristics of the producers? A comparative analysis will be conducted in order to detect 
eventual variation and an explanation of this. The premise is as mentioned that the EU is 
dependent upon external suppliers for its energy security, and the EU therefore has to manage 
and develop relations with important producers of natural gas. Thus, the following bifurcated 
research question is posed:  
 
How does the EU´s external energy security policy vary across different energy producers? 
What can explain this eventual variation? 
 
This research question requires a qualitative within- case analysis of the EUs external energy 
security policy, consisting of a cross- case comparison of the EU´s most important relations 
with suppliers. Thus the unit of analysis is the EU, but the main bulk of the analysis is 
confined to the empirical analysis of cases that illustrate the EUs strategies. In turn, this will 
lay the basis for a comparative analysis discussing a) the eventual differences in the EU´s 
strategy and b) possible explanations for this variation; ultimately the EU´s external energy 
security policy. Referring to Andersen´s typology of case studies, the study can be classified 
as theoretical interpretive, because it utilises a theoretical perspective to analyse and sort out 
the empirical material (1997:69). The basic research model of explanation and thus for 
answering the research question is as follows;  firstly it is expected that the level of intensity 
with which the EU pursues different strategies
1
 can say something about whether or not there 
is any variation in the external energy security policy of the EU. The strategies are based on 
the theoretical debate in IR about what best can enhance energy security as well as 
instruments a gas consumer has at its disposal. They are called institutionalisation, market and 
political strategies and will be elaborated in the theory chapter. The level of intensity is 
determined according to the weight the EU puts on one or the other strategy i.e. if it makes 
use of one strategy more than the others. Secondly, it is assumed that certain characteristics of 
the producers can explain this variation; the EU´s external energy security policy varies 
according to a specific pattern that is determined by the characteristics of the producers.  
                                                 
1
 A strategy is understood as being a comprehensive or broad plan for certain actions or behaviour, in this case a 
conscious plan aiming at enhancing energy security (Hovi 2004:263).   
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Presented graphically, the explanatory model looks like this:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Explanatory model  
What is to be explained is the external energy security policy of the EU. Given the natural gas 
situation for the EU referred to in the introduction, in which it has no indigenous supply, the 
external relations is what constitutes the external energy security policy of the EU, simply 
because security of supply implies managing relations with the producers. In order to explain 
the external energy security policy of the EU as many of the relationships with energy 
producers are important to analyse, following from the diversification logic of Churchill.  
1.1.2 Theoretical grounding  
To address the research question, this thesis draws upon insights from the Foreign Policy 
Analysis (FPA) literature, as well as the theoretical debate in the International Relations (IR) 
literature between realists, institutional and economic liberalists. Overall, energy is not often 
referred to in the FPA literature, neither is the concept of energy security in the IR debate for 
that matter. However, the arguments from the literature and debate lend themselves well to an 
analysis of the external energy security policy of the EU. The IR debate provides the basis for 
the abovementioned strategies that are made up of different instruments a gas consumer can 
make use of vis- á- vis producers in order to enhance its energy security. The FPA literature 
provides insights concerning foreign policy actions, objectives, motives and capabilities, as 
well as the reasons for relating oneself to the context, here intended as the producers in 
question.  I do not seek to explain the decision- making process within the EU that led up to 
the specific policies and strategies, rather the implementation of energy security instruments 
“on the ground”. As mentioned, a basic assumption concerning the eventual variation is that 
certain characteristics of the producers influence the strategy that the EU has pursued. Given 
the variation of producers in terms of their economical, political and cultural differences, it 
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The external energy 
security policy of 
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seems logical to relate to them differently (Claes 2010:19). I assume that provided the 
variation of suppliers in terms of what type of regime they are, the degree of interdependence 
with the EU, the level of resource richness they hold and the conflict level they display, it 
should be reasonable for the EU to adapt its instruments and strategy accordingly. The 
reasoning behind this expectation is further elaborated in the following chapter.  
1.1.3 Methodology 
Keohane et al. (1994:15) identify two criteria that a social science research project should 
satisfy in order to be relevant and valuable; firstly it should “pose a question that is 
“important” in the real world”, and secondly, “make a specific contribution to an identifiable 
scholarly literature by increasing our collective ability to construct verified scientific 
explanations of the world”. Considerations concerning the importance of energy security were 
elaborated in the introduction of this thesis; the crucial role of energy in any society, the EU´s 
import dependency leading to a prominent place of energy on the policy agenda, as well as 
the recent development of a more coherent energy policy in the Union. These aspects 
establish the relevance of the study. Moreover it may contribute directly to the literature on 
energy security and the European Union; to the best of my knowledge any systematic 
comparative analysis of the energy relations of the EU does not exist. There are studies 
concerning the energy relations, but many do not take into account all of them, or are simply 
exploratory in nature or focus on certain aspects such as the associations with other foreign 
policy goals or the legal dimensions. Many contributions also focus on the dilemmas facing 
the EU, especially regarding the ability to speak with one voice.  This analysis is much more 
grounded in the energy security debate, it takes into account certain characteristics of the 
producers in question and it aims to observe and explain the pattern of action of the EU´s 
external energy security policy. 
In order to make the analysis readily understood and to manage the amount of data 
that this requires, I need a method that is clear and structured. I have therefore chosen to 
follow the method of structured focused comparison as presented by George and Bennett 
(2005), which underline that  
“The method is “structured”, in that the researcher writes general questions that reflect the 
research objective and that these questions are asked of each case under study to guide and 
standardise data collection, thereby making systematic comparison and cumulation of the 
findings of the cases possible. The method is “focused” in that it deals only with certain 
aspects of the historical cases examined” (2005:67).   
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In this thesis, the general questions are made up referring to the analytical framework 
presented, and will guide the empirical analysis:  
 What is the score of the producer on the indicators related to characteristics? 
 What type of instrument is being utilised?  
 With what level of intensity has the EU made use of the instrument?  
 What strategy does this reflect?  
 
The focus of the analysis is aspects concerning energy supply security in each relationship. 
Many other aspects could have been considered in an analysis of these relationships, since 
they encompass more political relations than just energy, but the advantage of the method is 
namely to focus the collection of empirical data on one part that reflects the research objective 
and research question. Moreover, the study utilises a form of pattern matching; it analyses 
empirical implications from the theoretical model in the energy relations to determine whether 
these correspond to the theoretically expected pattern. This method is essential in a case study 
that has explanatory purposes, and will be applied in the comparative chapter (Bratberg 
2009). Furthermore, this method corresponds to a theoretically interpretive case study; the 
theoretical implications utilised for this purpose is a certain way of applying a theoretical 
perspective to analyse and sort out a case.    
According to George and Bennett (2005:69) the research objective should guide the 
selection of several cases within a specified subclass. In this analysis energy relationships 
with major producers constitute the cases relevant for EU´s external energy security policy. 
Apart from some relations with Latin America and Africa, the chosen relations of study 
represent close to all important energy relations currently constituting the EU´s external 
energy policy. As such, they all represent valuable indications of the strategies the EU has 
preferred when handling its relations with important suppliers of natural gas. The cases 
chosen do not include countries that are considered as mere transit countries such as the 
Ukraine, which is often mentioned in relation to energy security and the EU. This is mainly 
because of time and scope restraints, but also because the analytical framework demands a 
focus primarily on suppliers. Nevertheless, some of the regions are constituted by countries 
that are mere transit countries, and others that are only suppliers, so the divide is not that 
clear, as will become evident in the empirical analysis. A possible objection to this 
comparative design would be the nature of the producers in question; some are individual 
countries, while others are regions, which may have consequences for the basis of 
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comparison. However, the focus of the analysis is the energy relations and the EU´s policies. 
These are directed both regionally and bilaterally in the name of energy security, and the EU 
has also stated these producers with the denotation used in this analysis in its energy policy 
papers.
2
 As such, the basis of comparison is secured.  
1.1.4 Questions of validity and reliability 
In order to secure construct validity (Yin 2009:40), I have relied on influential sources in 
order to operationalise central concepts such as energy security and foreign policy instruments 
and I have stated the operational definition and concrete indicators when appropriate. In 
addition, I have utilised different data sources both in the development of the research design 
and in the analysis; this contributes to secure that the empirical observations reflect the ideas 
contained in the concepts they are supposed to measure (ibid., Holdhus 2010:13). However, I 
have had some challenges concerning the collection of statistical data and the correspondence 
between data available and the instruments they are supposed to measure. This has 
implications for the measurement validity. The challenges are connected to the time period as 
well as geographical coverage
3
 of the data. Yet, these issues are noted when appropriate, and 
the relevant data is included in the annex, which increases the transparency of the study.  
Even so, I cannot rule out the fact that these indicators may sometimes be skewed. 
The level of intensity is determined according to the number of instruments that has 
been utilised towards the producer country or region and the content of the instruments is also 
considered; that is whether or not they are encompassing and characterised by a lot of effort 
or activity. On a general level, the level of intensity is determined according to how many 
times the producers have been mentioned in the press releases concerning energy the last 6-7 
years in the Rapid database
4
. In sum, the level of intensity does not have one established 
standard for measurement, but the standard and the assessments made are always pointed out 
when relevant. It is possible to imagine that this level of intensity says something about the 
perceived strategic importance of the supplier for the EU, and consequently that this is crucial 
for how much attention the EU is devoting to the different producers. The intensity is also 
                                                 
2
See for example European Commission 2006a and 2008a. Another important clarification is that “what the EU 
classifies as the Mediterranean region also include many countries normally understood as located in the Middle 
East” (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008: 274).  
3
 Examples include the level of export to the EU, which does not cover all of the countries considered in the 
analysis and numbers concerning the FDI outflows from the EU to the producers considered here.  
4
 The Rapid database is a database for press releases, memos and speeches of the European Union. A table is 
included in the comparative analysis denoting this measure 
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coupled with the different strategies; with what intensity has the EU sought after for example 
the market strategy and where? An important distinction needs to be made between the 
employment of instruments and the actual success of this employment. As will become 
evident in the empirical analysis, the EU has sought to use different instruments with several 
of the producers, which have met resistance and rejection on the part of the producers. As 
such, since the focus is on the EU´s policies, the extent to which the use of instruments has 
been successful will only be mentioned where appropriate, but will have no consequence for 
the mapping of the pattern of action. The instruments will therefore be included whether they 
have been successful or not
5
.  
Scholars relate internal validity to the establishment of a causal relationship, i.e. that 
certain conditions are believed to lead to other conditions, ruling out a spurious relationship 
(Yin 2009:40, Lund 2002:29-30). Internal validity is mainly a concern for explanatory case 
studies, which tries to explain why an event led to another event (Yin 2009:42). This thesis 
has an explanatory goal; it seeks to identify and explore some of the causal mechanisms 
leading to variation in the external energy security policy of the EU. The analysis is not an in- 
depth study of each relation, and the basis for saying something about the causal mechanisms 
in each of them is consequently not very good. However, it is an in- depth study of the 
external energy security policy of the EU through the comparative analysis of its energy 
relations, it is therefore possible to identify certain causal mechanisms or a causal pattern in 
relation to the strategy the EU chooses in its external energy security policy. Moreover, the 
advantage of a case study is that it allows the researcher to identify other causal mechanisms 
or explanatory factors than those expected, simply because it requires that the researcher 
acquires in- depth knowledge on several dimensions of the case. Therefore, it will be possible 
to identify other explanatory factors than the chosen characteristics of the producers if this is 
relevant, contributing to the internal validity of the study. Yet, it is not possible to completely 
rule out other explanatory factors; as such the analysis will not be able to establish a causal 
relationship similar to statistical studies i.e. causal effects.  
Case studies are generally not viewed as appropriate for enhancing the external 
validity of studies, i.e. the possibility to generalise. However, generalisations pertaining to 
case studies have been called analytic or contingent generalisations (Yin 2009:43, George and 
                                                 
5
 This call for a modification: I do not have a complete overview of absolutely all of the instruments the EU has 
pursued, successfully or not. The instruments included here are those detected in official policy through the 
collection of data. Basically it is official policy the EU has tried to conduct, but that not necessarily has been 
accepted by the producers.  
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Bennett 2005:112). It entails generalising from unique cases “by treating them as members of 
a class or type of phenomenon” (George and Bennett 2005:112-113). Crucial for this task is 
defining the domain or universe the case belongs to (ibid.119). It is obvious that this study has 
no way of generalising the findings to for example other consumers´ external energy security 
policy, such as the US or China. The study of the energy relations of the EU is as mentioned 
ultimately a case of the EUs external energy security policy. Moreover, the findings can say 
something about the preferred strategy of the EU towards different producers when enhancing 
its supply security. The analysis will also provide indications as to how the EU as an 
international energy actor can be characterised.  
In order to secure the reliability of the study, I am confident that by making use of the 
method of structured focused comparison, as well as paying due attention to references all the 
way, I am securing transparency and a level of standardisation that is quite good for a 
qualitative analysis. Moreover, I have included relevant data in the appendix and mentioned 
the different standards of measurement underway; this enhances the possibility of 
replicability.  
The data utilised in this analysis are documentary; that is official documents such as 
progress reports, policy papers, agreements, speeches, press releases and statements retrieved 
mainly from the EUs own database and resources. The analysis will also be based on 
statistical material most notably as indicators on several of the instruments referred to in the 
theory chapter, as well as general analyses of the relationships made by scholars and news 
sources. By utilising secondary sources for the empirical analysis it provides me with the 
opportunity to shed light on existing material in a new way, and combine material for the 
purpose of the study.  
In case studies, documents are often used as support or verification of other sources, 
such as interviews. In this thesis, the analysis is based solely on the documents referred to 
above. On the one hand, by using multiple documentary sources, I can secure triangulation of 
data, and cross- check information from different written sources. On the other hand, I will 
not achieve a high level of methodological triangulation, because I have not conducted 
interviews. An important point to mention is that since the analysis is based solely on 
documentary sources, the collection of data has been restrained to the documentary material 
that has been made official and available for the public. Therefore, there might have been 
actions or behaviour that this analysis has not been able to discover, and which might have 
been discovered through interviews with EU officials. Additionally, since the empirical 
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analysis is very encompassing I cannot rule out that I will not be able to get a hold of all the 
relevant information. However, since the analysis consists of mapping out the EUs action 
pattern comparing its relations with five different producers, the collection of data through 
interviews was deemed too complicated with regards to the amount of people needed to be 
spoken to. It proved too difficult to get a hold of experts pertaining to all the five areas of 
policy within the EU, especially when, at the time of writing, the EU is launching the new 
External Action Service (EEAS), with all the institutional coordination and rearrangements 
this entails. For the sake of data validity, interviews could have strengthened the analysis, but 
since the focus is on observed actions and not the decision- making process, the use of 
document analysis of the mentioned sources is merited.  
1.1.5 That which is to be explained: The EU´s external energy 
security policy 
With the research design established the dependent variable must be discussed in order to give 
the reader a well informed context, but also for the sake of analytical rigour in the 
comparative chapter. Firstly, a useful definition of European foreign policy activity suggests 
that it “refers to the universe of concrete civilian actions, policies, positions, relations, 
commitments, and choices of the EC (and EU) in international politics” (Ginsberg cited in 
White 2004:15).  
Secondly, a study of energy policy through a FPA lens forges the question; who is the 
EU as an international/ foreign policy actor? The debate concerning this aspect is essential in 
the studies of EU foreign policy, and the description of the EU ranges from civilian power, to 
quiet superpower and post- modern state (Whitman, Moravcsik and Cooper cited in Orbie 
2008:2). Moreover, is the EU an international organisation with supranational characteristics 
or is it an international regime? This discussion is too encompassing for the present analysis; 
what is certain is that even though it is not a conventional state it can act as one in limited 
ways and it has the capacity to finance its own policy decisions. The amount of resources at 
its disposal separates it from other regional organisations (Smith 2005:157). The common 
description of the EU as a civilian power implies that it is not associated with policies of 
“hard power” i.e. military and security policies. Moreover, it appears like the EU is a different 
entity with respect to different issues and as will be elaborated below, in the energy realm the 
EU is “working with but alongside its member states” (White 2001:21-23).  It is important to 
clarify, having these considerations in mind, how the EU as an international actor will be 
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treated in the analysis. The EU will be treated both as the institutions at Community level and 
as a sum of its member states, the latter most prominently in the collection of data for several 
of the indicators of the analytical framework. Moreover, some of the empirical chapters will 
give examples of member state policies towards the producer, when these have been 
prominent and well- known. The analysis will not be able to cover all of the member states 
policies in all the relations; as such the focus will be on what the EU as a supranational body 
has done. The distinctions between these three “interpretations” of the EU as an international 
energy actor will be duly noted and clarified where appropriate. An overview of the relevant 
actors and decision- making procedures of energy policy is included in the appendix.  
Thirdly, in FPA literature the sources of foreign policy is an important and recurrent 
theme, and since this thesis seeks to explore what the Union actually does in international 
relations, it can be useful to discuss sources of influence for developing an external energy 
security policy, and for the implementation of such a policy.  
Basically, one can separate between the external influences and the internal or 
domestic sources and constraints of foreign policy
6
 (Hill 2003). Important external influences 
for the external energy security policy of the EU are the globalisation trend implying more 
economic liberalisation, increased cross- border trade and capital flows, affecting the 
international gas market to some extent. At the same time there are tendencies pointing 
towards renationalisation of energy sources which can be observed in important energy 
producers such as Russia, where the aim is to bring back stronger national control over energy 
resources (Claes 2010:12-13, Belyi 2008:209). Additionally several supply crises has put the 
reliability of the producers to the forefront. The interdependent nature of the relationship 
between a gas consumer and producer also has implications for the external energy security 
policy of the EU. Some have argued that this interdependency is asymmetrical; given the 
relative importance of the commodity for the consumer, the EU is more dependent on gas 
than the producer is on the European market (Claes and Harsem 2010:5). In this analysis it is 
assumed that certain characteristics of the producers also are external factors influencing the 
EU´s external energy security policy.  
An important internal source of the development of an external energy security policy 
is as mentioned the EU´s current situation of import dependence in view of natural gas. As 
such it does not enjoy any control over considerable energy resources, and it has to look for 
                                                 
6
 These often include national pressure groups or general domestic policy. Illustrative examples are Allison´s 
(1969) study of the Cuban missile crisis and Putnam´s (1988) logic of the two- level game.  External influences 
can be shocks or incidents, as well as general trends in international relations.  
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them externally. This situation is illustrated with the following figures; the consumption of 
gas is high and the import dependency is on the rise:  
 
Figure 2 Gross energy consumption EU-27 in 2007  
Source: EU energy statistical pocketbook 2010
 
Figure 3 Energy dependency rate, EU-27, %
7
  
Source: Eurostat (2010) 
With the exceptions of the Netherlands and Denmark, which are net exporters of natural gas, 
and Romania and UK which have an import dependence around 20- 30 %, all of the other 
                                                 
7
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member states are depending on import for between 80- 100 % of their total natural gas 
consumption in 2007 (EU energy statistical pocketbook 2010). Regarding the gas imports by 
sources of origin, it is very clear that Russia, Norway and Algeria are currently the most 
important suppliers of natural gas to the EU:  
  
Figure 4 EU-27 Gas imports from 1990 to 2006 
Source: Claes and Harsem 2010:11. 
Other essential internal driving forces for this development have been the evolution of the 
internal market for energy through numerous gas and electricity directives (Matláry 1997:12-
13, Claes 2009:43), as well as Green Papers and energy policy strategies at Community level 
(European Commission 2006b, 2007a, 2008a). Additionally the EU has put energy into the 
larger picture of security; the European Security Strategy from 2003 identifies energy 
dependence as a global challenge with implications for EU security;  
“Energy dependence is a special concern for Europe. Europe is the world‟s largest importer of 
oil and gas. Imports account for about 50% of energy consumption today. This will rise to 
70% in 2030. Most energy imports come from the Gulf, Russia and North Africa” (European 
Council 2003:3).  
 
The strategy paper does not mention energy security more explicitly, but the inclusion of 
energy in such an important paper considering strategic objectives and security threats for 
Europe, illustrates that energy has been held up high on the security agenda since the 
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beginning of the decade. The treaty of Lisbon, which entered into force in December 2009 
states that Union policy shall aim, in spirit of solidarity between member states to: 
“(a) ensure the functioning of the energy market; (b) ensure security of energy supply in the 
Union; (c) promote energy efficiency and energy saving and the development of new and 
renewable forms of energy; and (d) promote the interconnection of energy networks”. “The 
European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative 
procedure, shall establish the measures necessary to achieve these objectives” (EU 
2011:Article 194). 
However, the treaty also explicitly states that ”such measures shall not affect a Member 
State's right to determine the conditions for exploiting its energy resources, its choice between 
different energy sources and the general structure of its energy supply” (ibid.). This points to 
an essential internal constraint; the lack of competence in the energy policy realm the EU 
enjoys vis -á- vis the member states. Even though energy was the main cause of integration in 
the first place
8
, it is a policy area that has not been subjected to the same supranational 
arrangements as other areas such as trade or monetary policies (Belyi 2008:203). As a 
consequence, national foreign energy policies co- exist with EU foreign energy policy, and 
more specifically external energy security policy: the role of national governments have 
remained strong, for the simple reason that energy security is tightly knit to the national 
security of a country (Matláry 1997:8-9). As such, the member states still reserve the right to 
act unilaterally in foreign energy policy (Smith 2005:155).   
At the same time the member states vary considerably in energy structure and degree 
of dependence on gas, this has implications for the level of coherence in the EU´s external 
energy security policy as well as the type of instruments that are pursued at the EU level.   
Another central concept in FPA is the capabilities of an actor which are essential for 
the implementation of foreign policy; hence the ability to make use of foreign policy 
instruments. In this regard, it is vital to recall the reflections concerning the EU as an 
international actor; it is not a state and consequently it does not enjoy the military power 
similar to that of a state. The capabilities are “reflecting and to some extent defining its 
limited actor status” (White 2001:43). Keukeleire (2003:46-47) views what he calls „structural 
diplomacy‟ as essential for a description of the EU as an international actor, and this has 
consequences for the instruments it deploys. This term entails the notion of a foreign policy 
actor capable of shaping and determining the structures, rules and institutions within which 
the other states operate; influencing the other states to the extent that they internalise the 
                                                 
8
 “The first two European Communities covered coal and nuclear energy policies” (Belyi 2008:203). 
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norms and values of the EU. As such, the EU distinguishes itself in non- military policies 
such as development, environmental and trade policies, and prefers political dialogue and 
market access (Orbie 2008:12-13). The economic, financial and diplomatic instruments are 
strong features of the capacity to employ the EU´s external energy security policy. Yet, at the 
same time, the ESDP
9
 has evolved quite rapidly in the last decade, which focus on 
humanitarian and rescue missions, peacekeeping and crisis management (Smith 2005:169). 
Therefore, the EU is not completely without military capabilities. These instruments are 
reflected in the strategies presented in the next chapter. 
Together, these external influences, internal sources and constraints on an external 
energy security policy give rise to different motives and objectives for acting towards external 
energy producers;  
“Given these global developments, the EU needs to take action to secure its energy future and 
to protect its essential energy interests. The EU needs to intensify its efforts in developing an 
effective external energy policy; speaking with one voice, identifying infrastructure of major 
importance to its energy security and then ensuring its construction, and acting coherently to 
deepen its partnerships with key energy suppliers, transit countries and consumers” 
(European Commission 2008a:3). 
 
Furthermore, they provide the basis for some expectations as to how the EU is going to act 
towards energy producers. A seminal study on energy supply security and geopolitics 
conducted by the Clingendael International Energy Program (CIEP 2004) put forward that the 
EU and its supply security situation face two different scenarios or storylines based on the 
current situation, which will continue to evolve with the future development of the 
international political and economic system. These are the Market and Institutions and 
Regions and Empires storylines. The former is characterised by continued globalisation of 
markets and cooperation in international institutions, and hence an evolution of the 
multilateral governance system in international relations. The latter is characterised by a 
world that is broken up into different political and economic blocks “with satellite regions that 
compete for markets and resources with other blocks” (CIEP cited in Claes 2009:42). The 
implications of these storylines and the discussion of the EU´s competences and capabilities 
are that it can be expected that the EU will pursue the strategies that include the instruments at 
its disposal; most notably the market and institutionalisation strategies, with the most 
intensity, and that its external energy security policy is thus well situated within the Markets 
and Institutions storyline.   
                                                 
9
 European Security and Defence Policy (pre- Lisbon treaty), now the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
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1.2 Structure of the thesis 
The next chapter provides an outline of the theoretical grounding that informs the analytical 
tools guiding the analyses. This is followed by an empirical analysis of the EU´s energy 
relations focusing on the deployment of the different strategies; institutionalisation, market 
and political. Subsequently, a comparative analysis is conducted in order to provide a fruitful 
discussion and understanding of the EU´s external energy security policy. More specifically it 
will seek to identify how the EU approaches the producers, whether or not there is any 
variation and possible explanations of this. Finally, concluding remarks are given concerning 
the analyses´ findings and the implications of these for an explanation of the EU´s external 
energy security policy, in addition to methodological considerations around how the study has 
been conducted.   
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2 Theoretical grounding 
This chapter will outline the theoretical framework utilised to frame and guide the analysis, 
derived from the concept of energy security, foreign policy analysis and the theoretical 
approaches available for studying energy security strategies. First, the concept of energy 
security is operationalised followed by a short review of the ongoing theoretical debate in the 
IR literature concerning which strategies or instruments that can enhance a consumer´s energy 
security in the best possible way. This debate will provide the background from which I 
derive three different strategies to energy security, namely the institutionalisation, market and 
political strategy. These are made up of the various instruments a gas consumer has at its 
disposal when managing its external energy security policy. After I have presented this 
framework, I will detail the chosen characteristics of the producers and the reasoning that 
justifies the inclusion of these. Empirical expectations concerning the EU´s strategy in its 
external energy relations are also included; these are used as a basis for comparing the EU´s 
strategy towards important producers of natural gas. 
2.1 Energy security 
The basic definitions of energy security underline the importance of diversification, managing 
geopolitical relations, and price/trade- policy for security of supply; they represent a common 
understanding of the external dimension of energy security.  Since this thesis focuses on this 
external dimension, I have not included strategies concerning for example energy efficiency 
and internal emergency stocks, which is often cited in relation to energy security. Jonathan 
Elkind (2010) provides a useful basis for my operationalisation of the concept. He divides 
energy security into availability, reliability and affordability.  
Availability entails both physical availability of the gas resources, i.e. the physical 
security, and the ability to agree on the terms of trade, capital investment in exploring and 
transport, and of course technology (2010:122). All this implies securing the capability of 
employing or making use of gas resources.  
Reliability involves protecting the gas resources from interruption, securing the 
confidence between the exporter and importer, and enhancing political stability through for 
example legal and politically feasible frameworks. Transparent information becomes an 
important tool, and Elkind (2010:124) also underlines the importance of diversification for the 
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reliability of energy. Reliable energy supplies therefore include both reliability of exporters, 
as well as reliability of energy, through diversification and risk management.  
The last component is affordability which sheds light on the importance of the price of 
the gas resources for energy security. Elkind (2010:122-126) emphasises low price volatility, 
transparent pricing and realistic expectations for future price; “getting prices right”. This 
implies getting energy prices that convey the full cost of energy consumption, in order to 
stimulate appropriate consumer responses. This economic element of energy security is 
getting more important as the energy market becomes more globalised, and energy 
interdependence requires collaboration between consumers and producers (Yergin 2006:78).  
2.2 Theorising energy security 
In order to situate energy security in a wider theoretical debate, other studies considering 
energy security strategies (Holden 2008, Kelly and Leland 2007) have paid significant 
attention to the traditional “grand theories” in international relations; realism, economic and 
institutional liberalism. I do not see the relevance in outlining the historical development of 
the theories themselves for the purpose of this analysis, but in the following I will present 
different implications of this debate for policy instruments available for ensuring the EU´s 
energy security. It is worth noting that these theories are not concerned with energy security 
first and foremost, but their general arguments lend themselves well to a discussion of 
different policy tools for energy security, for example of the role of the market, the type of 
suitable institutional arrangements and so on. In sum, these instruments can be used in order 
to enhance the EU´s availability, reliability and affordability of gas supply.  
2.2.1 Realism  
Basic realist assumptions are a pessimistic view of human nature, that international relations 
are necessarily conflictive given the anarchical nature of the international system, that 
national security and state survival should be duly valued and a basic scepticism towards the 
notion of progress in international politics (Jackson and Sørensen 2007:60). These 
assumptions can to a large degree be observed in the realists´ understanding of energy 
security and the instruments appropriate for the purpose of securing supplies. Enhancing ones 
energy security is perceived as a struggle to control the sources of a strategic energy resource 
and in this, political means becomes important (Constantin 2005:3-5). Power is the guarantor 
of energy security (Kelly and Leland 2007:27), and therefore, the physical control of energy 
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resources is vital. Realists also share a concern for relative gains, which can be relevant for 
the EUs energy security in the sense that “a rival´s increase in supply will necessarily lead to 
a decrease in one´s own supply”. (Kelly and Leland 2007:30). For example, provided that the 
EU competes with other actors for access to a certain transportation route or production site, a 
realist would argue that the EU looses out to its competitors should the competitors succeed in 
securing the supplies for themselves. This is in contrast to the absolute gains emphasised by 
liberals, which can be placed under both the institutionalisation and market strategies, and 
thus elaborated below. Realists are sceptical towards the market; the risk of market failure can 
have significant consequences for energy security, because it can lead to short term 
interruptions of supply. Moreover, because energy security is a strategic commodity it cannot 
be secured through the market mechanism alone. The realists downplay the price aspect of 
energy security and they do not believe that the energy market is a free market. As such they 
are more concerned with securing physical availability and actual supply and do not trust the 
market to provide for this (Holden 2008:12,34).  
2.2.2 Institutional liberalism 
Generally, liberalism has a more positive view of human nature and the nature of international 
relations. Liberalists also believe firmly in progress and cooperation based on mutual 
interests. Liberalism has evolved into different strands of thought, and here two of them are 
included (Jackson and Sørensen 2007:98-100). Institutional liberalists accept many of the 
realist‟s basic assumptions about the international system; the international system consists of 
sovereign states and a central enforcement mechanism does not exist (Keohane 1989:10). Yet, 
the perspective seeks to explain why states cooperate despite of this anarchical structure, and 
in this view, international institutions, be they organisations or regimes, can foster 
cooperation between states (Mingst 2004:63). This is done through creating a flow of 
information and a forum for negotiation. In this way they alleviate the lack of trust between 
states that is a traditional problem associated with the international anarchy (Jackson and 
Sørensen 2007:108-110). Thus, strategies that seek to institutionalise multilateral cooperation 
become relevant for increasing the reliability aspect of energy security. At the same time 
institutions provide a framework for interaction, because they suppose future interaction 
(Mingst 2004:64). Institutional as well as economic liberalists pay attention to absolute 
(economic) gains and political stability. They do not believe that the competition of securing 
supplies is a zero- sum game. Instead they see the increased potential of existing gas 
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resources, as well as the discovery and improvement of technology as a possibility for 
absolute gains. In order to increase the capacity of producers they highlight institutionalised 
cooperation (Kelly and Leland 2007:30). Basically the institutional liberalists emphasise that 
states which share the same sets of preferences can obtain energy security through 
institutionalised cooperation, be they conventions, international regimes or organisations 
(Holden 2008:36). The instruments for supply security thus entail creating a political and 
institutional framework to facilitate cooperation, most notably with producer and transit 
countries. Considering the type of institutionalisation, institutional liberalists will underline 
the importance of multilateral frameworks. The more states that are part of the 
institutionalised cooperation, the more likely are the prospects of success because the 
complex network of trade and interaction will create incentives to cooperate and remain in the 
regime. It can also foster issue- linkage which would reduce uncertainty (Kelly and Leland 
2007:29). Realists are more prone to favour bilateral cooperation or relations, because it gives 
the importer a greater degree of certainty and some minimum of control (ibid.).  
2.2.3 Economic liberalism 
Economic liberalism´s view on energy security includes an emphasis on the market- 
mechanism, i.e. that energy security best can be enhanced or protected by the market. It thus 
underscores the commercial aspect of energy security. Moreover, in order for an energy 
consumer to take advantage of the possibilities of the market, market creation is essential, that 
is the establishment of trade and other economic relations with the producers. As referred to 
in the introductory chapter, the international trade of natural gas is dependent upon pipelines 
in the majority of cases. Creation of infrastructure thus becomes an important instrument for 
market creation purposes. Additionally, liberalisation, which includes reducing barriers to 
trade and investment, is a preferred instrument for this purpose; free trade encourages energy 
security (Constantin 2005:3-5). The competition in the market will also ensure correct and as 
low prices as possible, thus securing the welfare of the consumers (Mingst 2004:238). This 
aspect is therefore connected to the affordability of energy security. Gas is perceived more as 
any market commodity rather than a strategic resource (Kelly and Leland 2007:13). The EU´s 
economic policy instruments will be important for these purposes. Liberalisation for the EU 
implies improvement and enablement of “investment and trading conditions to upstream and 
downstream markets, as well as possible access to pipelines” (European Commission 
2007a:24). Generally liberalisation entails decreasing trade and investment barriers, and 
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promoting the efficient functioning of international energy markets through “policies that 
promote competition, free trade and investment in the energy sector” (Bielecki 2002:246). For 
this purpose, one possibility is to make use of international trade and investment agreements 
and establish legally binding instruments. Moreover, creation of a regional energy market can 
be achieved through for example giving the energy producing states a stake in the European 
economy, and encourage integration and downstream investment facilities that give supplier 
incentives (Noreng 2009:227). In other words, one possibility can be to “increase the reach of 
the liberal free trade area, to include energy exporting countries” (Claes 2010:20). 
2.2.4 Energy security strategies 
Based on this theoretical debate on energy security, as well as inspiration from Aalto and 
Westphal`s (2008:5) approaches to energy policy, Andrews- Speed et al´s (2002:16-17) 
strategic implications of energy dependence and Holden´s (2008:37) typology of energy 
security measures, I have developed a typology of energy security strategies. Basically, the 
strategies include the different instruments a gas consumer can make use of towards a gas 
producer when he wants to enhance his energy security, and they can be related to the 
different arguments presented in the theoretical debate above. The energy security strategies 
are named institutionalisation, market and political. The first one is characterised by different 
forms of institutionalisation; following from the arguments of institutional liberalists this can 
best enhance the EU´s energy security. The market strategy encompasses several of the 
measures forwarded by the economic liberalists such as free trade, basically aiming at market 
creation. Finally, the realists´ assumptions concerning the international system lead them to 
place emphasis on political measures reflecting traditional foreign policy for the sake of 
enhancing energy security; these are included in the political strategy. It is important to note 
that the strategies are not mutually exclusive, since the EU not necessarily makes use of one 
or the other. The analysis will focus on how the policies of the EU fit into the spectrum of 
strategies (Constantin cited in Holden 2008:20). Therefore the EU will probably make use of 
all of the strategies, albeit some more than the others, and an important factor for detecting 
eventual variation in the external energy security policy of the EU becomes the level of 
intensity with which the EU pursues the different instruments; to what extent does the EU use 
more or less of a particular strategy towards one producer, compared to other producers or 
other strategies? The more instruments that can be attached to a strategy, the more this 
strategy can be said to dominate in the relations. These considerations are thus connected to 
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the first part of the research question: whether or not there is any variation in the external 
energy security policy of the EU at all. The following expectations can be stated for this 
purpose:  
 
The EU utilises the different strategies towards all the producers with the same level of 
intensity, or conversely, the EU utilises the different strategies towards the producers with 
varying levels of intensity. 
 
The first expectation implies that the EU puts the same weight or importance on a strategy 
regardless of which producer it approaches i.e. no variation in terms of intensity, whereas the 
latter implies that the EU do make use of a strategy more towards some producers than others 
i.e. variation in terms of intensity. For example, the latter expectation would be confirmed if 
the EU uses a political strategy more towards one producer compared to the others. The 
following table presents the three strategies schematically. Some of the instruments deserve 
special mention; the market instruments all have in common that they are commercial 
measures which seek to facilitate trade in natural gas between the EU and a producer. As 
such, they are vital for the actual delivery of natural gas to the EU. However, the creation of 
infrastructure need not be a strictly commercial activity that only engages European 
companies. Political and financial support for projects are considered as a political 
intervention from the EU in order to enhance availability of energy, and is thus included 
among the political strategic instruments which are divided between those that are relatively 
cooperative in nature and those that are more conflictive. Among the cooperative are 
instruments that seek to enhance political links with the producer, and the US- Saudi Arabia 
model is a good example of how weapon export can be used to secure supply; the US 
provides Saudi Arabia with arms, in exchange for oil (Kelly and Leland 2007:29). 
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Table 2.1 Typology of energy security strategies 
Institutionalisation strategy Market strategy Political strategy 
- Dialogue10 
 Bilateral 
 Regional 
- Formal bilateral agreement 
- Formal Intergovernmental/ 
Multilateral agreement 
- Supranational agreement  
 
 
 Infrastructure 
- Commercial11  
 
 Investment 
- FDI12 
- Financing instruments13 
 
 Removing barriers to trade 
- FTA 
- Regulatory 
harmonisation  
- Promotion of 
inclusion in the 
WTO
14
 
 Cooperative 
instruments 
- Political and 
financial support of 
infrastructure
15
 
- Development aid16 
- Weapon export17 
- Military assistance18 
 
 Conflictive 
instruments 
- Occupation or 
intervention 
- Sanctions19  
-  Protection of 
critical 
infrastructure 
                                                 
10
 Regular diplomacy such as negotiations, forums and summits 
11
 Commercial activity; responsible for these are consortia of energy companies, both EU member states´ 
companies and other energy companies. An overview of pipelines is included in the annex. 
12
 The data are based on UNCTAD (2011) FDI country profiles, and European Commission (2011a).  
13
 Financing instruments of the EU such as TACIS and ENPI (elaborated in the empirical analysis). 
14
 This information is based on the EU´s own presentation of its bilateral trade relations where it says 
straightforward that it supports accession negotiations. See for example European Commission (2011b) and 
similar pages for the other countries referred to here.   
15
 This is based on the status of the pipeline in relation to the TEN- E guidelines. The TEN- E guidelines are 
based on the Trans- European Energy Networks programme which aims at providing additional routes and 
access to more sources of gas to increase diversification. It was established by the Commission in 1994 and it 
states priority projects for these purposes that can either be pipelines, LNG import terminals or storage. The list 
of projects has been extended and the projects are provided with financing, complementary to member state 
financing. The financing is given mainly for feasibility studies, and the inclusion of a project is also regarded as 
an act confirming the political support for the project from the EU (IEA 2008:81-82). It is thus political 
intervention, in contrast to the strictly commercial activity of companies creating pipelines for market creation 
purposes.  
16
 These amounts are Official Development Assistance towards all of the countries except Israel, Kuwait, Qatar, 
UAE and Russia, which may receive Official Assistance in that they are More Advanced Developing countries. 
The amounts are targeted mainly towards social infrastructures, economic infrastructures and services, 
production, multi- sector cross cutting, budget support food aid/ security, action relating to debt, humanitarian 
aid and other/unallocated (European Commission 2010c).  
17
 The data are based on the SIPRI Arms transfers database (SIPRI 2011), and was generated 20.04.2011. All of 
the EU member states were chosen as suppliers, whereas all the producers were set to be recipients. The data 
entails transfers of major conventional weapons in the period from 1995 to 2010, and includes both orders and 
licenses given from the EU member states to the producers included in this thesis. The largest weapon exporters 
of the EU in this period were the UK, France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands. Copy in author´s files.  
18
 EU missions, Peace Building Partnerships and Instrument for stability crisis response programmes (EEAS 
2011a).  
19
 Restrictive measures (sanctions) currently in force (EEAS 2011b) 
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2.2.5 What can explain the eventual variation in the EU´s external 
energy security policy? 
In the FPA literature, the concept of motivation is essential in the study of foreign policy 
actions. For instance, Snyder et al (2002:116-117) discuss motivation around the following 
questions; why does action take the particular form that it does in a particular situation? Why 
do patterns of action evolve from decision- making? Although this thesis is not a study of the 
motivations of the EU per se, or the decision- making process as noted, the chapters so far 
have provided me with a possible “motivational chain” for the EU concerning its external 
energy security policy. I argue that this motivational chain ultimately provides me with the 
necessary link between the strategies and the level of intensity referred to above with certain 
characteristics of the producers. In the end this is the analytical framework for explaining the 
eventual variation.  
Firstly, I have established that the EU has motives for undertaking actions relating to 
its energy security; the high dependence on import and the different producers it has to relate 
to, give the EU a reason to develop and manage its external energy relations.  
Secondly, the debate between different theories of IR gives the EU motives to make 
use of various instruments as the theoretical arguments focus on the effects of them; some 
will be more successful than others given the nature of the international system, the role of the 
market, the nature of human beings and the extent to which states will engage in cooperation 
or not, as well as the view of energy security as a market commodity or as a strategic 
resource. As such, the strategies which were deduced from these theoretical arguments 
presented in the table above provide the toolbox for the how in the research question, and 
moreover, the toolbox for a gas consumer. 
Thirdly, when relating to different producers the various characteristics give the EU a 
reason or motive for pursuing one or the other instrument, keeping in mind the theoretical 
arguments of realism, institutional and economic liberalism. Why is this? The theories 
presented do not in themselves say anything about the relevance of the counterpart for the 
choice of strategy or the level of intensity for that matter. Yet, insights from the FPA literature 
can be employed to make this link clearer. It is demonstrated here that in order to say 
something about foreign policy behaviour one has to be attentive to the context, here intended 
as other actors and the set of relations they entertain. The argument is advanced by scholars 
advocating the so- called strategic- relational approach (cf. Brighi and Hill 2008, Hay 1995, 
2002).  They emphasise that “foreign policy behaviour is produced via a dialectic between the 
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actor´s own strategy on the one hand, and context on the other” (Brighi and Hill 2008:119). 
The actors are understood to be oriented towards the attainment of stated goals, while also, in 
the course of action, take into account the strategies of other players. The foreign policy 
behaviour of an actor has to be analysed in relation to its surrounding environment, thus the 
relational element of the approach becomes apparent (ibid.). The context referred to in these 
arguments is included by taking account of certain characteristics of the producers.  
Further arguments can be derived from the Clingendael study referred to in the 
introductory chapter. The implications of this for the EU are that provided that the producers 
it relates to place themselves somewhere along the dimensions of the Regions and Empires 
and Market and Institutions storylines, the EU will have to approach them differently. As 
Claes (2009:42) puts it; “the EU would have to be able to conduct a very different external 
energy policy dealing with Norway on the one hand and Libya on the other”. Given that this 
study was conducted in the beginning of the decade it provides good arguments for including 
the characteristics of the producers in the present analysis. An outline of the characteristics 
deemed relevant and how these will be determined is included in the following. The 
subsequent presentation of empirical expectations will provide the arguments for including 
these characteristics.  
2.2.6 Characteristics of the producers 
The first characteristic
20
 chosen for this analysis is the type of the political regime in question. 
This is determined by the scores of the Freedom House index, which rates countries according 
to the level of freedom of political rights and civil liberties. According to Freedom House 
(2011);  
“Political rights enable people to participate freely in the political process, including the right 
to vote freely for distinct alternatives in legitimate elections, compete for public office, join 
political parties and organisations, and elect representatives who have a decisive impact on 
public policies and are accountable to the electorate. Civil liberties allow for the freedoms of 
expression and belief, associational and organisational rights, rule of law, and personal 
autonomy without interference from the state”.  
 
These rights are estimated according to how the rights are experienced by individuals, and not 
the legal existence of the right per se; the estimates are thus based on the actual 
implementation of the rights. The index consists of a scale that runs from 1 to 7 for political 
                                                 
20
 The data concerning the indicators chosen for these characteristics are included in the annex if they have been 
retrieved from different sources or have been summarised and interpreted by me. This is the case for pipeline 
connection and conflict level. Remaining data can be retrieved from the various sources referred to in the text 
and bibliography or can be provided upon request.  
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rights and a similar rating for civil liberties; a rating of 1 indicates the highest degree of 
freedom and 7 the lowest level of freedom. The degrees of freedom that are given based on an 
evaluation of these rights show that the freer, the more democratic, and a status of partly free 
is comparatively more freer than not free (Freedom House 2011). Furthermore, I have 
included the Corruptions Index by Transparency International (2011). The index measures the 
perceived levels of public sector corruption running from 0- 10, with 0 being highly corrupt 
and 10 very clean. I find this relevant because securing energy has a clear economic element, 
and the trade in natural gas thus involves economic policy and transactions that might be 
affected by the level of corruption. Most of the world´s gas companies are partly or fully 
owned by the state; this makes the level of corruption in the public sector a relevant aspect or 
characteristic of the producer that the EU has take into consideration when employing and 
developing its strategies.   
The second characteristic, resource richness, is determined by estimates of proven 
reserves (Trillion Cubic feet (tcf), 2009) and reserves to production (R/P) ratios (BP 2010 and 
EIA 2011). These numbers are included to illustrate the supplier potential of the different 
countries and regions, and will be divided into high, medium and low. By looking at the 
reserves to production ratios it will provide some information as to what extent the proved 
reserves can be extracted.   
Third, the level of interdependence between the parties is decided based on the EU´s 
share of total import to the country or region, as well as the pipeline connection denoting 
structural dependence and strategic importance in terms of supply capacity (European 
Commission 2011a). The import numbers illustrate if the EU is an important trade partner for 
the country or region in question, while the pipeline connections are mapped out, the criterion 
being physical connection to the EU. Furthermore, these numbers are seen in relation with the 
numbers on gas imports into the EU by origin (EU energy statistical yearbook 2010). 
Approximately a 50 – 50 division, along with physical integration via several pipelines 
signifies a high degree of interdependence. Conversely, if one party is more dependent on the 
other, or if there is hardly any trade between the parties at all, the degree of interdependence is 
low. The level of interdependence considered is thus economic interdependence. It is worth 
noting that in contrast to the other characteristics, the degree of interdependence is a 
characteristic more of the relation and not the producer per se. Yet, the indicators used for this 
purpose are highly relevant for the producer and the energy relation; therefore, this feature is 
included among the characteristics.  
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Finally, the general conflict level is determined based on information from the 
Correlates of War project´s datasets (2011)
21
, and is divided into high, medium and low. 
These datasets cover interstate and intrastate wars in the period 1816- 2007 (v.4.0), and the 
observations in these tables are retrieved from the dataset by checking and counting which 
countries that have participated in the respective types of war from 1945 until today.  
The scores on all of these characteristics are presented under each chapter analysing 
the relationships between the EU and the producers. It must be underscored that I am well 
aware of the fact that other factors such as internal differences and considerations as well as 
other characteristics than the ones I include in this analysis might influence and do influence 
the choice of strategy. I will come back to these considerations in the comparative chapter and 
conclusion. 
2.2.7 Empirical expectations  
These specific empirical expectations are based on an argument derived from the 
abovementioned motivational chain: Provided that the producers display certain 
characteristics, certain strategies will dominate. An important note is that these expectations 
underline the fact that no strategies are expected to be nonexistent in relation to certain 
characteristics, rather, the level of intensity is expected to vary. As such, certain scores on the 
characteristics will give the EU a reason to pursue a strategy with less intensity than the 
opposite scores and vice versa.  
There are no specific theoretical arguments in the debate referred to above that imply 
that a consumer should act differently according to the regime type of the producer. However, 
the instruments of the political cooperative strategy can be utilised in order to create more 
stable and secure regimes, for example through development aid and military assistance. 
According to realists this can ultimately enhance energy security, and as such it can be 
expected that the EU will pursue them with high intensity if the regime is not free. 
Furthermore, these policies might help to promote other policies such as governance reform, 
                                                 
21
 The exact numbers are included in the annex. The criterion for an observation is that the country figures as a 
participant in a war, or is the place where the war is fought. For an exact rendition of all the names of the wars, 
duration and casualties please consult the datasets of the COW. Moreover, these numbers are not necessarily a 
good reflection of the current conflict level. Nevertheless, this indicator take into consideration both conflict 
history and fairly recent conflict level, and points to a relevant characteristic for energy security.  
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in order to improve the conditions in the regime which might be beneficial for the EU´s 
supply security in the end. These instruments become less relevant if the regime is free. 
 
1) If the producer is a free regime then the EU will pursue political cooperative 
instruments with low intensity. Conversely, if the producer is a partly free or non free 
regime the EU will pursue political cooperative instruments with high intensity. 
Seen in relation to the theoretical arguments of economic liberalists, market creation is 
relevant in order to secure that the resources the producers possess can be made available for 
the gas consumer. This is especially true when it comes to removing barriers to trade and 
commercial infrastructure. If the producer does not have any considerable level of resource 
richness, these efforts become irrelevant, at least from a commercial view, because it makes 
no commercial sense to create a pipeline if there are no resources available that can supply the 
pipeline. As such, it becomes more logical to put more effort into this kind of strategy where 
there are a lot of proven reserves, i.e. towards the producers with high resource richness. 
Conversely, the level of intensity with which a market strategy is pursued is low if the 
producer has a relatively low level of resource richness.  
2) If the producer has high and medium levels of resource richness then the EU will 
pursue the market strategy with high intensity. Conversely, if the producer is resource 
poor then the EU will pursue the market strategy with low intensity. 
Institutional liberalists view a situation of economic interdependence as a favourable situation 
that institutions can promote; the members can create more cooperation and interlinkage in an 
institutionalised web of interaction. Subsequently, it can be expected that if the degree of 
interdependence between the EU and the producer is low, it becomes important to 
institutionalise the relationship, because this can create an arena for more cooperation and 
also increase the interdependence by taking advantage of the possibility of issue- linkage in 
these institutional frameworks. Low degree of interdependence characterises those 
relationships where the EU has had little engagement, and therefore a relevant strategy 
becomes institutionalisation with a relatively high intensity in order to take advantages of the 
cooperation for energy security purposes. Thus, it can be expected that if the level of 
interdependency is low, the EU will seek to take advantage of the benefits of a more 
institutionalised relationship by creating common grounds for promoting the mutual interests 
in trade and economic collaboration between consumers and producers of natural gas. This 
30 
 
will further the relations with the producer as more cooperation can be expected. This high 
intensity of institutionalisation will not be similarly relevant if there is a high degree of 
economic interdependence.  
3) If there is a high degree of interdependence between the EU and the producer then the 
EU will pursue the institutionalisation strategy with low intensity. Conversely, if there 
is a low degree of interdependence then the EU will pursue the institutionalisation 
strategy with high intensity.  
The theoretical arguments of realists emphasise the importance of physically securing supply, 
and they view energy security as a zero- sum game. The same way competition from other 
consumers can reduce the possibilities of gaining access to supplies in this zero- sum 
scenario, so can a high general conflict level. War and political unrest are recognised sources 
of energy insecurity; they can result in supply disruptions with detrimental consequences for 
both the actual supply and the price of energy i.e. availability and affordability (Holden 
2008:38). Therefore, security policy and “hard power” are essential instruments in order to 
protect both reserves and pipelines, ensuring continued supply of gas to consumers. 
Consequently, the political conflictive instruments become relevant if there is a high level of 
conflict. These measures can also be used to induce the producers or the parties of the conflict 
to change behaviour for example through sanctions
22
, to a more favourable behaviour for 
supply security. Conversely, there is no need for these conflictive measures if the conflict 
level is low.  
4) If the producer displays a high or medium conflict level then the EU will pursue 
political conflictive instruments with high intensity. Conversely if the producer 
displays a low level of conflict then the EU will pursue political conflictive 
instruments with low intensity. 
It is worth noting that other combinations between the chosen characteristics and strategies 
can be justified according to the different theoretical arguments referred to above. For the 
sake of simplicity these are not formulated explicitly, but will be commented and discussed in 
the comparative chapter where this is relevant.  
                                                 
22
 I recognise the fact that the extent to which sanctions actually can have this effect on their targets is fiercely 
debated in political science. However, the debate is too encompassing for this thesis, and will therefore not be 
elaborated. Moreover, the focus of the thesis is not the effect of these instruments.  
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3 Empirical analysis  
3.1 EU- Mediterranean energy relations  
3.1.1 Short background of the relations 
The Mediterranean region has a pivotal role in connecting the EU to other producer regions 
such as the Caspian and the Gulf region: Turkey, Egypt and Algeria, are important transit 
countries for the Caspian, the Middle east and Nigeria respectively (Winrow 2008:162). 
Additionally, Algeria is the third largest supplier of natural gas to the EU.  
The formal relations between the EU and the Mediterranean countries
23
 started with 
the Barcelona process in the 1990s, which ended up with a declaration in 1995, also referring 
to energy by emphasising the “pivotal role of the energy sector and the importance of 
strengthening the cooperation and intensifying dialogue in the field of energy policies” 
(Barcelona Declaration 1995:6). This framework agreement between the two regions aimed at 
creating an economic area and to integrate the Mediterranean countries into European free 
trade as well as creating a zone of political stability and security (Haghighi 2007:361). In 
1996, the energy relations were deepened with the establishment of the Euro- Mediterranean 
Partnership (EMP) in the energy sector (European Commission 1996). In this, the EU`s 
security of supply was emphasised, especially with the importance of suppliers such as 
Algeria and transit countries such as Tunisia and Morocco. The launch of the European 
Neighbourhood policy in 2004 brought another dimension to the relationship. In 2008 the 
arrangements of the Barcelona Process were re- launched as the Union for the Mediterranean 
(UfM) as an attempt to revitalise the political relations and reorganise the governance of the 
framework. However, rather surprisingly, “the UfM does not mention the issue of energy 
security, nor does it deal with any aspect of fossil energies” (Escribano 2010:221). Libya is 
included as part of the analysis even though it is not part of the Euro- Mediterranean 
partnership. This is because it represents a current source of supply for the EU. In addition, 
the EU has sought to some degree to develop energy relations with the country.  
 
                                                 
23
 Morocco, Lebanon, Israel, Jordan, Malta and Cyprus (now EU members), Egypt, Algeria, Syria, Tunisia, 
Turkey, the Palestine Authority, Libya (observer status) 
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3.1.2 Characteristics of the region  
The countries of the Mediterranean region display a relatively wide range of freedom of 
political rights and civil liberties, on average 5,4 and 4,6 respectively. Israel is the only 
country deemed free, while Morocco, Lebanon and Turkey are regarded as partly free. The 
remaining countries are considered not free, and the regime type of the Mediterranean region 
lies somewhere between partly free and not free. The level of corruption is fairly high with an 
average score of 3,6. The Mediterranean region supplies first and foremost the southern 
European member states of the EU, and in 2007 Algeria and Egypt held a share of around 16 
% and 2 % of the EU natural gas import respectively. Libya held a share of around 3 % (EU 
energy statistical pocketbook 2010). Moreover, the supply figures point to the fact that “the 
Mediterranean countries differ greatly as to their external trade in energy. Some of them are 
net energy exporters (Algeria, Egypt), others are in balance (Tunisia, Syria), while the 
remainder are obliged to import energy sources (Morocco, Malta, Lebanon, Israel, Jordan, 
Palestinian Authority, Cyprus and Turkey)”24 (European Commission 2001:10).  
Considering the indicators on resource richness, they are in line with the export 
figures and show that it is only Algeria, Egypt and Libya which have the proved reserves 
currently worth mentioning in the Mediterranean region (159,1, 77,3 and 54,4 tcf 
respectively). On average the region holds around 27,7 (tcf, 2009) of proven gas reserves. The 
R/P ratios also reflect that under current production levels, the proved reserves of the 
countries will last for around 50- 100 years, indicating that they are able to supply the EU for 
a relatively long time
25
. Since the average resource richness for the region as a whole is 
relatively low compared to other producers, the Mediterranean region is classified with low 
levels of resource richness, even though Algeria holds considerable gas resources, ranking as 
number ten in the world.  
The EU holds a share of 41,3 % of the total import of the region on average, and of the 
Algerian and Egyptian import 50,6 and 31,9 % respectively.  The EU is thus an important 
trading partner of the Mediterranean region, underscoring a relatively high level of 
interdependence between the parties. Adding to this is the pipeline connection between the 
regions; currently there are four pipelines from the region to the EU, while plans have been 
announced for more. Even though Turkey currently does not hold proved reserves worth 
                                                 
24
 Malta and Cyprus are now out of this picture as full member states of the EU.  
25
 This argument has to be regarded in light of the fact that not all of the gas produced in these regions and 
countries necessarily will be exported to the EU in the future; this is also an important incentive for the EU to 
engage itself in these regions in order to secure future supply.  
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mentioning, the EU is a very important trade partner for the country, and at the same time, the 
country is crucial for transit of future supplies from the Caspian and Gulf regions, as 
demonstrated in the analysis. The future pipeline connection can thus be expected to increase 
between the EU and Turkey, and thus also the level of interdependence, even though this 
form of transit dependence add a somewhat different dimension, and is unlike the 
interdependence between supplier and consumer.  
The Mediterranean region displays a high conflict level according to the COW 
datasets, when both intrastate and interstate wars are taken into consideration.  
The image that emerges of the Mediterranean region is that it is an important supplier 
of natural gas to the EU, albeit not all of the countries. The region is also dependent on the 
European market to a fairly high degree. Yet, the conflict level is high, and the regimes are on 
a general level not free, which are factors that clearly have consequences for the appropriate 
instruments to apply.   
3.1.3 What type of instruments has the EU utilised? 
An important feature of the Euro- Med energy relations is the different channels through 
which the EU has sought institutionalisation, both at bilateral and regional level.  Similarly, 
instruments of the market strategy such as free trade promotion and regulatory harmonisation 
are also prominent. Removing barriers to trade was as noted one of the objectives behind the 
Barcelona process and the progress in this area is elaborated below. The instruments of the 
political strategy are also pursued with high intensity, most notably the cooperative ones.  
Institutionalisation strategy 
The main organs of the Euro- Med energy cooperation are a ministerial conference and a 
Forum of Energy General Directors. The European Commission acts as the Secretariat of the 
Euro- Med Energy Forum
26
. It is the main instrument for promoting dialogue between the EU 
and the Mediterranean partners on energy issues. Binding bilateral Association Agreements 
have been signed between the EU and most of the Mediterranean countries, in addition to the 
regional framework for cooperation (Winrow 2008:164). The institutional strategy towards 
the Mediterranean countries is very much influenced by the fact that they are in the close 
vicinity of the EU, and are therefore prone to the neighbourhood policies of the Union. With 
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 The Energy Forum comprises representatives of the 27 Member States of the Union and the 12 Mediterranean 
partners at the level of Director-General. (European Commission 2001, MEMO/08/755) 
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the establishment of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2004, EU included its 
Mediterranean relations. The Neighbourhood policy is not about enlargement, nor does it 
offer possibilities for future accession. It is viewed by the EU as a strategic way of enhancing 
political links and promoting social development, good governance and security in its close 
vicinity (ENPI Info centre 2011). Viewed from an energy security perspective, this stability 
can be regarded as essential for reducing the risks associated with continued supply, and it 
thus becomes an important instrument for availability and reliability of supplies. Within the 
framework of the ENP, the EU has signed Action Plans with Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, 
Morocco, Tunisia and the Palestinian Authority (Winrow 2008:164).  Several of the ENP 
Action plans have set up the prioritised measures for energy cooperation (Escribano 
2010:217), encompassing the necessary political and economic reforms, among other things 
related to trade, security and energy. In return for progress on relevant reforms the EU offers 
increased assistance and enhanced market access (ENPI Info centre 2011). The most 
important bilateral institutional relations are elaborated below. Moreover, EU delegations 
have been opened in several of the Mediterranean countries included in the partnership.
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The model of the European Energy Charter
28
 influences the institutional relations with 
the Mediterranean countries. It was signed in 1991, and became a treaty in 1994 (ECT). More 
specifically, the linking of security of supplies and a functioning energy market which the EU 
strongly promotes in the Mediterranean can be traced back to the principles of the Energy 
Charter (Escribano 2010:214). The EU has repeatedly encouraged the Mediterranean 
countries to accede to the European Energy Charter, and Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco 
gained observer status in the ECT in 2003 (Haghighi 2007:367). As will become evident in 
the chapter on Russia, the EU has generally met a lot of resistance on the part of the producers 
concerning the adherence to the ECT, and the Mediterranean region is no exception. This 
implies that even though the ECT principles influence the Mediterranean region to a large 
degree, the EU has not succeeded in bringing the institutionalisation of the principles onto a 
higher level of binding commitments.  
The Commission is also considering including the Mediterranean countries in the EU 
Energy Community, originally destined for South- East Europe, in order to secure a 
Mediterranean Energy Ring that would enhance the integration of European and 
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 Palestinian Authority, Tunisia, Morocco, Israel, Egypt, Algeria  
28
 The Charter underscores the importance of protection of foreign investment, non- discrimination in trade with 
energy materials, dispute resolution and the principle of freedom of transit, and is a prominent multilateral 
measure to enhance energy security (Wikipedia.org 15.02.2011). It will be elaborated in the EU- Russia chapter.  
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Mediterranean energy systems (Escribano 2010:220). If this is realised, the EU is furthering 
its institutional relations with market creation purposes with the Mediterranean countries.  
Concerning the institutionalisation of bilateral relationships, the EU signed a Joint 
Declaration with Morocco in 2007 on future energy cooperation, which underlined the 
importance of the country as a transit state for the delivery of natural gas and electricity to 
Europe (Winrow 2008:168). In 2008 Morocco gained advanced status with the EU. It entails 
the gradual integration of the country into a number of EU sector policies and a preparation 
for a deeper free trade agreement. Moreover, “with this advanced status, Morocco will benefit 
from more funds and will have a status slightly above that of the Neighbourhood Policy´s 
members” (Morocco Business News 2008). The same year, a Joint Declaration with Jordan 
was also signed, supporting reform in the energy sector “with a view to a progressive 
integration of the Jordanian energy market into that of the EU”.29 The EU signed a 
Memoranda of Understanding (MoU)
30
 with Egypt in 2008 that included provisions on the 
development of the Egyptian energy sector, gradual convergence of Egypt´s energy market 
with the EU, as well as development of energy networks.
31
 All of these agreements illustrate 
that the EU has incorporated provisions facilitating market creation, most notably 
harmonisation of regulations, in its institutionalisation strategy.  
The relationship with Algeria has been somewhat challenging for the EU, because it 
has been the Mediterranean country “most resistant or unwilling to incorporate several of the 
internal market governance norms promoted by the EU” (Youngs 2007:9). For example, in 
2007 Algeria resisted to drop restrictions in its supply contracts which had prevented its 
European costumers from reselling gas from the state-owned energy company Sonatrach 
within Europe. This restriction is the so- called „destination- clause‟ that limits the onward 
sales and use of gas to a contractually geographic area, giving the producer direct access to 
European gas consumers (Belyi 2008:210). The EU viewed this as an anti- competitive 
obstacle to a liquid market, and in the end, EU pressure through competition investigation led 
Sonatrach to agree on opening up its gas supply contracts, and abandon the destination clause 
(Electric Energy Online 2007, Winrow 2008:167). This is an example of EU pressure leading 
                                                 
29
 IP/07/1642 For the sake of simplicity the references referring to press releases in the Rapid database are from 
now on included with the tag number in footnotes. The web- address where these press releases can be searched 
and retrieved by number is included in the bibliography.  
30
 “A Memoranda of Understanding is a document describing a bilateral or multilateral agreement between 
parties. It expresses a convergence of will between the parties, indicating an intended common line of action. It 
is often used in cases where parties either do not imply a legal commitment or in situations where the parties 
cannot create a legally enforceable agreement. It is a more formal alternative to a gentlemen's agreement” 
(Wikipedia.org 14.02.2011).  
31
 IP/08/1854 
36 
 
to conformity with EU competition rules, and is an illustration of the efforts to harmonise 
regulations elaborated below.  Algeria also proposed to establish a partnership similar to the 
one offered to Russia. The EU´s answer to this proposal was a road map accompanying the 
already existing Association Agreement, with energy as one of the priority issues, thereby not 
giving Algeria the same status as it had given to Russia, which will be demonstrated in the 
chapter on the EU- Russia energy relations (Escribano 2010:221). The EU has expressed 
desire to conclude a MoU on energy with Algeria, and has initiated a process of negotiation 
for this (Piebalgs speech 2007a
32
). In 2011, there are no confirmations of the conclusion of 
such a MoU, and the negotiations are still ongoing.  
Turkey is currently an important country for the transit of gas to the EU from different 
producers, most notably the Mediterranean and Russia. With the development of the Nabucco 
elaborated in the chapter on the Caspian region, Turkey‟s role as a hub for energy supplies 
will become more important, as an essential part of the vital Southern Energy Corridor 
project.  The realisation of Nabucco is dependent on transit arrangements, and about half of 
the pipeline will stretch across Turkey (Euractiv 2010). Thus the bilateral relations with this 
country within the Mediterranean framework are essential. Turkey is in a different position 
than the majority of the countries considered in this thesis; it has adopted an accession 
partnership with the EU, and is negotiating the possibility of becoming an EU member. The 
strategic position of Turkey for supply of oil and gas from Russia, the Caspian and the Gulf 
region is one of the aspects in the negotiations over Turkish membership to the EU, as well as 
a factor in the overall relationship with Turkey. In the accession negotiations the energy 
chapter is currently closed due to disagreements between the Greek Cypriots and Turkey over 
gas and oil explorations in the eastern Mediterranean. This has resulted in political challenges 
because Turkey is aligned to the criteria of the chapter and ready to open it; it views the 
prevention from Cyprus´ side as purely political. Moreover, the EU has sought to include 
Turkey in the ECT as well, but it remains only as an observer. The reason presented from 
Ankara is that Turkey is not a member state and the energy chapter is blocked, so why should 
they apply EU laws in their territory? (Sayan 2010:10). This view resonates with similar 
views from the other Mediterranean countries. Moreover, the blocking of the energy chapter 
is certainly not supporting the vital role Turkey has in the Southern energy corridor, 
mentioned above.  
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See also MEMO/08/755 
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Libya and the EU has traditionally not had any diplomatic relations; this was stalled 
for years over charges from the Union that Libya supported terrorism, following from the 
Lockerbie- bombing in 1988. Currently, the importance of Libya for the EU´s energy security 
is largely connected to oil supplies. In 2003 Libya abandoned its nuclear program and later it 
accepted responsibility and paid compensation to the families of the victims of Lockerbie. 
Consequently, relations improved, and in 2008 the EU initiated negotiations over a 
framework agreement. Cooperation issues were identified as energy and migration, as well as 
an FTA agreement (Euractiv 2008). In early 2011 this agreement was not yet concluded 
(European parliament 2011), and the latest developments in the country imply that this 
process will probably be put on hold. Thus, the level of institutionalisation with Libya is low. 
The few dialogues that exist over energy cooperation have been taking place under the EMP 
where the EU has identified the integration of European and Maghreb gas markets, the 
extension of the European Community Treaty to the Southern Mediterranean and the 
inclusion of the Libyan energy markets into the broader regional framework as priorities 
(Burke et al 2008:11).   
In addition to the aforementioned bilateral institutionalisation between the EU and 
individual countries, member states have also concluded important bilateral deals with 
Algeria and Egypt (most notably France and Spain) (Burke et al. 2008:11). These tendencies 
can also be observed in relation to the other producers, and the chapter on Russia and the Gulf 
region will further elaborate on this. Moreover, given the constraints and sources of the EU´s 
energy security policy, such observations are not surprising. An important point relating to 
this is the extent to which these deals actually increase and decrease the overall energy 
security of the Union. Currently, this is an essential part of the debate within the EU in 
relation to the development of a common energy policy. Even though it is beyond the scope 
of this analysis to go into this debate, it is evident that it will have important implications for 
the EU´s ability to speak with one voice in its external energy relations.  
All in all, the EU has pursued the institutionalisation strategy with high intensity 
towards the Mediterranean region; both at regional level as well as the bilateral level.  
Market strategy 
The development of infrastructure and energy networks is among the objectives for an EU 
energy security policy towards the Mediterranean region. As noted this can have a strictly 
commercial nature, or it can be prioritised under the TEN- E guidelines and hence enjoy 
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political and financial support from the EU. The only current pipelines that have been built 
strictly as a commercial activity of European and Mediterranean energy companies, either as 
part of the consortium or as operators, are the Maghreb- Europe pipeline and the Green 
Stream. Thus, two pipelines from the Mediterranean have a political strategic nature as this 
has been defined in the analysis and will be elaborated below.  
Regarding financial instruments, the EU has allocated investments for projects in the 
region aimed at integrating the markets, as well as loans from the EIB to support energy 
infrastructure priority projects.
33
 The inclusion in the ENP, and through it, the European 
Neighbourhood Policy Instrument (ENPI) replacing the MEDA programme, has signified 
more financial assistance and more access to the EU internal market in return for political and 
economical reform (Winrow 2008:164). In 2003, the Energy Forum agreed to set up an 
energy programme outlining priority areas for cooperation, including the financing of an 
integrated gas market in the Mashreq
34
 countries (Winrow 2008:167). The Euro- Arab 
Mashreq gas centre has been established in Damascus, which is providing technical assistance 
from the European Commission, and has especially been working on the integration of the 
Mashreq gas market with an aim of eventually integrating it into the European Gas Market.
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The Commission stresses the significance of enhancing access for European companies in the 
Mediterranean markets for the production and export of energy resources (Burke et al. 
2008:15). It has also promoted cooperation between energy companies in the Mediterranean 
basin, through for example the establishment of the OME
36
 (Piebalgs speech 2007b). The 
numbers on FDI from the EU to the region between 2007 and 2009 indicate that the FDI has 
been concentrated on Egypt, Turkey, and Morocco. Moreover, Algeria and Tunisia were also 
main destinations, resonating with current export and resource richness levels, as well as 
transit importance. Yet, because of the quality of data relating to FDI it is difficult to conclude 
anything referring to level of intensity and comparing them to other producers, and they are 
therefore at best an illustrative indication of the way the EU has pursued the market strategy 
in the region.  
Another prominent measure has been regulatory harmonisation or attempts to 
converge the energy sectors of the Mediterranean countries with the EU´s internal market. 
Basically, “the idea is trying to extend EU´s energy acquis communitaire to its neighbouring 
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countries, in order to achieve a pan- European energy community” (Commission cited in 
Escribano 2010:213). The regulatory harmonisation is pursued through attempts to converge 
the energy markets of Europe and the Mediterranean region, as well as through free trade 
negotiations. As an example, the 2008- 2013 action plan for the Euro- Med energy partnership 
envisions among other things to establish a regional database to monitor gas market/energy 
sector reform. The Euro- Mediterranean Energy Platform (REMEP) was subsequently created 
to facilitate and monitor the implementation of gas market reform, and to develop energy 
scenarios, demand and supply forecasts (European Commission 2008b). These reforms are 
regarded as crucial for the eventual convergence of energy markets.   
As mentioned, the Barcelona process set out intending to negotiate a free- trade 
agreement. Yet, a formal free trade agreement has not been set up, even though this was 
foreseen for 2010. However, the EU has also financially supported the process of negotiating 
a free- trade agreement between Jordan, Egypt and Morocco, called the Agadir Agreement, 
signed in 2007, which is perceived as a significant step towards a free- trade area for the 
Euro- Mediterranean region.
37
 Hence, even though an encompassing FTA is not in place, the 
EU still pursues this instrument on a step- by- step basis. Moreover, the EU has promoted and 
participated in the negotiations over the Algerian accession to the WTO. The inclusion of the 
producers in the WTO is especially important for the EU because of the dual pricing system 
they often maintain. This implies that the price of gas is higher for the EU as an importer than 
the domestic prices within the producer country. The EU has attempted to remove this 
arrangement through the principles
38
 of the WTO, because it considers it as unfair 
competition. However, because of the unclear feature of the principles, the producers have 
often argued against their application, and consequently the WTO has become a rather limited 
instrument for this purpose (Belyi 2008:211-212). Nevertheless, it remains an important pillar 
in the trade policy of the EU.  
Political strategy 
Important political instruments are the infrastructure projects the EU has supported by giving 
them priority status under the TEN- E guidelines
39
 including the Medgaz pipeline linking 
Algeria to Spain, the Trans- Mediterranean pipeline and the planned Galsi pipeline from 
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Algeria to Italy. The idea is that these pipelines can deliver more gas to the Iberian Peninsula, 
and eventually to France and Germany (Winrow 2008:172). The EU has also expressed 
support for the exploration of a possible Trans- Saharan pipeline, where Algeria can become a 
transit state for natural gas from Nigeria. In 2007 the energy commissioner signalled that the 
EU could give financial support to the realisation of this project, and that this could enhance 
diversification of supply (Winrow 2008:172). Furthermore, the Arab Gas Pipeline represents 
an important source of supply, especially if connected to the Nabucco project. It runs from 
Egypt through Jordan and Syria, and it has later been interconnected with Turkey where it can 
be connected with Nabucco in the future. Iraq is also a possible supplier, and it thus provides 
a new transport route for gas resources from the Mashreq region to the EU. It has been an 
important issue in the development of the Mashreq gas market referred to above (Winrow 
2008:167).  
Moreover, other prominent instruments the EU has pursued towards the Mediterranean 
region are development aid and arms export. The data collected for these purposes confirm 
this argument; on average, the EU disbursed around 870 million € a year between 2004 and 
2009 to the region as a whole (European Commission 2010c). Similarly with weapon export, 
the SIPRI has tracked 48 transfers of conventional weapons (i.e. supply contracts on different 
weapons and military equipment) from EU member states to countries of the Mediterranean 
region in the period between 1995 and 2010. The EU has also made use of several 
instruments aiming at military assistance in the region, most notably through the Stability 
Instrument (Lebanon, Libya, Palestine, Syria), and Peace- building partnership (Lebanon, 
Palestine, Syria) and Mission in Palestine. These instruments are part of the crisis response 
mechanism of the EU, and the partnership also focuses on the relationship between civil 
society and EU institutions (EEAS 2011a).  Turning to the more conflictive ones, the most 
prominent instrument utilised by the EU is sanctions
40
, mainly towards Libya, Lebanon, 
Syria, Egypt and Tunisia. These are basically embargos on arms, freezing of funds and 
economic resources as well as restrictions on admission of persons to the EU (EEAS 2011b). 
Furthermore, the current NATO engagement in Libya (spring 2011) includes several EU 
member states, but as will be further discussed in the comparative chapter, the extent to which 
this can be related to energy security is debatable. So far, the EU has not established concrete 
measures aiming at the protection of infrastructure. That this is an essential instrument was 
illustrated in the Egyptian protests early in 2011 when a part of the Arab gas pipeline was set 
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on fire, halting gas supplies to Jordan and Israel (CNN 2011). The Galileo project of the EU, 
which aims at the development of a European satellite system, has the potential of monitoring 
the movements of hydrocarbons, also in relation to the monitoring of gas transport to Europe 
in the future, but more concrete steps have not been taken yet.
41
 
Summed up, the EU has utilised the cooperative instruments to a great extent, whereas 
the conflictive ones have been pursued to a relatively lesser extent. Still, the overall 
impression is that the EU has pursued the political strategy with high intensity, and especially 
compared to the other relations considered in the analysis, which will become evident further 
on. As such, the EU has pursued all of the strategies with relatively high intensity towards the 
Mediterranean region.  
3.1.4 What strategies dominate and with what intensity?  
As will be evident from the analysis, the energy relations with the Mediterranean countries 
are characterised by a lot of effort from the EU, on both the regional and bilateral level, and 
they are also heavily influenced by the broader political institutional framework applying to 
the Euro- Med relations, such as the European Neighbourhood Policy. With reference to the 
analytical framework, it is clear that the EU´s approach towards the Mediterranean countries 
is well situated within the institutionalisation and market strategies, because the EU has 
pursued measures on all the dimensions; liberalisation, regulatory convergence with the aim 
of establishing an integrated energy market, securing investment access, as well as large 
amounts of lending and funding to energy related projects. However, elements of the political 
strategy are also present, most notably with the prominent use of political support for 
infrastructure, development aid to enhance political links with the parties, as well as military 
assistance and arms export. Compared to the other producers, this is a feature that separates 
the Mediterranean region, and will be further elaborated in the comparative chapter. These 
measures might be expected to figure more prominently in the near future, given the latest 
developments in the countries of Northern Africa and the Middle East.  
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3.2 EU- GULF energy relations  
3.2.1 Short background of the relations 
Except for the UK, Europe has not had a strong presence in the Gulf region; it was not until 
the oil crises in the 1970s that the Gulf region really attracted the Europeans´ attention 
(Echagüe 2007:1). According to Haghighi (2007:371), the relationship with the countries 
situated around the Persian Gulf and the European Union is the least developed of all the 
energy relations. The Gulf region has long been considered as important to the EU, but never 
urgent (Youngs 2009a:1). Nevertheless, recognising the Gulf region´s potential as a future 
supplier of natural gas, the EU has sought to intensify its energy relations with the Gulf 
States, mainly through the GCC
42
. Additionally, it has bilateral relations with Iran and Iraq.  
3.2.2 Characteristics of the region  
The scores on political rights and civil liberties of the countries constituting what I have 
defined as the Gulf region range between 4 and 7, indicating a low level of freedom. In fact, 
all of the countries, except Kuwait, which is partly free, are regarded as not free by Freedom 
House, and the average score is around 5. The level of corruption in the public sector is 
considered by Transparency International as quite middle range on the index running from 0- 
10; several of the countries lie between 4,5 and 7,7, except for Iran and Iraq, which display a 
high level of corruption (2,2 and 1,5 respectively). The average score is 4,6, slightly better 
than the Mediterranean region. Currently, the Gulf region represents a very small amount of 
the total gas supply to the EU; only Qatar has some of its export shipped to the EU as LNG, 
amounting to around 2,4 % of the EU´s total import of natural gas (in 2007). Yet, looking at 
the estimates indicating the resource richness of the region, these figures display a vast 
amount of proved reserves; on average the region holds 332,6 Tcf of proved natural gas 
reserves, where Iran and Qatar are the largest share holders, with 1045,1 and 895,8 tcf 
respectively. The region thus represents a huge possibility for being a new future supplier to 
the EU. Additionally, the R/ P ratios show that only Bahrain and Oman have reserves that will 
last for under 100 years under the current production level, supporting the vision of the 
region´s enormous potential for availability of natural gas supply for the EU (EIA 2011 and 
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BP 2010). Presently, the EU holds a share of 26,7 % of the total import to the region on 
average, a relatively low share. Adding to these supply and import numbers is the fact that 
there are no pipeline connections between the Gulf region and the EU; signifying a low level 
of interdependency between the parties as this has been defined in the analysis.   
The conflict level of the Gulf region is high, especially in Iran and Iraq. 
The Gulf region emerges as a producer representing future potential for the 
enhancement of the EU´s energy security. It is the producer, apart from Russia, that has the 
highest level of resource richness, and as will be elaborated below, is increasingly in focus 
regarding the development of the Southern Energy Corridor and the Nabucco pipeline. 
Factors that are important with regard to these characteristics are the type of regime, as well 
as the conflict level.  
3.2.3 What type of instruments has the EU utilised?  
An analysis of the press releases, speeches and memos concerning energy the last 7-8 years in 
the EU database, reveal little activity of the EU towards the Gulf region. This is true for all 
the strategies. Yet, even though the overall level of intensity of the EU´s pursuit of energy 
security towards the Gulf region is low, some efforts have been made, and will be elaborated 
in the following.  
Institutionalisation strategy 
In 1989 the EU signed a Cooperation agreement with the GCC and thus set up a region-to-
region institutionalised relationship. It established annual joint ministerial meetings and aimed 
at cooperation in the realm of energy, industry and trade among other things (Echaqüe 
2007:7). The focus of the EU towards the GCC has mainly been the establishment of a free 
trade agreement, with negotiations running since 1989, but without a conclusion up to date. 
Energy is also included in the negotiations (Haghighi 2007:375). In 1995 the EU initiated to 
strengthen the relations, among other things through regular political dialogue (Hertog 
2007:4).  The free trade negotiations have come to a halt several times and were re- launched 
in 2002, when it was agreed to refocus the activities of the parties on a limited number of 
priorities; the FTA, business and energy cooperation (Echagüe 2007:3). Generally, the EU- 
GCC dialogue includes an EU- GCC energy working group, technical energy experts 
meetings annually and the Euro- Gulf Energy Summit. Furthermore, the Commission has 
proposed to extend the structure of different energy agreements within the Euro- 
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Mediterranean framework (Youngs 2009a:4). This proposal was established in the strategy 
paper from 2004; “Strategic partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East”, 
adopted by the European Council which indicated that the EU wished to pursue bilateral 
relations with individual Gulf states (Hertog 2007:5). The political document builds on the 
EMP, the EU- GCC relationship and bilateral relations, as well as the Middle East Peace 
Process, setting the political agenda for the dialogue between the EU and the regions, 
focusing on among other things non- proliferation, security and counterterrorism. The EU also 
aims at economic reform and promotion of WTO membership (European Council 2004). 
Additionally, small scale cooperation projects, such as the establishment of a 
Technical energy centre and an EU delegation in Saudi Arabia and Iraq, have also been put in 
place (Echagüe 2007:12). The EU has also proposed a MoU on energy cooperation, and in 
2006 the parties agreed to promote negotiations of such a MoU (EU- GCC Cooperation 
council 2006). Yet, the first regional MoU on energy has not been concluded and according to 
Youngs (2007:9) this is because the GCC countries have rejected this idea.  
Moreover, the Gulf countries are reluctant to be part of the ECT; consequently they 
remain as observers (Escribano 2010:214, Haghighi 2007:374). As such, the EU is currently 
unable to make use of an important instrument both for institutionalising purposes, but also 
for market creation purposes, following from the commercially and market oriented 
provisions of the ECT.  
The EU has sought to institutionalise its energy relations with individual countries of 
the Gulf region, most notably with the countries outside of the GCC, which hold considerable 
gas resources. A communication from the Commission in 2004 underlined the importance of 
Iraq in terms of its energy sector, but there had been no political relations before the fall of 
Saddam Hussein‟s regime (Haghighi 2007:377). The relationship has developed quite rapidly 
after this; a delegation was opened in 2006 and energy cooperation was identified as 
important from then on (Burke et al. 2008:13). In 2008 a Trade and Co- operation Agreement 
signed with Iraq included an energy chapter, and a MoU on energy was concluded months 
after, with EU support for infrastructure development, and the transfer of technological 
knowledge as the most prominent features. Connecting Iraqi supplies to the Nabucco pipeline 
was also described as a priority (Burke et al. 2008:14). Furthermore Iraq became a part of the 
Extractives Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI) in 2008, and Qatar has expressed its 
support for the initiative (EITI 2011a). It represents an attempt to connect energy security and 
good governance policies and tries to convince multinational corporations to commit to 
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publish details of their payments in producer states, in order to detect corruption. It is thus an 
important initiative promoted by the EU as a means of improving the transparency of the 
energy sector in the producer countries.  
The Commission formed a working group on energy with Iran in 1999 (Coskun 
2008:12), and the country was also invited to participate as an observer in the Baku initiative, 
elaborated in the chapter on EU- Caspian relations. The relationship with Iran is influenced by 
the nuclear- issue; the EU has offered technical assistance in the energy sector if Iran 
abandons its nuclear programme (Youngs 2007:9).  The “carrot” has been a promise of 
accepting Iranian supplies for the Nabucco pipeline (Burke et al. 2008:13). This clearly 
reflects strategic bargaining in order to facilitate deeper energy cooperation. Historically, and 
in contrast to US policies, the EU has aimed not to isolate Iran, and has focused on a more 
“soft approach”, underscoring dialogue and reciprocity as illustrated by the strategic 
bargaining. Nevertheless, political considerations have impeded the relationship. As will be 
discussed below in relation to the development of the Southern Gas Corridor, these political 
challenges have been augmented by the EU´s decision to tighten its sanctions towards the 
country. This is also reflected in the institutionalisation of the relationship; in 2002 the EU 
initiated negotiations on a Trade and Cooperation Agreement with Iran, but these were put on 
hold when Iran resumed its nuclear programme in 2005 (European Commission 2011c). In 
addition, the relationship with Iran and Iraq has been characterised by markedly different 
views on the appropriate strategy among the member states (Youngs 2007:9). National 
policies of member states are important in the Gulf. For example, the UK concluded a 
bilateral supply deal for LNG with Qatar in 2006 to the complaints of several other member 
states and Germany´s Angela Merkel underscored a desire to promote Germany‟s national 
energy ties during a visit to the Gulf in 2007 (Burke et al. 2008:13, Youngs 2009b:67).  
Thus, the EU- Gulf relationship is characterised by a low level of intensity in terms of 
institutionalisation. The EU has done comparatively little on the regional level, and the 
established initiatives are mostly dialogues. More binding institutional commitments are 
absent. Furthermore, the relations with individual countries are not without challenges and 
national policies of the member states often prevail.  
Market strategy 
Since there are currently no pipelines from the Gulf region, the commercial aspect of 
infrastructure development has not been prominent in the EU- Gulf energy relations. The only 
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indicator that can be related to this aspect is the establishment of LNG terminals in Europe in 
order to receive supplies from Qatar; the construction is developing rapidly.  
One of the objectives of the EU has been regulatory convergence of the respective 
energy markets. Echagüe (2007:12) describes the energy security strategy of the EU in 
relation to the GCC as “heavily based on incorporating regulatory cooperation within formal 
contractual agreements”. However, efforts outside of the FTA negotiations have been few. 
The agreement has been such a prominent feature of the relationship, and it is clear that free 
trade demands have not been reduced in exchange for progress on energy cooperation. Part of 
the explanation for this has been the Gulf States reluctance to be “dictated” as to how to 
reform their sectors (Echagüe 2007:12). These observations resonate with the situation in 
many of the external energy relations of the EU; the most important producers have resisted 
to be influenced by many of the instruments the EU has pursued as part of its market strategy.  
Considering investments, and the access for European companies in the Gulf region, 
Qatar has emerged as the world‟s largest exporter of LNG, and it has attracted large 
investments from several European companies (Echagüe 2007:12). European companies play 
an important role in the development of gas deposits in the Gulf States, including Iran (Bahgat 
2006:974). As noted in the previous chapter the data on FDI are not very satisfactory for 
comparative purposes. However, the numbers on the Gulf region between 2007 and 2009 
illustrate that the countries of the GCC and Iran are important for European investors; and it is 
thus the most prominent feature of the market strategy, apart from the FTA agreement.  
Considering the promotion of inclusion in the WTO, the only country which has 
gained support from the EU in its accession negotiations is Saudi Arabia. The EU decided to 
give up its requirements concerning the abandonment of the dual pricing system, paving the 
way for membership in 2005 (Belyi 2008:211). 
 
Political strategy 
In view of infrastructure, and the political strategic nature of this aspect, the most prominent 
development is the priority given to the Southern Energy Corridor, which consists of making 
the large- scale gas reserves in the Middle East and Caspian region available to the EU. It is 
therefore the infrastructure project currently with most relevance for the relationship with the 
Gulf countries. It has been defined as a strategic objective of the EU´s external energy policy, 
and the goal is to promote the rule of law and the economic development in producing and 
transit states (Devlin and Heer 2010:5-6). As part of this corridor, the TEN- E prioritised 
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Nabucco project is especially prominent in the relationship with the Caspian region, and is 
therefore elaborated further in this chapter. In 2009 the first high level summit was put in 
place with the partners to discuss the development of the corridor, and the declaration shows 
the first formal commitments by consumer, producer and transit states, following four years 
of dialogue. The Southern Corridor is perceived by the EU as very important, in that it “plays 
an important role as a major energy infrastructure initiative contributing to diversification of 
energy sources and routes for EU supplies”.43 Key suppliers to the Southern Corridor from the 
Gulf region are Iran and Iraq. However, the recent developments of the political situation in 
Iran, and the EU decision to tighten its sanctions towards the country in July 2010, including 
new restrictions on the oil and gas sector, makes the role of Iran as a supplier rather 
unrealistic for the time being (Devlin and Heer 2010:6). Egypt and Qatar may also become 
suppliers, through interconnections. However, there are both technical and economical 
challenges to this scenario, for example the preference for LNG development in Qatar, as well 
as political challenges such as regional and ethnic clashes in Iraq and the nuclear programme 
of Iran (Bilgin 2010:20). In the beginning of 2011, the political situation in several Middle 
Eastern countries is a further challenge to the energy supply from these countries. Other than 
this plan, there are currently no signs of more concrete development concerning infrastructure 
in the EU- Gulf energy relations. 
Turning to other political strategic instruments, “the region does not qualify for 
development aid [...] reducing the scope for conditionality to be used” (Echagüe 2007:6). The 
Gulf States´ level of wealth has hindered a strategy based on aid as a political link enhancing 
energy security (Youngs 2009a:4). However, in 2006 the EU established a financing 
instrument for high- income countries supporting cooperation in energy among other things 
(Echagüe 2007:6). This instrument is however more relevant for market creation purposes. 
Also, the Commission provides support to Iran and Iraq through the new Development Co-
operation Instrument (DCI), which came into force in January 2007. These observations are 
confirmed by the data retrieved from EuropeAid. The only countries receiving any 
development aid from the EU are Iran and Iraq, and Iraq is receiving the bulk of these 
amounts. In the period between 2004 and 2009 the EU disbursed on average 24 million € per 
year to Iran and Iraq, a comparatively low number. Turning to the data on arms export, it is 
useful to have in mind the US- Saudi Arabia model; the US receives oil in exchange for arms 
export and provision of security (Kelly and Leland 2007:29). The SIPRI data on transfers of 
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conventional weapons paint a somewhat similar picture; from the EU member states to 
countries of the Gulf region there were 57 transfers between 1995 and 2010, the highest 
number of all the relations considered here. Keeping in mind the fact that the Gulf region 
mainly supplies the EU with oil, the extent to which these transfers have been used for energy 
purposes similar to the US- Saudi model is probably either way connected to the supply of oil 
and not so much gas. Yet, the score is comparatively high, and the EU has thus utilised 
weapons export with high intensity towards the Gulf region. It is not unthinkable that this will 
be continued as the possibilities for increased gas supplies from the region become more 
realistic. The only indicator of military assistance from the EU towards the Gulf region is the 
current mission in Iraq.  
Turning to the more conflictive instruments of the political strategy; the sanctions 
towards Iran and Iraq figure prominently. As will be further discussed in the comparative 
chapter, the invasion of Iraq in 2003 where several member states, most notably the UK, were 
a part of the coalition can be viewed as an observation of the use of intervention or occupation 
as a conflictive instrument. However, it is very important to note that there have been large 
disagreements among the member states concerning the legitimacy of this invasion, among 
other things, and it is beyond the scope of the present analysis to go into detail about the 
specific motives behind the invasion. Given the rather unstable political and security 
environment in the Gulf, as reflected in the high conflict level, one should expect an emphasis 
on the protection of infrastructure as a part of an energy security strategy towards this region. 
However, the EU has been reluctant to use military means as a way of securing infrastructure 
in the Gulf (Coskun 2008:11). There have been some initiatives focusing on security in the 
region, but these have not been directly related to energy security or the protection of energy 
infrastructure (Echagüe 2007:15). A concrete example of an initiative focusing on the 
physical protection of infrastructure was in the Iran- Iraq war between 1980- 1988 were 
several EU member states took part in securing tanker routes in the Persian Gulf as a part of a 
NATO mission (Spiegel Online 2008). As will be noted also in the chapter on the EU- 
Caspian relations, this instrument has the potential of being utilised more if and when gas 
pipelines are developed linking the Gulf region to the EU.  
Summed up, the EU has utilised the political strategy towards the Gulf region with 
relatively high intensity. Only the Mediterranean region displays a higher level of intensity in 
terms of both the cooperative as well as the more conflictive instruments. 
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3.2.4 What strategies dominate and with what intensity?  
As has been reiterated several times in this chapter; the level of intensity with which the EU 
has pursued the institutionalisation and market strategies is relatively low, and most effort has 
been put into the free trade agreement that only has energy as a component of many. The EU 
has tried to utilise the same market strategy as in the Mediterranean, characterised by 
convergence of energy markets and regulatory harmonisation, but has not succeeded to the 
same degree. It has also put a lot of effort into the issue of energy infrastructure, as the 
description of the Southern Corridor projects show, were the EU has positioned itself as a 
main driver for the realisation of the project. This implies a realisation of the strategic 
importance of the Gulf region, yet most emphasis has been placed on the Caspian countries up 
to date. Contrary to the EU´s relations with the Mediterranean, it seems like the EU has tried 
to foster trade cooperation separately from other political interests such as energy in the Gulf 
region. The cooperation agreement with the GCC from 1989 states provisions on energy in 
very general terms and no concrete measures are put in place, and as Haghighi (2007:373) 
puts it; “exchange of views with respect to energy policies cannot be considered as an 
important undertaking from the perspective of the EU to guarantee security of energy supply”. 
Furthermore, the GCC has a limited competence on energy matters, and this has also 
hampered the establishment of a broader energy dialogue compared to other regions (Echagüe 
2007:13). As remarked earlier, “the nature of Gulf polities has allowed little scope for the 
kind of economic and social bottom- up engagement which is the EU´s signature trademark in 
international relations” (Echagüe 2007:19), and which has been demonstrated especially in 
the energy relations with the Mediterranean region. According to Echagüe (2007:12), some 
EU officials have suggested that the lack of a consistent involvement in the Gulf region 
related to energy owes to the fact that the nature of the relationship with the GCC has been 
rather unproblematic. In relation to Gulf countries, their willingness to support stable markets 
and prices has made it unnecessary to engage in a more geopolitical approach; “any deeper 
EU energy relations have been left to ad hoc bilateral or company- to- company 
arrangements” (Echagüe 2007:12).  
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3.3 EU- Caspian energy relations  
3.3.1 Short background of the relations 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the countries of the Caspian region
44
 emerged as a first 
choice for the EU in order to diversify its gas sources (Locatelli 2010:963). In the beginning, 
the initiatives towards the region were based on a notion about future potential of export and 
transportation of natural gas (Youngs 2009b:100). Later, the estimates have shown that the 
Caspian countries have substantial gas reserves. This has enhanced the EU´s presence and 
deepened the energy relations, especially with Azerbaijan; “as policy- makers registered the 
region´s energy potential a range of new funds and strategies were introduced” (Youngs 
2009b:124). The EU itself stresses the Caspian region´s role as an alternative supplier 
compared to the EU´s traditional suppliers such as Russia and Norway and it considers the 
Caspian region an important element of the EU´s supply security policy (Piebalgs speech 
2007c, European Commission 2008a) 
 
3.3.2 Characteristics of the region  
The countries of the Caspian region represent the lowest score on political rights and civil 
liberties considered in this analysis, and with the average score of 6,5 and 6 respectively, the 
countries are deemed as not free by the Freedom House. Additionally, the level of corruption 
is very high with the average score of 2,1 when 0 represents a highly corrupt public sector. 
Thus, these indexes support common descriptions of the countries as autocratic regimes. 
Presently, the Caspian region does not supply the EU with levels of gas that is worth 
mentioning. According to BP (2010), only Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan deliver some 5-10 % of 
their total gas export to the EU. Consequently, it can only be classified as a future supplier for 
the EU. This view is also supported by the indicators of resource richness; the Caspian region 
holds significant proven reserves, on average 114,1 tcf, where Turkmenistan holds the largest 
bulk; 286,2 (blowing up the average estimate considerably). The current production levels 
also indicate that the proved reserves will last for around 100 years for the region as a whole. 
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 Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Iran and Russia. In this chapter, the relations with the 
former countries will be elaborated, as Russia will be treated separately, and Iran is treated as a part of the 
relations with the Gulf region. Uzbekistan is not a littoral state of the Caspian Sea, but is included because the 
EU has shown interest in its energy resources, and because supplies from the country have to be directed through 
the larger Caspian infrastructure system. Moreover, it is considered as part of the Caspian region by the EU. 
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Comparatively speaking, the resource richness of the Caspian region is at medium level.
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The EU´s average share of total import to the region is comparatively low: 22,3 %, with the 
largest share in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan (26,7 and 25,1 % respectively).  This indicates 
that the EU has some foothold in the region, albeit very small compared to the other 
relationships in this analysis, but it is at least greater than the stake the Caspian countries have 
in the supply of natural gas to the EU.  Therefore, it makes no sense to characterise the current 
relationship as interdependent as this has been defined in the analysis. Adding to this 
perception is the fact that there are no pipelines running from the Caspian region to the EU 
which are not bypassing Russia, a situation that might change if the planned Nabucco pipeline 
is realised in the future. Either way, the relationship is not one of interdependence; this aspect 
displays similarities with the relationship between the EU and the Gulf region. The level of 
conflict in the Caspian region is initially low, but considering the fact that the countries were 
a part of the USSR until 1991/92, the COW does not provide exact numbers concerning the 
region. Therefore, they can be considered in relation with the numbers on the USSR, as such 
the conflict level is somewhere between low and medium.  
The Caspian region is hence a region that represents future potential for the 
enhancement of EU´s energy security, at the same time as the relationship between the parties 
scores low on the indicators of interdependence. Adding to this picture is that the countries 
have the comparatively worst score on the indicators on the type of the regime representing a 
challenge for any strategy the EU pursues and has pursued in the region.  
3.3.3 What type of instruments has the EU utilised?  
Even though the Caspian region is not a current supplier of natural gas to the EU this 
empirical analysis will show that the EU has increased its attention towards the region for 
energy security reasons, especially since the turn of the century. The level of intensity related 
to the institutionalisation strategy is relatively high on a regional level whereas the EU has 
pursued institutionalisation with individual countries in the region with varying degrees of 
intensity. The market strategy is also pursued with high intensity; the efforts have especially 
been aimed at regulatory harmonisation. The support for infrastructure development is the 
only instrument pursued with some intensity of the political strategy.  
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 An important fact concerning this picture is the disagreement within the region over how to divide the Caspian 
Sea i.e. sovereignty disputes (Bahgat 2006:971), which may have consequences for the pace of energy extraction 
and development. However, this element has not been considered in the present analysis. 
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Institutionalisation strategy 
The EU has had a regional institutionalisation focus in the Caspian region, as can be observed 
with the other regions considered in this thesis. The regional instruments are mostly 
characterised by regular diplomacy, i.e. dialogue. Launched in 1997, the aim of the 
INOGATE
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 programme is to support energy cooperation between the EU and the littoral 
countries of the Black and Caspian Seas, including their neighbouring countries. The energy 
cooperation entails promoting European investment in the Caspian countries in exchange for 
their cooperation in supplying energy resources to the EU (Bahgat 2006:971). In 2004 the 
mandate and energy cooperation under INOGATE were further enhanced at an energy 
ministerial conference in Baku, Azerbaijan, also known as the Baku initiative (INOGATE 
2011). This initiative was said to focus on developing regional energy markets and network 
interconnections; “the EU´s stated objective was to drive energy- sector reform in the region, 
around EU regulatory standards – once again using Europe´s internal market as a template to 
be exported into the foreign- policy domain” (Youngs 2009b:105). Hence it is an obvious 
example where the EU utilises market instruments conditionally to secure the reliability and 
availability of supplies, also applied elsewhere. Moreover, the Central Asia Strategy agreed 
on in 2007 proposed a new formal energy dialogue with the region, focusing on the 
progression towards a new transport corridor and the extension of the EU´s internal market 
principles (Youngs 2007:4). It also promised a doubling of aid to the region and regular 
foreign ministers dialogue (Youngs 2009b:106). The initiatives referred to in this paragraph, 
both bilateral and regional, are referred to under the Central Asia strategy framework, and are 
the results of an intensified political dialogue provided for by the implementation of the 
strategy (European Commission 2008c). European diplomatic presence in the region 
remained limited until the mid 2000s (Youngs 2009b:104). However, a small delegation 
opened in Baku in 2008 and Astana in 2009, increasing the EU´s presence in the region.  
The ECT has been ratified by Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan 
(Hoogeveen and Perlot 2007:490). Thus, the EU is able to make use of a preferred 
multilateral institutional framework as a tool for ensuring energy security towards the Caspian 
region, which is in contrast to the other relations considered in this thesis. This is well in line 
with what Youngs (2007:2) describes as “extending the EU´s norms and infrastructure as the 
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 “Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe”: “The INOGATE Program is an international energy co-
operation program between the European Union and the Partner Countries of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, 
Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan”. It has among 
its foremost principles convergence of energy markets and energy security and is funded by the EU (INOGATE 
2011). 
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main solution to security concerns”. There has been some effort from the EU for enhancing 
transparency in the Caspian region, most notably through the EITI with particular attention to 
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan (Youngs 2007:5). Azerbaijan has reached the status of a 
compliant country according to the webpage of the EITI, while Kazakhstan is still a candidate 
country (EITI 2011b). However, the initiative does not enjoy full support from all of the 
member states; several countries have admitted that they have blocked proposals of exerting a 
more united pressure on important producers such as Russia and Algeria to sign up to the 
initiative, leaving the possibility of attaching conditionality to a more transparent management 
of energy revenues out in the cold (Youngs 2007:10-11). Hence, even though the Caspian 
countries have been engaged in the initiative, it does not necessarily imply that it will 
contribute to increased transparency and energy security if the effort is not viewed as 
important or relevant by the member states.   
The EU prefers the same level of institutionalisation in its energy relations with the 
Caspian as in the Mediterranean region; its approach is a regional one, but there has been a 
special focus on strengthening bilateral relations with individual countries. Bilateral 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCA) involving all the countries were signed 
during the 1990s (Hoogeveen and Perlot 2007:489). The most developed bilateral relation is 
EU- Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan is the first Caspian state that was included in the ENP in 2004 
(Youngs 2009b:104). The inclusion of Azerbaijan in the Neighbourhood policy reflected the 
country´s “geo- strategic location and energy resources” (Ferrero-Waldner speech 2005). The 
Action Plan for Azerbaijan set up under the ENP calls for reform on the political and 
economical level (Nuriyev 2008:163). During the negotiations with the EU over the Action 
Plan, Azerbaijan displayed resistance to WTO membership and market liberalisation; their 
position was that this was not needed because of the large energy resources they possess 
(Youngs 2009b:115). Thus, Azerbaijan resisted an important aspect of the EU´s strategy, as 
can be witnessed also in the other energy relations (Youngs 2007:10). Kazakhstan has 
displayed similar resistance, and the negotiations over WTO membership are elaborated under 
the market strategy below.  Yet, a MoU on energy was signed with Azerbaijan in 2006, which 
underscored that the initiatives in focus were convergence with the EU internal market and 
transit provisions (Youngs 2009b:114,116). Consequently the EU has managed to include 
important elements of market creation after all in its institutional arrangements with the 
country. Through the relationship with the EU, Azerbaijan has asserted its commitment to its 
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integration into the European transport system, and focused on the development of effective 
energy transportation corridors (Nuriyev 2008:162).  
The EU also agreed on a MoU on energy with Kazakhstan in 2006, but it was less 
focused on broader governance convergence than the Azeri agreement (Youngs 2009b:116). 
At the same time, the MoU paid attention to nuclear energy, as Kazakhstan is the third largest 
producer of uranium in the world,
47
 making the agreement not only about oil and gas. 
Inclusion in the ENP was discussed but there was internal disagreement in the EU regarding 
whether or not to include Kazakhstan. Finally the European Parliament rejected the idea 
(Youngs 2009b:117). Consequently, today there are no signs of an inclusion of Kazakhstan in 
the ENP any time soon.  
Regarding Uzbekistan the EU has shown some initiative. The PCA agreement with 
Uzbekistan was signed in 1996, and there have been several meetings between the EU and 
Uzbekistan since then. However, in 2005 Uzbek government forces opened fire against 
demonstrators at a rally in an Uzbek city, which led the EU to react strongly; it did not offer 
an energy partnership to the country and European governments withdrew their development 
assistance. The relationship cooled off, and the EU has not had a very notable influence in the 
country since then (Youngs 2009b:121-122). This might be changing, because as of late, in 
January 2011 the EU managed to agree on a MoU on energy with this country as well (EU 
and Uzbekistan 2011). In comparison to the other MoUs concluded with the Caspian 
countries, this one is much more about governance and renewable energy than security of 
supply.   
The Turkmen have traditionally not been that interested in cooperation with the EU, 
but even more interested in taking care of its relations with Moscow (Youngs 2009b:122). 
The country has problems with transparency; even the size of its energy reserves were kept a 
secret for a long while after independence, making any strategy towards the country difficult 
to carve out.  A PCA was signed in 1998, but it has never been ratified by several member 
states of the EU as well as the European Parliament (Youngs 2009b:123). A new regime came 
into power in Turkmenistan in 2007, which opened up the country to the outside world a bit 
more, and among other things, created a new state agency on the management of hydrocarbon 
resources. The EU offered Turkmenistan a MoU on energy, while the Parliament was still 
blocking the PCA (Youngs 2009b:124). The MoU was concluded in 2008, but it is a very 
short one compared to the other bilateral relations. In the same year, substantial gas reserves 
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were discovered in Turkmenistan, and the EUs efforts have intensified towards the country. 
These efforts are especially related to the Nabucco project, as will be elaborated below.  
The EU´s institutional strategy towards the Caspian region is thus characterised by 
relatively high intensity with both a bilateral and regional focus. The energy partnerships 
agreed on with Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan reflect, according to Youngs (2007:5), a “familiar 
EU- style approach of attempting to use contractual agreements to attain adherence to rules- 
based behaviour, market regulations, transport and safety”. This resonates with the argument 
which has been repeated elsewhere, namely that the EU is to a large degree including market 
creation measures in its institutionalising frameworks. Some commentators point to a possible 
conflict in the bilateral- regional approach, which is relevant for all the regions considered as 
producers. On the one hand promoting regionalism can foster more cooperation within the 
region, and thus favour a region- to- region cooperation (and for example make the 
integration of energy markets easier). On the other hand, bilateral policies can drive wedges 
between the countries. An example of this kind can be found in the rather disappointed 
Kazakh response to the inclusion of Azerbaijan in the ENP, resulting in that the countries 
were split between different financing instruments of the EU (Youngs 2009b:107). 
Market strategy 
In view of market creation, there is currently no infrastructure that has been developed solely 
as a commercial activity without the political and financial support of the Commission. 
Concerning investments, as the Caspian countries have opened up for foreign investment 
slowly over time, the energy sectors in the countries have experienced a high inflow of 
capital. Major European countries, such as BP and Total Fina Elf have invested in the 
Azerbaijani energy sector, and there is stronger presence in the country of some EU member 
states; for example, the biggest European investor in the region is the UK (Youngs 
2009b:111). Additionally, “the EU attaches much importance to the creation of a liberal 
business climate in Azerbaijan” (Nuriyev 2008:161-162). In 2002 the EU became the biggest 
source of FDI into Kazakhstan, mostly in oil related projects, from member states such as the 
Netherlands, UK and Italy (Youngs 2009b:117). This fact is confirmed by the FDI numbers 
collected; in 2007 the EU´s share of the total amount of foreign investment in the country was 
around 54 %. A similar figure characterises the EU´s FDI flows to Azerbaijan; in 2008 the 
EU represented around 50 % of the total amount of FDI in the country. Regarding lending and 
funding, EBRD and EIB have released large funds for energy-related infrastructure projects 
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(Youngs 2009b:105), as well as for energy reforms. Moreover, the EU has been participating 
in the development of the energy sector in the countries, through different financing 
instruments such the TACIS programme
48
 since the 1990s, INOGATE (pipeline 
development) and TRICECA (infrastructure) established in 1993
49
 (Youngs 2009b:105). 
Moreover, in 2010 the Investment Facility for Central Asia was established, allocating 20 
million € for energy, transport networks and market integration in Central Asia, thus 
including the countries of the Caspian region considered here (European Commission 2010d). 
The issue of free trade is being negotiated under the dialogue set up under the Central 
Asia Strategy, but a formal FTA has not yet been concluded. The countries of Central Asia 
are all beneficiaries of the EU´s Generalised System of Preferences, which is a “trade 
arrangement through which the EU provides preferential access to the EU market to 176 
developing countries and territories, in the form of reduced tariffs for their goods when 
entering the EU market” (European Commission 2011d). There are no requirements of 
granting the EU equal access in the beneficiaries´ markets. The EU has promoted in this 
region, as well as in the Mediterranean region, plans to move towards sub- regional energy 
markets, which aims at supporting the convergence of these markets with the EU internal 
market (Youngs 2007:3). The most prominent of these was launched in 2008; the Black Sea 
synergy. It is an important step in regulatory harmonisation, a central instrument for market 
creation.  
Concerning the EU´s support for the inclusion of the Caspian countries in the WTO, it 
is first and foremost providing financial assistance to Azerbaijan in order for the country to 
prepare for membership. Similarly, the EU supports the accession negotiations of the other 
countries of the Caspian region through the Central Asia Strategy. Kazakhstan is the most 
developed country in relation to membership, whereas Uzbekistan is in the early stages and 
Turkmenistan not yet has applied for accession (European Commission 2011e). Hence, the 
Caspian region is the only producer region towards which the EU has publicly and concretely 
supported the WTO with all of the countries. In sum, the EU has put a lot of weight on the 
market strategy in its energy relations with the Caspian region.  
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 “Technical Aid to the Commonwealth of Independent States”, was a grant based technical aid program that 
was implemented in order to help the states of the CIS countries transform their economies to become more 
market oriented. It was later substituted by Europe Aid, as well as the financial instrument under the ENP 
elaborated in the chapter on the Mediterranean region (Wikipedia. org 22.03.2011) 
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 Transport Corridor to Connect Europe via the Caucasus to Asia (Youngs 2009b: 104). It is an interregional 
program of technical assistance which aims at the development of a transport corridor from Europe, crossing the 
Black Sea, Caucasus, and the Caspian Sea and reaching the Central Asian countries. It is financed by the 
European Union (TRICECA 2010).   
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Political strategy 
The most prominent political strategic instrument the EU has pursued in the Caspian region is 
infrastructure development. Most notably is the Nabucco pipeline, which is planned to deliver 
gas from the Caspian and Middle East regions, running through Turkey and then on to 
Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary before connecting to a major gas hub in Austria, completely 
bypassing Russia (Erdogdu 2010:2936). This pipeline project is the most central one under 
the Southern Corridor plan
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, elaborated in the Gulf chapter, and it has priority status under 
the TEN- E guidelines, implying political and financial support from the EU. Potentially then, 
the pipeline serves as a strategic alternative to Russia, and thus underscores the increasingly 
strategic importance of Azerbaijan for European energy security (Nuriyev 2008:159). The EU 
has on several occasions underscored the prominence of the project: “Nabucco concretely – in 
all senses – contributes to our energy security” (Piebalgs Speech 2006).  
The first talks of a pipeline started in 2002 between gas companies in the 
aforementioned transit countries, as well as RWE of Germany. The European Commission 
entered into a grant agreement in 2003, and thus materialised the EU´s commitment to the 
project with a promise of covering 50 % of the estimated total costs of a feasibility study of 
the planned pipeline (Erdogdu 2010:2939).  The development of the pipeline gained more 
impetus in 2007, partly because of increased pressure from the EU; Javier Solana, former 
external relations commissioner, started negotiations with the countries
51
 of the Caspian 
region on the Nabucco project (Youngs 2009b:109-110, Norling 2008:127). The EU also 
appointed a special co-ordinator for Nabucco, as the only gas project among the prioritised 
energy projects of the EU.
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 In 2009 an intergovernmental agreement was agreed on between 
the relevant transit countries, improving the project´s chances of getting realised. 
Additionally, during 2008 the governments of Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan took to a more 
favourable position towards the pipeline, and substantial gas reserves were discovered in 
Turkmenistan, as mentioned above (Erdogdu 2010:2940). Currently, the final investment 
decision is expected to take place during 2011, building in 2012 and start up in 2015, 
depending on the timing of the supplies (European Energy Review 2010). 
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 Other pipelines, such as the Turkey- Greece pipeline, and the BTE pipeline (from Azerbaijan via Georgia and 
Turkey) are part of several linkages that are seen as potential transportation routes for gas from the Caspian 
region, and have the potential of becoming supply pipelines for the Nabucco. They are therefore also vital in the 
Southern Corridor Plan (Baran 2008:156, Youngs 2009b:108, Larsson 2008:30). 
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Contributing to this political strategic nature of the Nabucco project are the recent 
developments concerning supply contracts between the EU and individual countries of the 
Caspian region. Early in 2011 the Commission´s president Barroso signed a deal with 
Azerbaijan to bring ten million cm of gas per year to Europe, which is the first written 
commitment of Azerbaijan to supply gas to Europe (Euractiv 2010
53
). In return for long term 
supplies of gas, Azerbaijan gets access to the European market, a classic example of the EU 
using its market position in its relations with producer countries. The deal is according to the 
EU an “important step in the realisation of the Southern Gas Corridor”, and vital for the 
Nabucco project.
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 Azerbaijan can also become (and is currently) an important transportation 
hub for energy resources between the Southern Caucasus, Central Asian region and Europe. If 
the Trans-Caspian
55
 pipeline is realised this importance will only increase. Earlier, in 2008 the 
EU struck a deal with Turkmenistan that set up provision of 10 million cm of gas per year 
from 2009. Turkmenistan´s role in relation to the development of a Trans- Caspian pipeline is 
also reiterated in several communications from the EU.
56
  
However, the realisation of Nabucco has not been shy of problems. The interest and 
support towards the project has been different from member state to member state; so far, 
important countries such as Germany and France have not shown much interest. Other major 
issues are investments and cost feasibility; it has recently been announced that Nabucco will 
cost more and take longer than estimated, and there is also uncertainty about where the gas is 
going to come from (Euractiv 2010).  
The uncertainty associated with the project is not least because of Russia´s attempts to 
impede the construction by launching the competitor pipeline South Stream, but also by tying 
up Turkmenistan and other Caspian countries´ gas reserves
57
 and entering into agreements 
with Central European countries committing them to the South Stream pipeline (Norling 
2008:131). The South Stream is planned from Russia to South East Europe and Italy via the 
Black Sea. This uncertainty has led investors to be apprehensive, a situation that does not help 
to speed up the pace of the process (Norling 2008:140). Other projects may also compete for 
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 The Trans- Caspian pipeline is envisaged as a project bringing gas from Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and (Iran) 
to Azerbaijan, which can then be connected to the BTE from there. The pipeline will thus eventually be built on 
the seabed of the Caspian Sea. This has two implications: increased supply from the Caspian region as a whole, 
and increasing importance of Azerbaijan as a gas hub in the Caspian region (Wikipedia.org 28.04.2011)  
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 Russia signed gas purchase agreements with Central Asian countries in 2007, granting substantial price 
increases in exchange for control of most of the gas volumes they export (Economides and Wood cited in 
Erdogdu 2010:2942).  
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the supply sources in the Caspian region (European energy review 2010). For Nabucco to be 
realised, there initially needs to be gas supply from Azerbaijan, therefore, the strategic 
position of this country in the EU´s external energy security policy cannot be stressed enough. 
Yet, in order to remain feasible the pipeline requires additional supplies from Turkmenistan 
and Iran (Erdogdu 2010:2940-2941). The case of Turkmenistan may show signs of 
improvement, as mentioned above, but as discussed in the Gulf chapter, the Iranian case 
represents a major challenge for the European Union and the other developers of Nabucco. 
Related to this are investment risks, as well as financing troubles. Although the EIB 
and EBRD have committed themselves to provide financial backing in 2009, this was 
conditioned on “solid project financing” from other parties as well (Erdogdu 2010:2941). 
Therefore, it remains uncertain whether or not the ambitious project will be realised as 
planned. If it is realised, the EU have succeeded with its most ambitious politically strategic 
infrastructure project towards a major producer region, as well as contributed to the 
diversification of supply by reducing dependence on Russia.  A failure will be a major blow 
to the EU´s aspiration of projecting firmness and ability to act in the name of energy security, 
and it will have important implications for the ability to diversify.   
Regarding other political strategic instruments, the EU´s aid to the region is 
increasingly related to energy security, according to Youngs (2009b:105). For the period 
2002- 04 the Commission allocated 150 million Euros in aid assistance to the Caspian region. 
Yet compared to other regions, Youngs (2009b:104-105) argues that the amount of aid was 
modest. This argument is confirmed when the data I have collected from EuropeAid is taken 
into account. In the period between 2004 and 2009 the EU disbursed on a yearly basis on 
average 27 million € to the Caspian region as a whole, a comparatively low amount. The same 
picture emerges regarding weapon export; only 4 transfers were detected by the SIPRI in the 
period between 1995 and 2010, and Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan were the 
recipients. Additionally, the EU has made use of its stability instrument towards Kazakhstan. 
Compared to the Mediterranean and Gulf this illustrates a very low intensity regarding 
political cooperative instruments, even though the Nabucco project features prominently. 
Moreover, none of the conflictive instruments are detected in the EU´s political strategy 
towards the Caspian region. It is possible to imagine that protection of infrastructure may 
become relevant if the Nabucco is realised in the future, but for the time being it is feasible to 
conclude that the political strategy of the EU towards the Caspian region has not been very 
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prominent with the notable exception of Nabucco, at least as this has been operationalised in 
the analysis.  
3.3.4 What strategies dominate and with what intensity?  
Generally the EU has concentrated on a few regional initiatives as well as separate 
institutionalisation efforts for each of the countries considered. The level of intensity related 
to the institutionalisation strategy has increased significantly over the last years, and the 
Caspian region emerges as the producer the EU has devoted most attention to among the 
current non- suppliers of natural gas to the European market i.e. the Gulf region. Again, the 
institutional frameworks contain important market provisions. The market strategy is also 
very prominent, as can be observed in relation to investment and financial instruments, as 
well as free trade arrangements and support for inclusion in the WTO. The only political 
strategic instrument the EU has put weight onto is the Nabucco. Through this, the EU wishes 
to gain access to Caspian supplies and as such diversify its supply alternatives, and it has also 
concluded important supply deals. A reservation against this diversification potential lies in 
the position of Russia in the region, which is elaborated in the comparative chapter, as well as 
the actual viability of both the infrastructure and possibilities for actual extraction of 
resources in the region. Apart from this however, the EU has not made use of the political 
strategic instruments at its disposal to any considerable degree.  
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3.4 EU- Norway energy relations 
3.4.1 Short background of the relations 
Norway is not a member state of the EU after the Norwegians said no to accession twice, in 
the referenda of 1972 and 1994. However, Norway was one of the founders of the European 
Free Trade Area (EFTA) in 1960. When the EU started working on the internal market in the 
middle of the 1980s, it became evident for the members of the EFTA that they needed a 
strong association to this development. In 1989 an economic cooperation between the EU and 
the EFTA countries was suggested, which Norway and the other members of EFTA accepted. 
The result was the EEA agreement, which entered into force in 1994 (Claes and Førland 
2004:212).  The EEA agreement makes Norway an integral part of the internal market. This 
implies that the relations with the EU on energy issues are conditioned by this association; 
Norway has to adapt to the developments of the EU´s internal market for gas and with it the 
liberalisation of the gas market. Other areas of integration include competition, trade and 
research, all relevant aspects for energy policy. Consequently, the relations with Norway are 
special and considerably different from the starting point; one can view the relationship as the 
ultimate realisation of the EU´s market and institutionalisation strategy. As the EU itself puts 
it; “Norway is as integrated into EU structures as it is possible to be without actually being a 
member state” (Barroso Speech 2008). Still, the relationship is not only characterised by 
agreement, as will be elaborated below.  
3.4.2 Characteristics of the country  
Norway has the highest score possible on the Freedom House index, indicating that the 
political rights and civil liberties of the people are well attended to, and the regime is deemed 
as free. Regarding corruption in the public sector, Norway has a score of 8,6, the highest of 
the producers considered in this analysis, and thus has a relatively clean public sector 
according to Transparency International.  
The gas supplies from Norway constitute around 25 % of the EU´s total import of 
natural gas, and it is therefore the second largest supplier to the EU.  Norway also holds 
considerable proved gas reserves (72,3 Tcf), Comparatively speaking, this number is 
relatively low, and the country is not part of the current top ten list of proven natural gas 
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reserves holders.
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 Additionally, the R/P ratio from 2009 (19,8) indicates that the current 
production is quite high, and that the proved reserves that Norway holds not necessarily will 
last for a very long time, given the current production rate. This situation may of course 
change depending on the discovery of new reserves, as well as changes in production 
capacity. Overall the resource richness of Norway is at medium level. The EU holds a share 
of 66,8 % of Norway´s total import, underscoring the importance of the EU for Norwegian 
export, as well as the tight integration of the parties. Seen in relation to the level of 
Norwegian natural gas export to the European market the parties can be characterised as 
interdependent. Norway is connected to the EU via pipelines first and foremost to the UK and 
Germany, and there is therefore a considerable level of structural dependence between the 
parties. Norway displays a low conflict level according to the COW datasets.  
Even though the estimate of proved reserves and the R/P ratio for Norway are smaller 
than the other producers considered in this analysis, this does not take away the fact that 
Norway currently is an important supplier of gas to the EU and in all likelihood will continue 
to be this. After all, Norway scores favourably on all of the indicators included in this analysis 
in order to be a stable and reliable supplier of gas to the EU, and Norway is also very 
dependent on the European market.  
3.4.3 What type of instruments has the EU utilised? 
The EU has pursued the institutionalisation and market strategy with high intensity towards 
Norway, owing to the strong association through the EEA agreement elaborated below. The 
politically strategic instruments are not present at all; the implications of this are further 
discussed in the comparative chapter.  
Institutionalisation strategy 
The EEA agreement is a dynamic agreement, basically entailing inclusion of new EU acquis 
although it includes a reservation right (Vahl 2005:7). It thus emerges as the most 
comprehensive and complex agreement of any EU association agreements (Vahl 2005:7). In 
addition to being granted access to the internal market, the EEA agreement also includes the 
four freedoms; freedom of movement, persons, goods, services and capital. Norway is also 
part of the Schengen area. An additional element is that at least for the time being, Norway is 
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not seeking membership in the EU, therefore, the agreement is “thus to be regarded as a 
permanent alternative to membership” (Vahl 2005: 9).  
In 2005, the EU- Norway energy dialogue was established, to further enhance the 
energy cooperation between the two parties. The energy minister of Norway now meets the 
energy commissioner on a yearly basis, with one of the focus areas being security of supply. 
The energy dialogue consists of consultations on key energy issues, and the EU has reiterated 
that Norway can play a part in the completion of the internal energy market,
59
 as well as in the 
development of an energy policy for Europe.
60
 The objective is to coordinate energy policies, 
as well as to exchange knowledge and updates on research and technological development as 
well as relations with other producer countries or regions.
61
 An EC/EU- Norway Energy 
Cooperation Group has been established under the auspices of the energy dialogue as a 
special forum, however, there is not much public information on the discussions and the work 
of this group. The main task of the group is to discuss energy issues and present suggestions 
before meetings at ministerial level (Norway Mission to the EU 2009a). With the energy 
dialogue the energy relationship has been lifted to a more high- level form of collaboration:  
“from a purely economic activity to the strategic and political domains” (Godzimirski 
2008:157). Yet, it is mainly a forum for discussion and exchange of views, and compared to 
the energy dialogue with Russia, it is much less encompassing and pursued with less intensity 
and importance. This will become evident in the next chapter.  
Furthermore, Norway became an observer in the Energy Community in 2006 right 
after the Energy Community Treaty was ratified (European Commission 2011f). The EU 
views the observer status as the first step to an eventual membership; the community treaty is 
intended to be the “legal vehicle” for the establishment of a wider energy market in Europe.62 
Another multilateral agreement the EU has pursued towards Norway, as towards the majority 
of the producers considered in this thesis, is the European Charter Treaty (ECT). However, 
Norway has not yet ratified the treaty, thus rejecting an important instrument for the EU. Still, 
the EU has not exerted the same pressure on Norway for ratifying the agreement as it has 
towards Russia, viewed in the following chapter (Grigoriev and Belova 2009:79).  
The Northern Dimension is the EU´s policy framework for the northern non- EU 
members, and as such an important regional institutional framework for Norway. It was 
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established in 1999, and the EU stated that “the Northern Dimension represents one essential 
frontier for security of supply due to the importance of Russian and Norwegian energy 
supplies” (Commission cited in Godzimirski 2008:154). However, Vahl (2005:3) argues that 
the Northern Dimension from 2004 became a regional element of the EU- Russia relations, 
thus downplaying this policy as a relevant instrument in the EU´s relations with Norway. 
Additionally, in the first period of the ND, there was relatively little focus on energy 
(Øverland 2008:143).  The area covered by the ND policy framework includes important 
energy sources as well as transportation routes (Aalto et al 2008:4), as such, the energy 
element should be a vital part of the ND. Nevertheless, in a study of the EU´s interest in the 
Arctic, Offerdal (2010:34) notes that in formal EU policy there has been little mention of the 
Norwegian Arctic or Barents energy resources within the ND framework. As a result, even 
though there is awareness about the importance of energy in this framework, this has not 
resulted in any concrete policy measures from the EU.  
These observations are also noted with regard to another element that is increasingly 
becoming a part of the energy relations with Norway; the Arctic – and possible future 
extraction of energy in this area. Analysts have pointed to the increased European interest in 
the Arctic as an expression of mainly energy security concerns (as well as climate change 
concerns) (Grindheim 2009, Airoldi 2008, Offerdal 2010), and in this, the relationship with 
Norway has been highlighted as important (Barroso speech 2008).  In terms of diversification, 
the EU can gain on keeping its relationship with Norway warm when it comes to future 
developments in the Arctic. Russia´s role in this area cannot be underestimated; therefore, if 
the EU wishes to reduce its dependence on Russian gas, it does itself a favour by contributing 
and cooperating to Norwegian development in the region. It seems like the EU is beginning to 
realise this fact, and the High North or the Arctic is increasingly being put into discussions 
with Norway (Offerdal 2010). The Commission is a member of the Barents Euro- Arctic 
council, but the request to become an observer in the Arctic Council was rejected in 2009 
(Grindheim 2009:14). During 2008, EU officials travelled numerous times to Norway, to 
discuss High North issues, and visiting important sites for Norwegian energy production. 
However, as the analysis of Offerdal (2010) illustrates, the Commission has not made any 
attempts to influence Norwegian High North energy policy and the interest has not yet 
resulted in any concrete actions or initiatives from the EU´s side.  
Concerning transparency in the energy sector, which the EU has promoted elsewhere 
such as in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, Norway has participated in the EITI initiative since 
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2003, and in 2011 it was approved as the first OECD- country to take on full membership 
(Norwegian Government 2011).  
Norway for its part has agreed on many of the initiatives, and has not demonstrated the 
same resistance as has been shown in the analysis of the other relations. Nevertheless, it has 
rejected a vital instrument, both for institutionalisation and market creation purposes, namely 
the ECT. Additionally, it has not agreed on all of the directives without any objections, 
elaborated below. Compared to the other relations, the EU has pursued relatively few 
instruments of the institutionalisation strategy besides the EEA agreement with high intensity. 
However, the very encompassing nature of the agreement implies that the EU has put a lot of 
weight onto its institutionalisation strategy towards Norway, not least because energy is a 
vital part of the agreement and because it infringes so much on the sovereignty of the 
producer in this area. As such the EU has pursued the institutionalisation strategy with high 
intensity towards Norway.  
Market strategy 
Gas infrastructure projects from Norway, such as the one from the largest gas fields supplying 
mainly the UK, the Langeled gas pipeline, was realised by a consortium of Norwegian and 
EU oil companies and inaugurated in 2007. However, the EU is in a very favourable position; 
there are no real competitors for Norwegian gas. Thus, the interdependence issue plays a part: 
if Norway wants to sell its gas somewhere, it has to make gas pipelines to Europe, and the 
infrastructure that is created need not be the result of any conscious or prioritised effort from 
the EU, as is the case with the Nabucco project. European companies might participate in the 
development of projects, but it is not supported financially and politically by the Commission 
through the TEN- E guidelines such as other projects mentioned in the Caspian, Gulf and 
Mediterranean chapters. As such, the pipelines are therefore to be considered as market 
creation efforts from the European companies, and the EU has not made use of its political 
strategic instruments with regard to infrastructure.  
The level of FDI from the EU between 2007 and 2009 illustrates the close relationship 
between the EU and Norway. In fact, Norway received the comparatively largest amount of 
FDI in this period.
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 In relation to the establishment of a FTA, this element is handled through 
the EFTA that was the basis for the EEA agreement as referred to above.  As such, the free 
trade element is much more developed with Norway than with other producers, were the free 
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trade negotiations have been going on for a long time without conclusion, most notably with 
the Mediterranean region, Russia and the Gulf region.  Additionally, Norway is a member of 
the WTO, in contrast to the majority of the producers considered here, and is thus a part of an 
important pillar of EU trade policy.  
As mentioned, through the EEA agreement the EU has secured that Norway has to 
adapt to changes in the internal market; and the bilateral relations are thus shaped by its 
principles which have been shown to “leak out” into all of the relations considered in this 
analysis. The difference is the degree to which Norway as an important supplier of natural gas 
has to adapt to the principles; all areas concerning energy are included. However, this 
arrangement does not necessarily imply that there is agreement between Norway and the EU 
on the issues that emerge in the dynamism of the EEA agreement at all times. Negotiations 
between the parties frequently show differing opinions, and the directives of the internal 
market often encounter resistance within different segments of the Norwegian society. A 
controversial issue in the relation has been the Gas Negotiation Committee consisting of 
Statoil, Norsk Hydro and Saga Petroleum (established in 1986), which was the umbrella 
structure under which Norwegian gas contracts with Europe were negotiated.
64
 However, after 
several incidents concerning supply contracts to the European market the EU viewed this as a 
cartel with possible detrimental effects for the competition in the market; the Committee was 
accused of keeping the gas prices at an unrealistically high level. Ultimately this resulted in a 
legal conflict, where the EU regarded the activity of the committee as a violation of the EEA 
agreement. In the end, the Norwegian authorities dissolved the Committee, yet the conflict 
illustrates the fact that the relationship with Norway has not always been characterised by 
harmony, nor has Norway accepted all of the directives without objection (Austvik and Claes 
2011:27-31).  
Moreover, concerning the gas directive(s)
65
, a lot of discussion between the parties 
took place, and the result (adoption and implementation of the third gas directive in Norway) 
implies that Norway “loses” an important tool in its negotiations with the EU, namely long- 
term contracts (normally 20 years). The adoption agreement between the EU and Norway 
stated however that old agreements can run out the contractual period, and that Statoil and 
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Norsk Hydro commits themselves to supply more gas to the market (Europaveien 2009). 
Thus, the EU has succeeded in its early efforts to liberalise the market, and gain more power 
on the hands of the consumers, an act that also affects one of its most important suppliers of 
natural gas by the nature of the EEA agreement. Yet, since the third gas directive primarily 
has to do with the relationship between transporters and end- users of gas, it does not affect 
Norway as directly as does the license directive. The license directive was adopted in order to 
secure non- discriminating allocation of oil and gas licenses (Claes and Eikeland 1999:153-
154). Norwegian authorities reacted quite strongly against this directive; traditionally the state 
had been active in the petroleum operations on the Norwegian continental shelf by securing 
long- term production through the allocation of licences. A common understanding was that it 
would not be favourable to Norwegian interests. As such, Norway expressed that they did not 
see the need for such a directive (Austvik and Claes 2011:18,20). Nevertheless, the directive 
was adopted in the end, and the Norwegians had been able to influence the design of it. 
Generally this example illustrates that the EU´s influence is quite strong through the EEA 
agreement, even though the changes and “adaptation” in the Norwegian energy sector and 
policy might have happened either way (Claes and Eikeland 1999:151).  Furthermore, even 
though conflicts have arisen, Norway has not made use of the reservation right inherent in the 
agreement
66
. Either way, the establishment of the EEA agreement and the implications of this 
for Norwegian gas export to the EU emerge as the most extreme case of internal policy 
leaking out, and the EEA represents a specific way of realising the goal of liberalisation with 
third parties. Compared to the other relations, the EU does not have a similar instrument when 
dealing with producers such as Russia and Algeria (Austvik and Claes 2011:30). The market 
strategy is therefore pursued with high intensity in the energy relations with Norway.  
Political strategy 
The EU has engaged itself through political strategic instruments with very little intensity 
towards Norway. Apart from some arms transfers between EU member states and Norway 
between 1995 and 2000, none of the other instruments are utilised. Aid is not a relevant 
instrument, given Norway´s economy and capacity, as well as its association through the 
EFTA and EEA. Additionally, the cooperation in the foreign policy realm between the parties 
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is also strong, and Norway regularly supports the EU´s initiatives that have been identified as 
political strategic instruments (Norway Mission to the EU 2009b).  
3.4.4 What strategies dominate and with what intensity?  
As demonstrated by the foregoing paragraphs the energy security strategies of the EU towards 
Norway are influenced by the strong relationship that exists between the two parties on all the 
other areas as well. This implies that the relationship has been characterised by the EU 
following the market and institutionalisation strategies with high intensity. Market measures 
are almost a given, since Norway is a part of the internal market for energy, and thus has to 
follow new provisions constantly. Even though the interests of the two parties are different in 
that they represent consumer and producer, there seems to be rather mutual interests in 
expanding the relationship, as well as agreement on the energy security principles of the EU. 
In this sense, this relationship represents almost the only one where the EU has achieved 
“acceptance” from the producer on (almost) all of the initiatives suggested. An important 
exception is of course the ECT, and Norway has shown considerable resistance towards some 
of the provisions affecting them through the EEA. On the other hand, the EU has not 
undertaken so many concrete initiatives that have been observed in the other relations. A 
reason for this rather passive approach might be a great belief in the trustworthiness of 
Norway when it comes to supply of energy, as well as a good environment for investment, 
which makes the reliability of Norway as something that is almost taken for granted in the EU 
(Offerdal 2010:39). As a consequence, the importance of Norway as an energy supplier is 
often mentioned in official policy, but not necessarily in relation to the notion of energy 
security (Offerdal 2010:35). 
As Offerdal (2010:39) argues, the interest for example in the High North might 
increase if there are indications that Norway no longer can keep up the expected pace of gas 
exports, which is in fact the case in the beginning of 2011. Thus, the future relationship 
between the two parties might be characterised by more engagement from the European side, 
as well as possibly more “strategic positioning” and the use of political strategic instruments 
witnessed in the other relations. 
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3.5 EU- Russia energy relations 
3.5.1 Short background of the relations 
Russia is by far the most important external supplier of natural gas to the EU, and the 
relationship has been subject to the lion´s share of both analytical attention and debate within 
the EU. Energy has been a very important part of the relationship since the end of the Cold 
War and the energy relations has become more institutionalised on several dimensions since 
the 1990s. The energy dialogue established in 2000 is the first one of its kind with an external 
energy producer (Cleutinx and Piper 2008:25). In the last years, the relationship has been 
influenced by events such as the Russian- Ukrainian gas crises in 2006 and 2009.  Some say 
that energy defines the relationship between the EU and Russia (Barysch 2008:2-3), while 
others opine that the relationship with Russia is fundamental for the creation of the external 
energy policy of the EU and why it has emerged at the forefront of the European agenda in 
the last decade, as demonstrated in the introductory chapter (Geden et al. 2006:16). Given the 
importance of Russia as a supplier of gas to the EU it is no surprise that the EU has pursued 
many of the instruments at its disposal with high intensity.  
3.5.2 Characteristics of the country  
According to the Freedom House index, Russia is a not free regime with the score of 6 and 7 
on political rights and civil liberties respectively. Furthermore, the level of corruption in the 
public sector is very high (2,1). Russia held a share of 40,6 % of the EU´s total import of 
natural gas in 2007, making Russia the largest supplier of gas to the EU. Considering also the 
indicators of resource richness, Russia has the largest proved reserves in the world (1567,1 
tcf), and may thus be expected to hold this role as a vital supplier for the EU for a long time. 
The R/P ratio is however smaller than for example Iran and Qatar, which hold the second and 
third largest reserves in the world respectively, something that may be related to the status of 
the energy sector in Russia which has been a focus area for the EU´s initiatives towards 
Russia. The EU holds almost a 50 % share of the total import of goods to Russia, signifying 
that Russia is reasonably dependent on the EU as a trading partner. Russia has also the most 
developed and extensive pipeline system towards the EU, and plans for several new pipelines, 
such as the Nord Stream, South Stream and White Stream have been announced.  The EU- 
Russia relationship is thus characterised by a high level of interdependence. When the 
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numbers of the USSR is included Russia displays a medium conflict level according to the 
COW datasets.  
It is therefore apparent that Russia is the most important supplier to the EU.  This 
image is of course dependent on many factors, and the situation might change. For example, 
as several commentators have pointed to, the future management of the Russian energy sector 
will be important, that is to what extent it is able to restructure and invest in new production 
capacity in order to improve its supply capacity. Yet, this does not decrease the current 
importance of Russia to the EU, something that is also illustrated by the weight the EU has 
put on the different strategies towards Russia.  
3.5.3 What type of instruments has the EU utilised? 
The EU has pursued the market and institutionalisation strategy towards Russia with high 
intensity. As will be evident from the other empirical chapters, many of the 
institutionalisation instruments contain provisions relevant for market creation, so the market 
strategy is pursued through two channels. Some of the cooperative instruments of the political 
strategy can be identified, but to a lot lesser degree. Generally, Russia is the producer by far 
receiving most attention in terms of energy security, and at the same time, it is the producer 
which has showed the most resistance towards many of the EU´s instruments. This will 
become evident in the following.  
Institutionalisation strategy 
The relationship with Russia is highly institutionalised, reflected in all the bodies and 
agreements managing the relations. In fact, “the EU does not have such a dense network of 
contacts, formats and agreements with any other partner in the world” (Leonard and Popescu 
2007:25). Additionally, after having read energy strategy documents from the EU the last 
decade, as well as press releases concerning energy, the relationship with Russia emerges as 
clearly high on the EU´s agenda. 
The Energy Charter process in the early 1990s was the first institutionalisation 
instrument in the energy relations between Russia and the EU (Romanova 2009:120). The 
process was put in place to ensure stability of the energy supply to the European 
Communities. It was also meant to foster transformation of the energy sector and the whole 
economic and political system of post- Soviet countries (Romanova 2009:120-121). The 
treaty (ECT), established in 1994 and anticipated as a multilateral legal framework, “was 
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structured into “four pillars”: trade, investments, transit and energy efficiency” (Romanova 
2009:121). Through its transit provisions it clearly challenges Gazprom´s transit monopoly 
and Russia has not been willing to ratify the treaty seemingly because of the possible loss of 
power for the energy sector (Haghighi 2007:349). This can be seen in relation to the other 
producers that have resisted the ECT as well; both Norway and Algeria have gas sectors 
largely dominated by state- owned companies, and as such, this motive might be part of the 
rejection also here
67
. A more sober analysis on the Russian position points to the fact that the 
treaty clearly favours the interests of consumers. Additionally, nuclear energy was exempt 
from the treaty after pressure from France, thereby the EU lost potential support from the 
nuclear sector in Russia, an important lobby which could have worked in favour of 
ratification (Romanova 2009:121-122). The Russian energy strategy in general represents the 
main challenge to the ratification of the ECT; Russia prefers asset swapping
68
 and vertical 
integration, two notions not compatible with the principles of the ECT (Locatelli 2010:963). 
The Commission has repeatedly underscored that the Energy Dialogue (elaborated 
below) should not be considered a substitute for the ECT, thus showing that the EU considers 
the ECT as a favourable instrument in securing energy supply from Russia. This is illustrated 
by numerous attempts to get Russia to ratify, for example during the 2006 G8 meeting on 
energy security, without any luck. Russia followed the agreement provisionally until 2009, as 
long as the provisions were compatible with its own laws and regulations (Konoplyanik 
2008:104). In 2009 however, Russia announced that it would never become a contracting 
party to the current ECT, and hence, this provisional association was terminated (Practical 
Law Company 2009). The parties are seemingly as far from each other as ever on the content 
and application of the ECT, consequently the EU has not been able to take advantage of the 
provisions as an instrument to enhance its energy security.  
A Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), was signed first in 1994, and came 
into force in 1997 with the objectives of establishing a free trade area, facilitate Russia´s entry 
into the WTO as well as to focus on human rights and economic reform (Haghighi 2007:343). 
According to Haghighi (2007:343-344) the energy provisions of the PCA sought to “strike a 
balance between security of energy supply and assisting Russia in overcoming its shortages in 
the energy sector”.  The first PCA had a time frame of 10 years, thus in 2006 the EU prepared 
to negotiate a new PCA. Russia did not want to be included in the newly established 
                                                 
67
 Although this is not confirmed by the present analysis  
68
 The strategy of asset swapping or exchange entails “making Russian upstream access for international firms 
conditional on Russian companies being able to invest downstream in Europe” (Locatelli 2010:963).  
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Neighbourhood policy, and the EU thus missed out on an important instrument utilised both 
towards the Caspian and Mediterranean regions. Therefore, the EU sought to make up the 
new PCA with the ENP Action plan as a model incorporating as well the basic principles of 
the ECT in a new energy chapter. Youngs (2009b:82-83) argues that the EU sought to use 
access to the EU´s internal energy market as a negotiating tool, in order to get Russia to sign 
up on principles similar to the ones in the ECT. As a result, the EU tried to make use of the 
ECT “through the back door”, but Russia refused to discuss Gazprom´s market position and 
third party access to networks, and negotiations halted twice (Finon and Locatelli 2008:436). 
A new PCA agreement is currently not yet concluded.  
In the beginning of the EU- Russia energy dialogue, the EU regarded it as an adequate 
forum for promoting its investment interests in the Russian energy sector, and for paving the 
way for European companies in upstream activity in Russia. Further on as well, the issue of 
investment was important (Romanova 2009:136). Development of infrastructure has been 
another predominant issue within the dialogue, and Romanova (2009:139) demonstrates that 
there have been several issues where the parties have not reached agreement, such as third- 
party access to pipelines. The actual participation
69
 in the energy sector is left to private 
companies; the dialogue is primarily about creating a forum for defining common interests 
between the political institutions (Haghighi 2007:345). As such, it is a common instrument 
establishing dialogue and negotiations between the parties. The EU- Russian Permanent 
Cooperation Council on energy was established within the energy dialogue in 2005, and with 
it, the dialogue became more structured and included more interlocutors such as business and 
political authorities of the parties (Monaghan 2006:2, Romanova 2009:143). An important 
initiative in the dialogue framework facilitating tighter cooperation on technical matters as 
well as research and development, was the establishment of the EU- Russia technology centre 
in Moscow in 2002, which was co- funded by the two parties.   
Despite of these tighter institutional relations as a result of the establishment of the 
energy dialogue, an analysis of Romanova (2009:123,131) reveals that the two parties have 
had divergent views of the strategic goal of the dialogue, as well as of the measures necessary 
to realise the objectives set up for the dialogue; these differences only became larger as the 
dialogue went on. The EU wanted the energy dialogue to be included in the overall economic 
relations with Russia; a view the Russians did not share (Romanova 2009:125-126). This is 
clearly an example of the fact that in the end, the two parties seek to take advantage of their 
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respective powers; the EU has a clear prevalence in the economic realm, and Russia has its 
stronghold in the energy sector, mirroring the dynamics of their interdependent relationship. 
This has also led to a rather poor functioning energy dialogue, because the differences have 
only materialised themselves more over time, leaving the room for agreement between the 
parties smaller and smaller; “political feasibility has to a considerable extent limited energy 
cooperation to technical problem-solving” (Romanova 2009:147). In 2010 the energy 
dialogue celebrated its 10
th
 anniversary, and despite all the praise coming from both camps 
about the relevance and importance of the dialogue, most analysts agree that it has yielded 
few results, at least from a European energy security view, because the EU has not been able 
to convince Russia to agree on the most valuable initiatives. Commentators have marked that 
the results can be found in the business sphere, and that misunderstandings, different policy 
views and history have blocked the dialogue at the political level (Grigorjev cited in 
Morgenbladet 22 October 2010). 
Other institutionalisation efforts, most notably dialogue frameworks, have been 
pursued. The parties decided in 2003 to organise the relations around four Common Spaces
70
. 
According to Youngs (2009b:85), the Common Spaces have made less mention of the 
incorporation of EU governance rules and standards when compared to the ENP action plans 
for many of the Mediterranean countries. The Common Space relevant for the energy 
relations of the two parties is the common economic space (Godzimirski 2008:153).  
The Northern Dimension was established as a regional component of the EU- Russia 
relations, covering northern Europe and the Baltic region, and later also the Barents region 
(Romanova 2009:122). The Northern Dimension is “a framework for practical cooperation 
with Russia without mention of political conditions or issues – apparently circumventing the 
supposedly baseline values of EU external relations” (Youngs 2009b:93). As elaborated in the 
chapter on Norway, the energy sector has not been a prominent feature of the Northern 
Dimension up to date, but analysts consider that this might be emerging in the feature, in 
relation to the growing importance of the Barents and Arctic region for European energy 
security, as well as the Russian production capacity.  
This short review of the institutionalisation instruments the EU has made use of 
towards Russia illustrates the comments that was made in the beginning of this paragraph; the 
EU has sought to institutionalise the relationship with high intensity, but there are a lot of 
challenges connected to the different instruments. Several of the attempts to institutionalise 
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the relationship according to different binding legal arrangements have met resistance from 
Russia, and consequently the EU cannot take advantage of them for energy security purposes.  
Market strategy 
Infrastructure is a vital part of the energy relationship, as the Russian reserves are often found 
in remote places, and thus need to be exported to the EU through far- stretching pipelines, and 
as of late, as LNG. Many of the pipelines connecting Russia to the EU has been initiated by 
Russia, and some have included the participation of European companies. The commercial 
aspect of infrastructure development is therefore a prominent feature of the market strategy of 
the EU, as the relations with Norway also show. However, the EU has also supported some 
pipelines politically and financially, as will be elaborated below.   
As already mentioned, the investment climate in Russia has been an important issue 
for the EU in its energy relations with the country. Although problems followed after Putin´s 
rise to power in Russia, this did not seem to slow down investment; in 2006, “the EU 
consolidated its position as the largest investor in Russia” (Youngs 2009b:91). However, 
challenges for European investments in the Russian energy sector exist; the state enjoys great 
control over the amount of foreign investment allowed, by applying a law which states a low 
legal percentage part of foreign ownership in different companies, as well as strict regulations 
on exploration and development licenses (Kryukov and Moe cited in Locatelli 2010:963). 
This is confirmed by the data collected for FDI flows from the EU to Russia between 2007 
and 2009; compared to Norway, the Gulf countries, and some of the countries in the 
Mediterranean, the flows are considerably low. As mentioned in the chapter on the energy 
relations with Norway, Norway has lost considerable sovereignty as regards to licensing 
practises. This is however not the case with Russia, again illustrating the rather large control 
the EU enjoys over the Norwegian energy sector compared to the energy sectors of the other 
producers. In view of financing instruments, funding has to a large degree been confined 
under the TACIS programme for increasing production capacity in Russia. Initially, 
assistance from the EU to the development of the Russian energy sector was prominent, 
including extraction and infrastructure, regulation facilities, advice and technical assistance 
(Haghighi 2007:344,346). After the launching of the energy dialogue the amounts have been 
raised on several occasions, also including funding for Russian gas infrastructure (Youngs 
2009b:81). 
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Here, as elsewhere, the EU is promoting harmonisation of energy regulations and 
markets as well as liberalisation of the energy market. As such,  the ECT is a framework for 
institutionalising the relationship between its signatories, at the same time, the principal aim 
of the treaty is to secure international investments, and through the associate Transit 
protocol
71
, provide third party access to producer pipeline networks (Locatelli 2010:962). 
Thus, the ECT represents also an important tool in the market strategy pursued by the EU, 
aiming at securing a good environment for investments as well as liberalisation of the energy 
sector. However, as noted above, Russia has not ratified the treaty, and thus, the extent to 
which the EU can make use of the ECT´s important provisions for removing barriers to trade 
and harmonising regulation is limited. The adoption of the reciprocity principle, often dubbed 
the Gazprom- clause, is often viewed as an expression of the more general EU strategy to 
advocate legal approximation in its relations with third countries (cf. Romanova 2009:131). 
Basically it implies that third parties‟ access to the European market is conditioned on the 
opening up and establishment of adequate rules in their own market, and it foresees sanctions 
in the form of restrictions related to access in the EU market in case third- countries refuse to 
guarantee a certain level of legal harmonisation (Romanova 2009:131). The Commission has 
applied pressure in order to break up long term contracts with producers in order to promote 
competition in the market, in opposition to the vertical integration strategy of Gazprom (Finon 
and Locatelli 2008:428). Long term contracts have traditionally been favoured by gas 
producers because it gives them a guarantee of stable demand at a predictable price, but they 
contradict the market conditions set out by the EU´s gas directives (Romanova 2009:135). 
After several years of discussion, some of the provisions related to long term contracts were 
modified; in particular the destination clause was prohibited and the duration of the contracts 
were reduced to 10- 15 years (Romanova 2009:136). Thus, the EU has been able to remove 
the destination clause also here, as was seen in relation to Algeria´s Sonatrach in the chapter 
on the EU- Mediterranean energy relations.   
Free trade negotiations with Russia are conducted mostly in relation to the 
negotiations for a new PCA, as well as under the Common economic spaces and Russian 
accession to the WTO. Until now however, a formal FTA has not been set up. The EU has 
been very supportive and active in the Russian negotiations for WTO membership. It did 
nevertheless agree to exempt the energy sector in the negotiations over Russia´s entry to the 
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 The transit protocol implies that “the Russian gas company would have to open its gas pipeline network to 
external suppliers, in particular so that gas can be delivered from Central Asia to Europe, and so that the number 
of suppliers serving the European market can be increased” (Locatelli 2010:963).  
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WTO (Youngs 2009b:85). Negotiations over accession to the WTO are still ongoing, and 
have been somewhat intensified since 2010 (WTO Russia 2011).  
Political strategy 
As mentioned above, some pipelines connecting Russia and the EU has been subject to 
political and financial support from the EU. As such, they reflect more of a political 
intervention in relation to the political strategy rather than being a strictly commercial activity 
taking place at company level. The EU has supported especially two projects initiated by 
Russia; the Yamal and the Nord stream pipeline, by giving them priority status under the 
TEN- E guidelines
72
 (Solum Whist 2009:173, Youngs 2009b:84). The Nord Stream
73
 is one 
of the projects that have gained a lot of attention in Europe in the last years. The Commission 
supported the Nord Stream project as potentially beneficial for securing European supplies. It 
will connect Germany and Russia through the Baltic Sea (Losoncz 2009:147). Later, the 
project has been viewed as more problematic, and does not necessarily enjoy the support from 
all of the EU member states; the conflict over the Nord Stream is especially between 
Germany on the one hand and Poland and the Baltic countries on the other. The latter´s 
arguments are that the pipeline will increase Russia´s leverage over them and threaten their 
energy security, whereas Germany has dismissed these concerns and argued that the pipeline 
is for the benefit of Europe as a whole (Solum Whist 2008:1-2). As elaborated in the chapter 
on the Caspian region, Russia has launched the South Stream project together with Italian- 
owned ENI as an alternative to the strategically important Nabucco- project. Together with 
the Hungarian deal with Russia on Blue Stream, also a competitor to the Nabucco project 
(Youngs 2009b:89), these bilateral deals are regarded to be expressions of Russia´s game of a 
“divide and rule” tactic (Youngs 2009b:86-87). However, this perspective is challenged by 
the argument that the member states are “queuing up” to strike deals with Gazprom (Youngs 
2009b: 96). Other commentators have pointed out that “the EU has not taken any action to 
prevent single members from entering into long- term contracts that other members consider 
problematic” (Larsson 2008:35). Hence, it does not necessarily need to be “divide and rule” 
tactics, if the different member states invite Russia to engage in these kinds of bilateral 
policies (Mendelson speech 2007). In addition to there being differences between the EU and 
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 The aim of having an arrangement for priority infrastructure projects is to “accelerate the implementation and 
construction of connections and to increase the incentives for private investors” (European Commission in 
Solum Whist 2009:173).  
73
 Formerly known as the Northern Europe Gas Pipeline (NEGP) 
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Russia, there are also differences between the member states of the EU as to how to relate to 
Russia on several dimensions concerning energy, as illustrated with the abovementioned 
pipelines. Several bilateral deals between member states and Russia were concluded in the 
latter half of the 2000s. The deals have given Gazprom greater access to the market in 
exchange for an agreement to maintain supplies on a bilateral level (Youngs 2009b:82). 
Apart from these efforts, the level of intensity with which the EU has pursued the 
other political strategic instruments has been low compared to the other strategies discussed 
above. Concerning weapon export to Russia from EU members, the data collected for this 
purpose indicates that the transfer rate of conventional weapons to Russia has been 
comparatively low. Between 1995 and 2010 only 3 transfers were cited by the SIPRI. In 
contrast, the average annual amounts of EuropeAid disbursed to Russia between 2004 and 
2009 were around 110 million €, and the only producer receiving more than this was the 
Mediterranean region. Of the conflictive instruments, the only instrument detected is the Early 
Warning Mechanism established under the Energy dialogue in 2007. This can be utilised for 
monitoring of critical infrastructure and to minimise the consequences of a gas dispute by 
identifying and notifying each other in advance on demand or supply problems relating to 
natural gas (Youngs 2009b:86, Yastrzhembsky 2008:31). After the gas crisis in 2009 the 
Mechanism was further strengthened, but it is interesting to note that it originally did not 
function satisfactory as an instrument avoiding a similar crisis to the one in 2006. As will be 
further discussed in the comparative chapter, more physical measures to protect infrastructure, 
i.e. through the military, have not been detected in the EU- Russia relations. Thus, the level of 
intensity with which the EU has pursued political strategic cooperative instruments is 
somewhat middle ranged, yet, seen in relation with the more conflictive instruments; the level 
of intensity connected to the political strategy is comparatively low. 
3.5.4 What strategies dominate and with what intensity?  
This analysis shows that the energy relationship with Russia is a complex one, with many 
instruments and initiatives being implemented and attempted since the end of the Cold War. It 
becomes clear that the EU´s initiatives to a large degree have been based on the market 
strategy, and the institutionalisation efforts all have a clear commercial or market content 
(Youngs 2009b:83). Again, the internal market is utilised as a benchmark and for example, 
“the spread of the EU´s legislation beyond the EU´s borders [...] became the dominant aspect 
of the Commission´s activities in the energy dialogue” with Russia (Romanova 2009:128).  
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An important factor in the dynamics of the energy relationship has been mentioned 
several times in this chapter, namely the diverging views and approaches to energy policy of 
the two parties. It can be underscored that “the EU wants to extend a multilateral market 
regime for energy trade while Russia prefers to use its energy resources to restore its 
geopolitical power” (Finon and Locatelli 2008:424). Commentators remark the growing 
opposition in Russia towards the EU paradigm (Romanova 2009:124). These tendencies can 
also be observed in the other external energy relations of the EU. An important puzzle here is 
that while Russia has complete opposite views and is regularly refusing to cave into the 
demands of the EU, the EU persists in pursuing its strategies and instruments as illustrated in 
the analysis above. This might seem a little counterproductive – or is it just an expression of 
the fact that the EU lacks the hard power so many argues to be true?  
Youngs (2009b:85) argues that the EU´s strategy towards Russia can be characterised 
by two levels of policy: on the one hand, technical and regulative cooperation have prevailed 
and on the other a more high- politics, strategically oriented political dialogue has taken place. 
Although the institutional arrangements and other instruments presented above clearly reflect 
the market strategy, commentators argue that there has been an increasingly geopolitical 
dimension to the EU policy in its relations with Russia (Youngs 2009b:85). For example, in 
the energy dialogue, the vision of the EU was initially economic rather than security or 
geopolitically focused, yet later the EU policy increasingly reflected a politicised and 
securitised approach to energy (Romanova 2009:128,130). This can be seen in the heightened 
activity towards Russia in relation to the gas crises, as well as the establishment of an Early 
Warning Mechanism. Yet, when the political strategic instruments are considered, the 
strategic dimension is not so prominent. This implies that the increased politicised perception 
of Russia as an energy supplier has made the EU more or less resort to familiar instruments, 
and the overall level of intensity has increased with added attention being given to Russia´s 
assertive role as a gas producer, although this has not necessarily meant more employment of 
political strategic instruments.  
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4 Comparative analysis 
The diversification logic, both by source and type of energy, lies behind the EUs pursuit of 
managing its relations with several of its most important suppliers of natural gas, as well as 
engaging with new, potential suppliers. The foregoing chapters have taken this as a premise, 
and an empirical analysis of five external energy relations has been conducted. This chapter is 
devoted to the pattern of action that emerges from this analysis, and it seeks to reveal whether 
or not there is variation in the external energy security policy of the EU, and if there are any 
systematic tendencies between this variation and certain characteristics of the producers. As 
such, the empirical expectations proposed in the theory chapter will be confirmed or rejected. 
First, a short recap follows on what instruments a gas consumer can utilise in order to enhance 
its energy security.  Secondly, a brief summary or overview is given of what the empirical 
analysis has revealed about what strategies the EU has pursued, against which producer and 
with what intensity. Afterwards, the pattern and eventual variation that emerges are analysed 
and discussed in relation to the empirical expectations presented in the theory chapter, 
whereas the chapter concludes with some general observations on what this pattern reflects 
and eventual other explanatory factors the comparative analysis has revealed.  
4.1 How can a gas consumer secure supplies? 
As put forward in the theory chapter, a gas consumer can make use of different instruments 
that all can be employed in order to enhance energy security. There are of course several 
internal measures such as reserve stocks and demand control that can be a part of an overall 
strategy for energy security, but as is evident by now, this analysis is confined to instruments 
which are aimed externally and towards the producers of natural gas:  
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Table 4.1 Typology of energy security strategies 
Institutionalisation strategy Market strategy Political strategy 
- Dialogue 
 Bilateral 
 Regional 
- Formal bilateral agreement 
- Formal Intergovernmental/ 
Multilateral agreement 
- Supranational agreement 
 
 
 
 
 Infrastructure 
- Commercial  
 
 Investment 
- FDI 
- Financing instruments 
 
 Removing barriers to 
trade 
- FTA 
- Regulatory 
harmonisation  
- Promotion of inclusion 
in the WTO 
 
 Cooperative 
instruments 
- Political and 
financial support of 
infrastructure 
- Development aid  
- Weapon export 
- Military assistance 
 
 Conflictive 
instruments 
- Occupation or 
intervention 
- Sanctions  
-  Protection of 
critical infrastructure 
4.2 What has the EU made use of? Where? How 
intense? 
4.2.1 Institutionalisation strategy 
Recalling that the level of intensity refers to the weight the EU has put on one strategy, the 
EU has sought to institutionalise its relationship with all the producers considered here, albeit 
with different intensity and with different types of instruments. Russia and the Mediterranean 
region are the objects of most attention from the EU, especially when the sheer number of 
institutional instruments and policies is concerned. Not surprisingly, the EU- Russia 
relationship is characterised by many bilateral dialogues and agreements, while there are 
many regional dialogues institutionalising the relationship with the Mediterranean region. At 
the same time, several bilateral instruments have been undertaken with individual 
Mediterranean countries ranging from non- binding MoUs on energy to binding bilateral 
Association Agreements. Furthermore, the empirical analysis has revealed that there is a 
distinct difference between the two regions that are currently non- significant suppliers to the 
EU, the Caspian and the Gulf, both in terms of which type of instruments the EU has made 
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use of, as well as the level of intensity. Towards the Caspian region the EU has pursued 
several bilateral instruments, but it is only in the latest years that the majority of these 
initiatives have taken place. Azerbaijan is definitely the country that enjoys the strongest 
institutional ties with the EU of the Caspian countries, and it is included in the ENP. On a 
regional level, the Baku Initiative and the INOGATE programme are important instruments of 
dialogue. The EU has therefore pursued the institutionalisation strategy with high intensity 
towards the Caspian region. Turning to the Gulf region, the level of intensity is obviously 
weaker; the EU has a regular dialogue with the countries of the GCC, and this is thus the only 
relationship where the institutionalisation has taken place between two regional organisations. 
Yet, other instruments such as an energy dialogue, the ECT and other regional programs are 
not present, and the level of institutionalisation is thus comparatively low. The same is true 
for the bilateral relations, even though Iraq has received more attention the last couple of 
years. 
Compared to for example Russia, the energy dialogue with Norway has had relatively 
little activity, and the country is only an observer in the Energy Community. The Northern 
Dimension is a regional policy affecting both Russia and Norway, but as discussed it is 
mainly relevant for the EU- Russia relationship. Additionally, the energy dimension has not 
been very prominent. Nevertheless, the very nature of the EEA agreement is definitely an 
important reason for characterising the relationship with Norway as highly institutionalised: it 
is the only instrument the EU has utilised with supranational aspects, and it covers a wide 
range of issues. Norway has had to give up sovereignty on many dimensions relating to 
energy, to the benefit of the EU´s energy security.   
The EU has promoted the ECT in all of its relations except from the Gulf region, but 
with different levels of success. The only countries that have actually ratified the treaty are the 
countries of the Caspian region, while the traditional suppliers of the EU such as Russia, 
Norway and Algeria all have rejected it. The ECT contains provisions aiming at 
harmonisation of regulation in the energy sector, and as such it is also an important instrument 
for market creation purposes. Given the current supplier role of the Caspian region it is 
evident that this is a clear advantage for the EU, provided that the Caspian countries actually 
adhere to the provisions of the treaty.  
Summed up, the instruments utilised for the purpose of institutionalising the 
relationships are presented in the following table. The level of intensity referred to in this 
paragraph becomes apparent; the EU has sought to institutionalise the relationships with 
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Russia, the Mediterranean and to some degree the Caspian region on several dimensions, 
while the Norwegian and Gulf case display fewer instruments, not implying that the level of 
institutionalisation with Norway has been low. The measure on intensity also takes into 
account the content and reach of the instruments, as was noted in the introductory chapter.  
 
Table 4.2 Institutionalisation strategy 
Institutionalisation 
strategy
74
 
Russia  Norway Caspian 
region 
Mediterran
ean region 
Gulf region 
Dialogue 
- Bilateral 
 
 
 
- Regional  
 
 
 
 
Formal bilateral agreement 
 
 
 
 
 
Formal 
Intergovernmental/multilateral 
agreement  
 
 
Supranational agreement  
ED, EWM, 
CS 
 
 
 
 
ND 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PCA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ECT 
 
 
ED  
 
 
 
 
 
ND 
EITI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ECT 
Energy 
Community 
Treaty 
EFTA 
 
 
 
 
EEA 
MoUs 
 
 
 
 
ENP 
(Azerbaijan) 
EITI 
Baku Initiative 
INOGATE 
Central Asia 
Strategy 
 
 
PCA 
Action Plan 
(Azerbaijan) 
 
 
 
 
 
ECT 
MoUs 
Action plans 
under ENP 
 
 
 
ENP, EMP, 
Barcelona 
Process, UfM 
 
 
 
Association 
Agreements 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ECT 
MoU (Iraq) 
 
 
 
 
INOGATE (w/ 
Iran) 
MoU Trade EU- 
GC 
 
 
 
EU- GCC 
Cooperation 
agreement  
T & C Agreement 
(w/Iran and Iraq) 
PCA (w/Iraq) 
 
 
 
ECT 
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 The abbreviations of the table are; ED: Energy Dialogue, EWM: Early Warning Mechanism, CS: Common 
Spaces, ND: Northern Dimension, PCA: Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, ECT: European Charter 
Treaty, EITI: Extractives Industry Transparency Initiative, EFTA: European Free Trade Association, EEA: 
European Economic Area, MoU: Memoranda of Understanding, ENP: European Neighbourhood Policy, 
INOGATE: Interstate Oil and Gas Transportation to Europe, EMP: Euro- Mediterranean Partnership, UfM: 
Union for the Mediterranean, GCC: Gulf Cooperation Council, T&C Agreement: Trade and Cooperation 
Agreement.  
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4.2.2 Market strategy 
Turning to the instruments facilitating market creation, the pattern relating to the level of 
intensity more or less repeats itself. Concerning infrastructure, the strictly commercial 
projects can be found in the energy relations with Norway, Russia and the Mediterranean. The 
content of the institutionalisation efforts referred to above is also almost without exception 
relevant for the market strategy.  
Concerning investments, the data retrieved for this purpose originates from different 
sources due to great challenges related to the collection of available relevant data. These 
challenges concern definitions of the countries or the region, the time period and the currency 
unit as well as non-availability for several countries. Therefore, the data presented in the 
empirical analysis are a very rough estimate of the outward FDI from the EU by geographical 
destination and are merely illustrative. Nevertheless, they point to certain tendencies 
regarding the flow of FDI to the various producers. The EU invested considerably in Norway, 
the countries of the GCC as well as in Turkey between 2007 and 2009, and comparatively less 
in Russia in the same period. Other countries that stand out in the Mediterranean region are 
Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt and Morocco. On a general level, investments from the EU in the 
energy sector have been a prominent feature of the EU´s market strategy, reflecting the fact 
that the EU is the largest economy in the world.
75
  
Financing instruments referred to in the empirical analysis can be seen as a way of 
enhancing the political links with the producer, similar to the implications of making use of 
development aid, but they can also be interpreted as an important instrument for the creation 
of a market, for example where the energy sectors are not adequately developed for large 
scale export, or where the energy sector needs restructuring or upgrading in order to sustain 
the current level of supply. In this thesis, the latter interpretation has been applied. The 
Caspian region can be considered as an example of the former while many commentators 
point to the fact that the Russian energy sector is in need of upgrading and restructuring. 
Generally, these financing instruments feature prominently in the relations with Russia, the 
Caspian and Mediterranean region, and the EU has therefore pursued this instrument with 
high intensity. These numbers also reflect the figures for development aid referred to under 
the political strategy.  
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 Even though I do not have accurate data on EU FDI in the energy sectors of the producers because it was not 
possible to combine data on total FDI flows in the energy sector and total FDI flows by destination, this 
argument has been confirmed by several of the secondary analyses, as mentioned in the empirical analysis. See 
for example Youngs (2009b).  
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Efforts to remove barriers to trade have been stated by the EU as a basis for its energy 
policy towards the producers. It is therefore not surprising that several instruments for this 
purpose have been identified in the empirical analysis. Instruments such as the EFTA and 
EEA in the Norway case, and ECT and the Black Sea synergy towards the Caspian region are 
prominent examples. Again, the efforts towards Norway are more encompassing, and once 
established, they have covered many of the areas the other instruments aim to cover one by 
one.  
Several of the provisions of the internal market which have been introduced over the 
years aiming to liberalise and integrate the market to a larger extent, are also affecting the 
relations with external producers. As such, they are instruments which can be used with 
external ramifications aiming at the harmonisation of regulations. The most prominent of 
these provisions is the so- called reciprocity clause, discussed in the chapter on Russia, which 
has direct consequences for the suppliers of natural gas to the EU, given that it implies that 
access to the European market is conditioned upon making their own markets accessible and 
the establishment of adequate rules (Romanova 2009:131). Other provisions are those 
concerning unbundling and third- party access, which has been demonstrated as important 
especially in the EU- Russia relations. Moreover, with the Black Sea synergy towards the 
Caspian region the EU has sought to develop a sub- regional energy market. This might also 
be interpreted as an important instrument of regulatory harmonisation, as the principal aim of 
this initiative is to establish an integrated sub- regional energy market, facilitating the 
convergence towards the EU gas market. This resonates with similar instruments utilised 
towards the Mediterranean, namely the promotion of the Mashreq gas market and the Agadir 
FTA. A free trade agreement was actually one of the purposes with which the EU based its 
effort on the Barcelona Process giving the EU- Mediterranean relations a push in the 1990s, 
but a formal agreement has not yet been set up. The only formal agreements are the 
mentioned sub- regional Agadir Agreement that is supported by the EU and a bilateral free 
trade agreement with Tunisia. Similarly, the EU has engaged in free trade negotiations with 
the countries of the GCC, yet without any conclusion. The success of this instrument in 
enhancing the EU´s energy security is thus debatable. FTA negotiations with Russia are 
taking place within the framework of the negotiations on WTO accession and a new PCA 
agreement, as well as the Common Economic Spaces, but a formal agreement has not yet 
been set up.  
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An instrument the EU has pursued to some degree is promotion of accession in the 
WTO. Most of the countries still outside the WTO are energy exporters, at the same time; the 
WTO is an important pillar in the EU´s trade policy. Therefore, the inclusion of the energy 
exporters in the multilateral trade framework is a vital instrument for the EU in order to 
facilitate free trade, and as such create and maintain a market for natural gas. The EU has 
publicly supported the accession of Russia, Algeria, Iraq and the countries of the Caspian 
region, as well as Saudi Arabia (under certain conditions), and in some instances it takes part 
in the accession negotiations, while the subject is also present in the political dialogues 
between the parties.  
Presented as a table, a summary of the market instruments reveal that the EU has 
pursued the market strategy with high intensity. However, again, the Gulf region is the 
producer the EU has paid less attention to, and instruments are thus pursued with less 
intensity here. In the relations with Norway, the EU has sought to remove barriers to trade 
especially, while in its relations with the Caspian region, Russia and the Mediterranean the 
EU has pursued market creation with high intensity both by removing barriers to trade and 
investments. The latter three therefore emerge as the relations that reflect the most intensity 
from the EU´s side, together with Norway when content and consequences of the EEA are 
taken into account. 
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Table 4.3 Market strategy 
Market strategy
76
 Russia  Norway Caspian 
region 
Mediterra
nean 
region 
Gulf 
region 
Infrastruct
ure 
 
Commercial 
(European 
Companies)  
 
X (pipelines included 
in the annex) 
 
X (all of 
the 
pipelines) 
 
 
 
 
X (pipelines  
included in 
the annex) 
 
Investment 
 
 
 
FDI
77
 
 
 
 
Financing 
instruments 
 
5,7 billion €78 
(2007-09) 
 
 
 
TACIS  
 
14,8 billion 
€ (2007-09) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ENPI  
(Azerbaijan), 
TACIS, 
TRICECA, 
INOGATE 
CAIF 
 
15,4 billion € 
(2007-2009)79 
 
 
 
MEDA 
ENPI 
 
9 billion € 
(2007-2009) 
GCC and 
Iran 
 
DCI 
Remove 
barriers to 
trade 
- FTA 
 
 
 
 
 
- Regulatory 
harmonisatio
n 
 
 
 
 
- Promotion of 
inclusion in 
the WTO 
(PCA, CS, WTO) 
 
 
 
Reciprocity clause 
Transit protocol 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
EFTA 
 
 
 
EEA 
General 
System of 
Preferences 
 
BlackSea 
synergy 
ECT, PCAs 
 
 
  
All of the 
countries 
EuroMed 
process, 
Agadir FTA, 
FTA 
w/Tunisia 
 
Mashreq,  
 
 
 
 
X Algeria 
EU- GCC 
FTA 
 
 
(x) 
 
 
 
 
 
X (Saudi 
Arabia, Iraq) 
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 The abbreviations of the table (that are not mentioned under the previous table) are: TACIS: Technical 
Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States, ENPI: European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument, 
TRICECA: Transport Corridor to Connect Europe via the Caucasus to Asia, CAIF: Central Asia Investment 
Facility, MEDA: MEsures D'Accompagnement, DCI: Development Co- operation Instrument, FTA: Free Trade 
Agreement.  
77
 In the Caspian region, the EU accounted for around 50 % of the total FDI in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan in 
2008 and 2007 respectively.  
78
 Average amount per year in the time period 
79
 This number is valid for Egypt, Israel, Turkey and Morocco, where Turkey stands for 8, 8 billion €. Algeria 
received on average 266, 5 million $ a year between 1998- 2001, whereas Tunisia received on average 368, 63 
million $ a year between 1994 and 2003 (UNCTAD 2011, European Commission 2011a).  
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4.2.3 Political strategy 
Finally, the empirical analysis has revealed that the EU to some degree has made use of 
several of the instruments identified as part of the political strategy, most notably those 
aiming at enhancing political links with exporters, or the more cooperative instruments. Here 
the political and financial support of infrastructure features prominently in the energy 
relations with the Mediterranean, the Caspian and to some degree with Russia. Regarding the 
Caspian region this argument is connected to the importance of the region for the Nabucco 
Project. The construction of Nabucco has received both financial and political support from 
the Commission through the TEN- E guidelines, in contrast to for example the pipelines 
connecting Norway to the EU, where the European involvement is through European 
companies that have taken part in the consortiums developing the pipelines. The pipelines 
from Russia such as the Yamal and the Nord Stream have also had the same status as 
Nabucco, yet the Commission has been far more outspoken regarding its support and the 
prominence given to the Nabucco project. This may be a result of the diversification logic 
referred to in the beginning of this chapter, provided that Russia is the largest supplier of 
natural gas to the EU at the moment. Additionally, the EU has recently concluded two 
important deals with Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan committing the producers to gas supply. 
This has of course important implications for the realisation of Nabucco, as they can be 
considered as essential for this purpose.  The Nabucco is to some extent also relevant for the 
Gulf region, but as mentioned the initiatives pursued up to date have not concentrated so 
much on the supply potential of the Gulf for Nabucco, compared to those found in the EU- 
Caspian relationship. Some of the pipelines connecting the Mediterranean to the EU are also 
given financial and political support. It is safe to say that in the majority of the relations 
infrastructure has been a top priority for the EU.   
Moreover, development aid in different forms and weapon export emerge as 
prominent political strategic instruments. Data from EuropeAid show that the Mediterranean 
region receives the largest amounts. Norway is not receiving any EuropeAid, the same is true 
for all of the countries of the Gulf region, except for Iran and Iraq. Together, Iran and Iraq 
receive about the same average amount as the Caspian countries, Iraq receiving the bulk this, 
while Russia receives the second largest amount of EuropeAid. Therefore, the Mediterranean 
and Russia are the exporters towards which the EU has made use of development aid with 
most intensity.  
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Turning to the numbers on weapon export, the largest recipients of conventional 
weapons from EU member states in the period 1995 to 2010 were the countries of the Gulf 
region, closely followed by the countries of the Mediterranean. The Caspian region and 
Russia hardly figures in the overview of transfers, whereas Norway appears more often, but 
very little compared to the Gulf and Mediterranean region. The EU has made use of military 
assistance with little intensity, and the indicators illustrate that the bulk of attention is given to 
the Mediterranean region as well as Kazakhstan and Iraq through the stability instrument and 
deployment of missions. Taken together, the EU has pursued the strategy with most intensity 
towards the Mediterranean region, followed by the Gulf region. Whereas the Mediterranean 
has high scores on all the instruments, this is only true for weapon export to the Gulf region.  
The instruments identified as those that aim at physically securing supplies through 
more conflictive measures are hardly utilised by the EU, and the only producers affected by 
these instruments are a few countries in the Gulf region and to some extent the Mediterranean. 
Concerning occupation or intervention it is very debatable whether the invasion of Iraq in 
2003 and the NATO intervention in Libya in 2011 were influenced by motives of energy 
security or not, and it is beyond the scope of this thesis to go into this discussion. Still, several 
EU countries, most notably the UK was part of the coalition going into Iraq in 2003, and they 
are also part of the NATO coalition in Libya. The general observation is that occupation or 
intervention is an instrument the EU hardly ever uses, and when it is utilised, it is very 
difficult to determine whether or not the motive for such an action is energy security. 
Moreover, “the EU” is in these cases the member states, and not the Commission or the EEAS 
acting on behalf of the member states. Nevertheless, as has been illustrated lately in Libya, the 
energy prices, especially oil prices are very vulnerable to disruptions such as war and conflict, 
and thus have important implications for the energy security of the consumers. It is therefore 
not unthinkable that energy security might be one motive behind an intervention in a country 
that is a large producer of energy.  
Connected to the former instrument are those aiming at the protection of infrastructure 
i.e. energy installations and networks. Basically, this may entail military protection of 
infrastructure, and is therefore often an integral part of the occupation or intervention 
instrument. Military protection of infrastructure might also be deployed separately; for 
example, in the Iran- Iraq war between 1980- 1988 several EU member states took part in 
securing tanker routes in the Persian Gulf as a part of a NATO mission (Spiegel Online 2008). 
Yet there are several other indicators such as monitoring and surveillance as well as warning 
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mechanisms that may be relevant for the protection of infrastructure. As such the only 
instrument detected in the empirical analysis is the Early Warning Mechanism established 
between the EU and Russia. Additionally, the Galileo project mentioned in the chapter on the 
Mediterranean might be utilised for this purpose in the future. However, these are not 
measures of “physical protection” as was the essence of the Polish proposal of an Energy 
NATO in the wake of the gas crisis in 2006, in which the Polish suggested that a solidarity 
clause be made valid in the event of threatened energy security (ibid.). The proposal was 
however rejected. Therefore, the empirical analysis has not detected any instruments that aim 
at physical protection of the important infrastructure for gas supply into the EU. The EU has 
mainly concentrated on the protection of critical infrastructure within its own borders, such as 
with the Network of Energy Security Correspondents (NESC) and the overall strategy 
presented in a communication from the Commission and Council in 2004 (European 
Commission 2004). These measures are first and foremost seen in relation with the fight 
against terrorism. Additionally, other crisis management instruments such as reserve stocks 
feature prominently among internal measures.   
The tables summarising which of the political strategic instruments the EU has made 
use of reveal that in comparison to the instruments of the market and institutionalisation 
strategies, they have been pursued with a lot less intensity, and the use of the instruments is 
more varied across the relations, resulting in a more scattered pattern.  The EU has utilised 
mostly those instruments aimed at enhancing political links with exporters, through political 
and financial support of infrastructure, development aid and weapon export, while the more 
conflictive instruments only have been utilised towards a few individual countries, most 
notably in the Mediterranean and Gulf region. Generally, the Mediterranean is the object of 
most political strategic attention from the EU.  Taken together, the political strategic 
instruments are the ones which the EU has pursued with least intensity compared to the other 
strategies, and are therefore not the most prominent feature of the EU´s external energy 
security policy.  
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Table 4.4 Political strategy – cooperative  
Political strategy 
 Cooperative Russia Norway Caspian  Mediterranean Gulf 
Political and 
financial 
support from 
the Commission 
(TEN- E priority 
status)  
Nord stream, 
Yamal 
 
 Nabucco, Southern 
gas corridor 
 
Medgaz, Galsi, Trans- 
Mediterranean 
 
 
(Nabucco, Southern 
gas corridor) 
Development 
aid 
Average yearly 
amount 2004- 
2009 (million €) 
 
113,14  
 
 
 27,30 867,12  Iran and Iraq 24,17 
Weapon export 
Transfers 1995- 
2010 
3 11 4 48 57 
Military 
assistance 
 
  Stability instrument 
Kazakhstan  
Stability Instrument 
(Lebanon, Libya, 
Palestine, Syria) 
Peace- building 
partnership (Lebanon, 
Palestine, Syria) 
Mission in Palestine 
Mission in Iraq  
 
Table 4.5 Political strategy – conflictive  
Political strategy 
 Conflictive Russia  Norway Caspian Mediterranean Gulf 
Occupation or 
intervention 
   Libya (x) (UK part of 
the invasion of 
Iraq) 
Protection of 
infrastructure 
(EWM)    x 
Sanctions 
 
   Egypt 
Libya 
Lebanon 
Syria 
Tunisia 
Iran,  Iraq 
4.3 Expectations and findings 
With this summary of what the empirical analysis has revealed as a background, I now turn to 
the question of how the EU´s actions relate to the proposed empirical expectations. The fact 
that the EU utilises a combination of the strategies was expected in the theory chapter and is 
thus not a very surprising observation. However, the tables above confirm the expectation 
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regarding variation in the external energy security policy of the EU: the EU has pursued the 
respective strategies with different levels of intensity and this varies across the energy 
producers.  
The EU utilises all of the instruments with various levels of intensity, except for the 
political strategic conflictive ones, which is only observed with very low intensity in a few 
number of cases. On a general level, the assumptions noted in the introductory chapter about 
what strategy the EU most likely would follow given its competencies and capabilities can be 
confirmed. The Clingendael study (2004) referred to in the theory chapter outlined two 
storylines as a basis for understanding the security of energy supply in the EU, and also 
concluded that the EU was well embedded in the Markets and Institutions storyline. The 
present analysis confirms this picture; as such the conclusion from 2004 has not been 
significantly changed taken into account the years after. The instruments of the market 
strategy are especially dominating, reflecting that the EU seeks to make use of its economic 
power and the advantages of being the largest trade bloc in the world. In fact, in many 
instances the instruments aiming at institutionalisation contains provisions that facilitate 
market creation. The energy relations of the EU has developed and become more 
encompassing in the last 7 years, and it is possible to observe that the heightened level of 
awareness around energy security in the policy papers of the EU over the last decade has 
translated into more concrete initiatives in the foreign policy realm. The Markets and 
Institutions approach reflect a focus on a long- term perspective on energy security; by 
building institutional relationships and creating markets the EU has sought to improve 
reliability, availability and affordability in the long run. Some of the political strategic 
instruments reflect a more short- term perspective on energy security, they seek physical 
control of supply and also crisis management, in line with the theoretical arguments of the 
realists, but these are only pursued with low intensity. Yet, these reflections are not 
representative of the whole picture; the EU has sought to use political strategic measures as 
well, and the pattern of action is actually more nuanced, as will be elaborated in the following 
paragraphs.  
The Mediterranean region and Russia have received most attention and this is also 
confirmed by a review of the press releases concerning energy between 2004 and 2011. As 
pointed to, the Caspian region has also emerged high on the EU´s agenda, which is confirmed 
by this review. Even though this table does not say anything about the link between level of 
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intensity and strategy, it illustrates the general level of activity of the EU towards the different 
producers and hence the importance of the producer on the energy agenda of the EU:  
 
Table 4.6 General level of intensity 
 Russia Norway  Mediterranean  Caspian  Gulf 
Number of mentions
80
  54 20 44 46 11 
  
These reflections point to an answer to the first part of the research question; the external 
energy security policy of the EU varies across different energy producers according to the 
level of intensity with which it pursues one or the other strategy. In the following, the possible 
explanations for this variation are discussed.  
4.3.1 Empirical expectations: Characteristics and strategies 
I expected that the EU has pursued the different instruments with varied levels of intensity 
according to certain characteristics of the producer. Basically, the empirical expectations take 
as a premise that different characteristics of the producers give the EU motives to pursue 
different strategies with varying intensity in order to enhance its energy security. The task of 
this part of the comparative analysis thus becomes to reveal whether or not there are any 
systematic tendencies between the chosen characteristics and the pattern of action that have 
been identified in the foregoing paragraphs, and as such to figure out whether or not the 
characteristics are valid explanatory factors for variation in the external energy security policy 
of the EU. In the empirical analysis the producers where identified with the following 
characteristics:
81
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
80
 The numbers were retrieved by counting the mentions of the countries or regions either alone, or in relation to 
the different instruments and initiatives that were identified in the empirical analysis. They were counted if they 
are the subject of the press release, are mentioned in the memos on the energy council meetings or in the 
speeches of the energy commissioner.  They were only counted once per document or initiative. On 6 May 2011, 
there were 751 press releases in the Rapid database on energy. 
81
 The possible combinations of all of these characteristics would result in a table consisting of 72 cells. Since 
this would be a very large and unmanageable table and analytical tool, I have confined the table to describe the 
summary of characteristics for the 5 regions and countries. Thus, even though the number of combinations is 
logically larger than the ones presented here, I will only note the characteristics relevant for each producer.  
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Table 4.7 Characteristics of the producers 
Characteristic of 
producer 
 Russia  Norway Caspian Gulf Mediterranean 
Type of regime Free  x    
Partly free     x 
Not free x  x x  
Resource richness High  x   x  
Medium   x x   
Low     x 
Degree of 
interdependence 
High x x   x 
Low   x x  
Level of conflict High    x x 
Medium  x  x   
Low  x    
 
In the theory chapter the following empirical expectations were proposed:  
1) If the producer is a free regime then the EU will pursue political cooperative instruments with low 
intensity. Conversely, if the producer is a partly free or non free regime the EU will pursue political 
cooperative instruments with high intensity. 
2) If the producer has high and medium levels of resource richness then the EU will pursue the market 
strategy with high intensity. Conversely, if the producer is resource poor then the EU will pursue the 
market strategy with low intensity. 
3) If there is a high degree of interdependence between the EU and the producer then the EU will 
pursue the institutionalisation strategy with low intensity. Conversely, if there is a low degree of 
interdependence then the EU will pursue the institutionalisation strategy with high intensity.  
4) If the producer displays a high or medium conflict level then the EU will pursue political conflictive 
instruments with high intensity. Conversely if the producer displays a low level of conflict then the EU 
will pursue political conflictive instruments with low intensity. 
Combined with the summary of the characteristics, the empirical expectations suggest a 
pattern of action presented on the left side of the following table. The empirical analysis and 
the subsequent summary in this comparative chapter have led me to place the different 
producers according to the various strategies on the right side, making up the actual pattern of 
action: 
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Table 4.8 The EU´s suggested and actual pattern of action 
 Suggested pattern of action  Actual pattern of action 
 
High intensity 
 
Low intensity  
 
High intensity 
 
Low intensity 
Institutionalisation 
strategy 
Caspian  
Gulf  
Norway 
Mediterranean  
Russia 
 
Russia 
Mediterranean  
Caspian 
Norway 
 
Gulf 
Market strategy 
 
Caspian  
Gulf  
Norway 
Russia  
 
Mediterranean  Mediterranean 
Caspian 
Russia 
Norway 
Gulf 
Political cooperative Caspian  
Gulf  
Russia 
Mediterranean 
 
Norway 
 
Mediterranean 
 
Caspian 
Gulf  
Russia 
Norway 
Political conflictive Caspian 
Gulf 
Russia 
Mediterranean 
 
Norway  Gulf  
Mediterranean 
 
As evident, the suggested and actual pattern display discrepancies. In the following, the actual 
pattern will be discussed according to each empirical expectation.  
4.3.2 The EU´s pattern of action  
On a general level, several of the empirical expectations might be confirmed or rejected when 
each relation is considered in isolation. Firstly it was expected that the EU has pursued 
political strategic cooperative instruments towards not free regimes with higher intensity than 
towards free regimes, basically towards all of the producers except Norway. The empirical 
expectation is confirmed when looking at Norway in isolation. Only weapon export features 
as the instrument utilised here, and the level of intensity is thus very low. Yet, this is also true 
for Russia, the Caspian and to some degree the Gulf region; apart from the focus on 
infrastructure, the level of intensity with which the EU has pursued political strategic 
cooperative instruments is low. The only producer towards which the EU has pursued the 
political cooperative strategy with high intensity is the Mediterranean region, suggesting first 
and foremost that this generally is a strategy the EU has not sought to use very frequently, but 
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also, that the pattern of action suggested by the empirical expectation may be rejected. The 
EU does not pursue political strategic cooperation with any different intensity depending on 
the type of regime.  
Even though it was not formulated explicitly in the theory chapter, either in the 
discussion or as an empirical expectation, it is possible to imagine that the EU would pursue 
another strategy according to the type of regime, namely institutionalisation of the 
relationship. Provided that the regimes are different from the EU, it might be so that the EU 
will encourage cooperation through different institutional arrangements in order to alleviate 
lack of trust and provide a framework for interaction (Mingst 2004:64). A combination of 
cooperation through different institutional channels can thus contribute to political stability 
through economic interdependence (Matláry 1997:55). Furthermore, over time, more parties 
might be included and create a complex web of interaction which gives incentives to 
cooperate and remain in the regime or other type of institution. Ultimately energy security 
might be enhanced. It can be expected that the EU will pursue institutionalisation with high 
intensity towards not free regimes, and with low intensity towards free regimes. Observations 
from the empirical analysis confirm that the EU has institutionalised the relationship with 
high intensity in those cases where the regime is not free or partly free. Yet it has pursued 
institutionalisation with the only free regime, Norway, also with high intensity. Moreover, the 
analysis of the relationship with the Gulf region revealed that the level of institutionalisation 
is very low compared to the other relations. Besides the political dialogue, agreement and 
FTA negotiations with the GCC, the EU has pursued fairly modest bilateral 
institutionalisation with individual countries, most notably with Iraq. Thus, even though this 
pattern of action might be expected, there are not any strong systematic tendencies between 
the type of regime and institutionalisation of the relationship.  
The expectation concerning resource richness in relation to strategy and intensity is 
correct for Russia, Norway and the Caspian region; the EU has sought market creation with 
high intensity towards producers with high and medium levels of resource richness. Thus, the 
logic of securing access to vast energy resources by way of commercial instruments seems to 
be confirmed. Commercial infrastructure is especially prominent in the Norwegian, Russian 
and to some degree also the Mediterranean cases, along with efforts to remove barriers to 
trade. Norway might be regarded as the “ultimate realisation” of market creation, as it is part 
of the internal market and therefore subject to all of the regulations of the European gas 
market. Yet the EU has pursued market creation with high intensity also towards the 
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Mediterranean region where the level of resource richness is on average low. Apart from 
Algeria, Libya and Egypt almost all of the countries have practically no gas resources. 
Conversely, the Gulf region has a high level of resource richness, but here, the EU has sought 
market creation only with low intensity. As such, the EU has pursued market creation with 
high intensity towards producers with both high and low levels of resource richness, whereas 
towards the producer that have the absolute highest level of resource richness, it has not 
pursued market creation to any significant degree or with any significant intensity. Therefore 
there are not any systematic tendencies with the level of resource richness and with what 
intensity the EU has pursued market creation.  The empirical expectation can thus be rejected, 
and resource richness does not contribute to any fruitful explanation of how the EU has 
pursued market creation.  
As noted in the theory chapter, the degree of interdependence between the parties can 
have important consequences for the policy outcome (Offerdal 2010:39). According to 
institutional liberalists, the effects of institutions are greatest for economic cooperation, and 
they are expected to lead to increased interdependence over time. This is done by facilitating 
further cooperation and ultimately enhancing energy security as the interdependence provided 
by the institutions offer certainty and predictability for the long run, when the consumers are 
“involving themselves in cooperative efforts to ensure greater supply of gas” (Kelly and 
Leland 2007:23,30).  With these arguments in mind, I expected that if there is a low level of 
interdependence between the EU and the producer, the EU would pursue institutionalisation 
with high intensity in order to gain the positive effects of the institutions referred to above. 
According to the empirical analysis, this is only true for the Caspian region and not for the 
Gulf region, even though these two producers have similar low degrees of interdependence 
with the EU. Similarly, where the level of intensity was expected to be low; towards Russia, 
the Mediterranean and Norway, which all hold a traditional supplier role and are significantly 
dependent on import from the EU, the level of intensity in terms of institutionalisation is high. 
The pattern that emerges from the energy relations all point to a rejection of the empirical 
expectation; the degree of interdependence does not seem to explain the way the EU has 
pursued the institutionalisation strategy towards the producers.  
As argued, the pursuit of other strategies can be expected to occur with different levels 
of intensity even though they were not explicitly formulated in the theory chapter. As such, in 
relation to the degree of interdependence, a possible strategy would be to enhance political 
links with the exporter in case of low interdependence, that is; to make them more dependent 
97 
 
on other dimensions, to ensure that the suppliers feel more obliged to deliver gas, because if 
they fail to do so, the consumer can retrieve important goods, or important funds of 
assistance.  On the contrary, such a strategy is not necessary if the level of interdependence 
already is high, and thus it can be expected that these political strategic cooperative 
instruments will be pursued with low intensity. The empirical analysis has revealed that the 
only producer towards which the EU has pursued political strategic cooperative instruments 
with relatively high intensity is the Mediterranean region, which was expected to be low 
given the level of interdependence. Similarly, in the relations with the Caspian and the Gulf 
region the EU has not pursued these types of instruments with high intensity, albeit with a bit 
more than towards Russia and Norway. Yet, since all the producers except for the 
Mediterranean place themselves in the low intensity cell of political cooperation while 
expected otherwise, the degree of interdependence also emerges with low explanatory power 
for the variation in the way the EU has pursued political strategic cooperation.  
Lastly, the conflict level was expected to induce the EU to make use of political 
strategic conflictive instruments with high intensity towards those producers displaying a high 
conflict level. The empirical analysis has revealed that the only places where some of these 
instruments can be observed are in some of the countries in the Gulf and Mediterranean 
regions; most notably towards Iran, Iraq and Libya. Yet, the level of intensity is very low, and 
regarding the other producers they are hardly detected. This implies that the tendency towards 
using more political conflictive strategies is in line with the empirical expectation, but not 
with the expected intensity.  
So, the pattern of action suggested by the empirical expectations could not be 
confirmed, that is, there are seemingly no systematic tendencies between the chosen 
characteristics of the producers and the level of intensity with which the EU has pursued 
different strategies in order to enhance its energy security. The only producers that are found 
in more than one of the suggested cells are the Caspian region concerning institutionalisation 
and market strategies, as well as Norway in relation to the two dimensions of the political 
strategy. Thus, the selected characteristics are not very relevant as explanations of the 
variation of intensity in the EU´s energy security policy. This does not necessarily mean that 
the EU does not pay attention to different characteristics of the producers. Rather it implies 
that the characteristics I have chosen lack significant explanatory power for the way the EU 
has pursued different strategies towards various producers, at least when the theoretical 
expectations are considered. In some instances, I have also suggested and discussed other 
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possible strategies of the EU connected to the different characteristics, but these were not 
confirmed by the empirical analysis either. So, a timely question becomes; what can be said 
about the pattern of action that actually does emerge? Are there any other factors of 
explanation that can be emphasised and which has induced the EU to act in a certain way with 
a certain level of intensity? It is important to note that the alternative factors discussed are 
mainly external factors as well. Internal factors such as for example disagreements between 
the different actors of the EU on the appropriate strategy have not been taken into account in 
this analysis, but might of course influence the choice of strategy, and as such also explain the 
variation of the EU´s external security policy. This may well be a task for future research.  
4.3.3 Alternative explanatory factors  
Turning to each relation, some general observations or alternative explanatory factors of the 
variation in intensity are now discussed. The EU has been most active towards the 
Mediterranean and Russia according to the general level of intensity. These producers are 
strategically important for the EU, for reasons referred to below. Moreover, some fairly recent 
developments concerning the two producers deserve mention in this regard. In 2006 a study 
prepared by NATO´s economic committee warned that Russia was working together with 
Algeria to form an OPEC- like gas cartel. Even though the possibility of such a cartel has 
been dismissed by most analysts because of the still largely regional nature of gas markets 
and because the other large gas producers would oppose a Russian leadership, it has probably 
had some consequences for the level of attention given towards the two producers from the 
EU. The level of contact has been fairly high between the two producers since Putin´s visit to 
Algeria in 2006, and this form of producer cooperation has implications for the European goal 
of diversifying supplies (Winrow 2008:176-177). It is notable that the empirical analysis 
reveals that the only producers towards which the EU has promoted mechanisms ensuring 
demand and supply forecasts and overall transparency concerning the supply situation are the 
Mediterranean and Russia.  
As noted the political strategic conflictive instruments does not feature prominently in 
the EU´s external energy security policy. Yet, where the EU actually has pursued these 
instruments, most notably towards the Mediterranean and the Gulf region, the level of conflict 
is high and the regimes are dominantly not free. The strategic importance of the regions, 
especially of the Mediterranean for the overall security of the EU must be regarded as a 
contributing factor to this type of pattern. This is also reflected in the institutional frameworks 
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with the Mediterranean; terrorism, immigration issues and regional stability are all part of the 
encompassing political dialogues. Aspects such as the geographical proximity and historical 
colonial ties between some of the Northern African countries and EU members are worth 
mentioning in this regard. An interesting pattern emerges of the political strategy in the 
Mediterranean; at the same time as the region is the producer receiving most development aid, 
the EU also exports considerable amounts of conventional weapons to the Mediterranean 
countries. And while the EU is providing the region with military assistance for the sake of 
stability and peace building, the member states have not been shy of participating in 
interventions, and sanctions towards the countries also figure prominently among the 
sanctions in force from the EU. This “cycle” may be regarded as fairly paradoxical, and 
moreover, not necessarily contributing to the reliability of the producer. As such, this pattern 
has implications for the overall energy security of the Union.  
Russia is the most important current supplier of natural gas to the EU and it is 
therefore not surprising that a lot of attention has been given towards this producer. 
Additionally, many of the incidents which have led to increased attention to energy security in 
the EU such as the gas crises have direct consequences for the EU- Russia relation.  For 
example, the institutionalisation strategy has been pursued with high intensity towards Russia, 
this can be interpreted in line with the institutional liberalist logic; in order to alleviate the 
lack of trust that has followed from the different developments in the energy relationship 
since the inauguration of the energy dialogue 11 years ago, one can observe a heightened 
emphasis on different dialogues and frameworks. The establishment of the Early Warning 
Mechanism is a good example of this. Another observation relating more to the general 
pattern of action is that the institutional frameworks that are detected in the EU- Russia 
energy relations have functioned as a model for the other relations, for example the ECT,  
Energy dialogue and PCA. The puzzle is that even though they have not necessarily 
functioned well towards Russia, they have been transferred to other different contexts in a 
seemingly similar fashion. This can be seen for example in relation to the pursuit of including 
producers in the ECT, and thus the attempts to create a “European energy security regime” in 
line with the theoretical arguments of the institutional liberalists. It seems like the EU pursues 
more or less the same institutional arrangements regardless of which producer it engages with, 
with the notable exception of some variation between regional and bilateral arrangements 
given that the energy relations are established with individual countries or on a regional basis. 
Interestingly, a review of the policies towards the different counterparts reveals that the EU 
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has more or less the same objectives towards all of the regions; and thus aims at utilising 
roughly the same strategy towards all of its suppliers. In view of the ECT, it has been 
mentioned numerous times that this multilateral agreement has met resistance among the 
producers. The reasons behind this resistance seem to be that the producers feel that the 
provisions reflect consumer interests at the expense of producer interests, and that they are too 
much of a reflection of EU laws and regulations, which is perceived as intrusive and too 
different from their own energy regulations. These elements are thus inherent obstacles to 
ratification, and it has implications for the extent to which these provisions may be used to 
increase the availability of energy and reliability of the producers, i.e. energy security for the 
Union.   
The empirical analysis identified that the EU has done comparatively little towards the 
Gulf region, both in terms of what could be expected, but also in relation to the other 
producers considered in the analysis. Several factors can be pointed to as possible 
explanations for this. Firstly, the EU is currently receiving the bulk of its oil supplies from the 
Gulf region, and therefore, there is a high degree of dependence on the region already. This 
may lead the EU to remain passive as a way of avoiding more dependence as long as there are 
other possible sources of gas supply. At the same time, the nature of the relationship with the 
GCC has been rather unproblematic besides the lengthy FTA negotiations, and the Gulf 
countries are stable suppliers to the world market. Additionally, as has been referred to, the 
nature of gas and the gas market have different implications for supply security than oil. Since 
the supply of gas for the most part is dependent on the existence of pipeline infrastructure, the 
factor of geographical proximity might be important: given that the Gulf region is relatively 
far off, and the pipelines have to transit considerable distances in order to arrive in the EU, 
not to mention the technical challenges this entails, the focus on the Gulf region may have 
been accordingly low up until now. Yet, one has seen an increased attention towards the Gulf 
region in relation to the development of the Southern Gas Corridor, even though this has not 
resulted in more concrete initiatives, compared to for example the Caspian region. The 
problems in the relationship with Iran were also noted in the Gulf chapter. Both in terms of 
transit and actual supply these difficulties have the potential of impeding and slowing down 
the relations with a big natural gas reserve holder in the Gulf region. Additionally, the conflict 
level detected in this region may have prevented the other strategies from being pursued. This 
can be observed in the Iraqi case where the EU has had a heightened institutional activity after 
the withdrawal of the US troops; in a situation of relative stability compared to the years after 
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the Saddam Hussein regime was overthrown and the conflict between insurgents and US 
troops was going on. It is worth noting that the member states policies have been prominent in 
the Gulf region for a long time, and this has implications for the extent to which the EU can 
promote its relations with the Gulf countries; with whom shall the countries relate? The UK, 
Germany or the Commission? The US presence also has a big impact in the region; this might 
be a reason for the EU to stay out of the area. However, the US is also fairly present in the 
Caspian region, so this might not be the most plausible reason for low activity.  
Generally, it seems like the struggle for geopolitical influence is an aspect underscored 
by commentators for the regions where the EU does not yet have a foothold, or where the 
energy trade is not yet developed. There has been, and still is, a struggle for geopolitical 
influence in the Caspian region; both the US and Russia are present and seek more foothold. 
In fact, some of the countries in the region are dependent on Russian pipelines in order to ship 
resources to consumer markets (Larsson 2008:26). An important factor to note is that the 
policies of the EU in the Caspian region are not necessarily pursued on a separate track from 
the policies on Russia (Youngs 2009b:125). Nuriyev (2008:165) argues that the foreign policy 
of the EU towards Azerbaijan is dominated by concerns about how EU policies will affect its 
important relations with Russia. If this argument has some merit, the important element of 
diversification might be somewhat under pressure; if the EU pays considerable attention to 
what the Russians do in the Caspian region, and carves out its strategies bearing in mind the 
important relationship with Russia, it might be difficult to free itself from Russian 
dependency. On the other hand, if the EU remains passive towards the Caspian region, the 
consequences might be that the export of the Caspian gas reserves will take place through the 
Russian pipeline system, thereby undermining the possibility of diversification and reducing 
dependence on Russia (Cornell 2008:141). Thus, a dilemma emerges on how to relate to the 
Russian factor in the Caspian region, as well as the overall strategy towards the important gas 
producing countries. Still, the empirical analysis has shown that the EU has been pursuing the 
market and institutionalisation strategy with high intensity, including important aspects such 
as MoUs on energy, the ECT, regulatory harmonisation and free trade provisions. Moreover, 
the Nabucco is central for the possibility of diversifying and make use of Caspian resources 
for this purpose. This indicates that the EU realises the potential of the Caspian region as a 
strategic new supplier, and that the EU has not considered taking a passive stance towards the 
region. This development may have positive implications for the affordability and availability 
of natural gas, provided that the Nabucco brings more gas to the European market. However, 
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according to Youngs (2009b:125) the market- institutions strategy pursued by the EU in the 
Caspian region seems to have made little progress when compared to the power politics 
deployed by other players in the region such as China and Russia. According to Nuriyev 
(2008:163), the EU takes a “more or less neutral stance” towards the Caspian region when 
compared to other actors such as the US or Russia, as well as Iran and Turkey, although some 
member states can be said to have taken a more strategic stance (such as the UK, France, 
Germany and Italy). The present analysis has concurred that the EU has not pursued political 
strategic instruments with high intensity in the Caspian region, although the Nabucco is a 
notable exception to this observation. Moreover, even though the Caspian countries have 
shown some resistance towards the EU´s approach, it is still the producer the EU has 
successfully incorporated into several essential institutionalisation arrangements not achieved 
in other energy relations. Yet, the consequences of this strategy remain to be seen, and there is 
no arguing that the Caspian region is high on the EU´s external energy security policy agenda.  
Some commentators have pointed to competition from consumers, most notably from 
China and the Asian markets, which are strengthening their relations with the Caspian region 
and to some degree also with Russia. They are perceived as challenges for the EU when it 
comes to realising its own strategies in the future. For the present analysis this factor cannot 
be said to have been very influential on the choice of strategy for the EU, other than it 
contributes to the general attention towards the energy regions given by all consumers of 
natural gas looking for ways to diversify their supplies. Additionally, given the existing 
relationship between the EU and Russia it does not seem that this will be a major problem for 
the Europeans in any foreseeable future.  
Apart from market creation and institutionalisation, the level of intensity towards 
Norway has been comparatively low. A reason for this rather passive approach might be a 
great belief in the trustworthiness of Norway when it comes to supply of energy, as well as a 
good environment for investment, which makes the reliability of Norway as something that is 
almost taken for granted in the EU (Offerdal 2010:39). As a consequence, the importance of 
Norway as an energy supplier is often mentioned in official policy, but not necessarily in 
relation to the notion of energy security, as compared to for example the focus on Russia or 
the Caspian region (Offerdal 2010:35). Poland and other Central European countries have 
shown interest in concluding bilateral supply deals with Norway, according to Godzimiriski 
(2007:18) this illustrates an “approach to Norway as a remedy for European overdependence 
on Russian gas”, mirroring the arguments from Offerdal (2010) regarding the perceived 
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reliability of Norway as a gas supplier. Moreover, it can be noted that the analysis of the EU- 
Norway energy relations point to a certain hierarchy among the three strategies which have 
guided the analysis; as long as the EU has been able to institutionalise its relationship with the 
producer in a supranationalist manner, and has incorporated it into important market 
structures, this has left the need for making use of the political strategy unnecessary. Even 
though this was not expected in the theory chapter, it seems like a valid interpretation, 
especially when compared to the other energy relations. Here, the EU has not been able 
incorporate the producers to the same extent into its preferred institutional and market regime, 
and therefore, the EU has resorted to other instruments as well for the sake of enhancing its 
energy security. This can be viewed for example in the Mediterranean or towards Russia.   
All in all the factors that emerge as essential for an explanation of the way the EU has 
made use of the different strategies and thereby for the variation in the EU´s external energy 
security policy, are: firstly, the perception of the supplier in terms of stability, the importance 
of the current supplier role and the potential for future supply which is perceived with 
relatively high certainty. Secondly, geographical proximity and strategic position in terms of 
the overall security for the EU are relevant. The diversification logic is also important for the 
overall level of attention; this is especially evident towards the Caspian region and the efforts 
to make these supplies available for Europe. Finally, crisis management entailing increased 
attention after a supply crisis seems decisive for the variation. Additionally, even though the 
empirical expectation concerning resource richness was rejected, it is possible to observe a 
pattern on the regional level in terms of intensity; the EU has pursued bilateral relations 
through the institutionalisation and market strategies towards the countries with the most gas 
resources; Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Iraq and Turkmenistan. The case of Azerbaijan is somewhat 
deviant here; the EU has pursued the strategies with high intensity even though the country 
has the lowest resource richness in the region. A closer look at the institutionalisation efforts 
reveal however that it is the transit potential of the country that provides it with the strategic 
importance; if the Caspian supplies are to be made available the EU depends on Azerbaijan. A 
high conflict level has also induced the EU to use more of the political strategy, at least when 
the conflictive instruments are concerned, yet with relatively low intensity. 
4.3.4 Implications 
What are the implications of these findings for the way the external energy security policy of 
the EU can be explained? As was pointed to previously, a notable internal constraint for a 
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coherent energy policy is the fact that energy security is still very much tied up to the security 
of each member state. As such a large part of the instruments are still confined to the 
sovereignty of the member states. The empirical analysis has revealed instances where the 
member states acts alone, for example in the relations with Russia. These instances often 
reflect the fact that the different member states receive the bulk of their gas supply from 
different producers. The Baltic countries, as well as the eastern European countries receive 
most of their gas from Russia, and are therefore more prone to establish bilateral relations 
outside the common framework of the EU with Russia, whereas the southern Mediterranean 
member states receive almost all of their gas from North Africa and therefore are more prone 
to focus on the Mediterranean region. Besides the implications for the ability to “speak with 
one voice”, this aspect of the external energy security policy also influences the way the 
producers view the EU and who they are supposed to relate to in Europe. These challenges 
were observed in the EU- Russia relations. Moreover, the empirical analysis revealed that 
there are often disagreements within the Union and lack of support for different initiatives; 
this has implications for the effectiveness of the external energy security policy of the EU.  
The present analysis gives me reason to characterise the EU as an international energy 
actor in the following manner; firstly, the EU is a powerful consumer in the world´s gas 
market. All of the producers here have engaged with the EU probably as a result of the large 
export potential that lies in the European market, and the EU is thus able to utilise many of 
the instruments at its disposal. In the same way the EU seeks security of supply, the energy 
producers are keen on securing demand, and there is therefore a lot of potential leverage in the 
market power of the EU. This is illustrated by the way the EU has sought to make use of its 
market power; it offers assistance and market access in return for progress on reform that can 
promote stability and hence availability and reliability of energy supply. Basically, the EU 
utilises its market position to achieve access to natural gas. This form of conditionality or 
reciprocity can be detected in all of the energy relations of the EU.  
Furthermore, the EU is very eager to secure a level playing field in the world, or more 
specifically the European gas market. In this lies a focus on rules- based behaviour as well as 
liberalisation of energy markets and energy trade. Also, it is possible to observe a focus on 
regionalisation in the external energy security policy of the EU; several initiatives aim at 
regional cooperation or integration, and this reflects the fact that regionalisation has been an 
all- embracing goal for the EU in all its external relations; the Union´s history is a testament 
of the fact that regional integration helps to achieve security, welfare and democracy 
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(Khasson et.al 2008:225). It has been reiterated that the EU prefers the market and 
institutionalisation strategies; they dominate in all the relations, as was expected. Concerning 
the theoretical debate around what instruments that best can provide for energy security, the 
EU is therefore definitely following the arguments of economic and institutional liberalists as 
an international energy actor. Following also the diversification logic, the EU has realised that 
it is essential to establish relations with as many producers as possible. In addition to the 
relations considered here, growing relations are set forth with countries of Sub- Saharan 
Africa, as well as Latin America. Nevertheless, a more nuanced picture can be observed; 
political strategic instruments, most notably political and financial support of infrastructure 
have been pursued in almost all of the energy relations. Yet, the EU is currently not an 
international energy actor making use of “hard power” to physically secure supplies, similar 
to common descriptions of the US. Foreign policy is being utilised, but the EU has resorted to 
the more cooperative strategic instruments, such as development aid, rather than the 
conflictive ones. These reflections seem to confirm that the notion of structural diplomacy 
(Keukeleire 2003) referred to in the introductory chapter also is relevant for the external 
energy security policy of the EU, and the EU as an international energy actor. 
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5 Conclusion 
To sum up the findings of this thesis it is useful to recall the research question posed in the 
introductory chapter. Firstly, how does the EU´s external energy security policy vary? It has 
been demonstrated that the external energy policy varies in terms of intensity, that is, the EU 
has sought to use almost all of the instruments identified as available for a gas consumer, but 
to varying degrees towards different producers. For example, the EU has sought to create a 
market more towards the Caspian region than it has towards the Gulf region, whereas the 
Mediterranean has received more political strategic attention than the other producers. In 
some instances the EU has used more of one strategy and less of others, and this varies across 
the relations. It was assumed that certain characteristics of the producers could be an 
important part of the explanation for these differences, but the comparative analysis has 
shown that there are no systematic tendencies between the chosen characteristics of the 
producers and the level of intensity with which the EU pursues the different strategies. Thus, 
the answer to the research question is that yes, the EU relates itself differently to different 
producers in terms of what strategy it makes use of and with what intensity; as such there is 
variation in the external energy security policy of the EU. Yet, the explanatory factors that are 
presented here are not suitable for explaining variation in the EU´s pattern of action, and other 
factors have been pointed to, such as perceptions of supplier role, transit potential, 
geographical proximity, strategic importance in terms of security, crisis management and 
diversification, along with resource richness and conflict level to some degree on the regional 
level.  
What can I say about the effects of these policies and instruments on the actual 
achievement of energy security? Answering this it is useful to recall the operationalisation of 
energy security, namely that it covers the notions of availability, reliability and affordability 
of supplies. An important note is that the effects of energy security policies often cannot be 
felt or measured for many years after they have been implemented. Regarding the present 
analysis, many of the initiatives have taken place over the last decade, as the development of 
an energy policy at community level is fairly recent. As such, the reflections regarding this 
subject are highly tentative. Nevertheless, it is possible to provide some general reflections. 
Basically, the efforts of the EU have primarily been focused on availability and reliability, 
and not so much on affordability, as this centres price policy first and foremost. Through 
diversification of supply and market creation, the EU has enhanced its possibilities of 
securing availability of supply. Moreover, through institutionalisation and political strategic 
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instruments it has also enhanced the possibilities for securing reliability, first and foremost of 
the exporters. By supporting the construction of pipelines the EU has also increased the 
possibility of enhanced availability and affordability, provided that the projects are realised 
and become both commercially and politically viable. As has been determined, the EU has 
institutionalised its relations to a high degree, and therefore also included more producers into 
“a complex web of interaction”. Recalling the arguments of institutional liberalists this has the 
possibility of enhancing the confidence and collaboration of the parties necessary for the 
reliability of suppliers. Yet, the EU has not made use of many measures pertaining to risk 
management; this has implications for the reliability of energy. Furthermore, many of the 
attempts concerning both market creation and institutionalisation have been met with 
sometimes heavy opposition from the producers, thus limiting the advantages they can 
provide for the availability of supplies. Generally, the EU has sought to enhance energy 
security on two levels; both by securing supplies from the individual producer and by aiming 
at diversification.  
What are the methodological considerations worth discussing after such an extensive 
analysis? Firstly it has to be reiterated that “no single publication can cover all the complex 
technical, economic and geo- strategic issues that define the energy relations” of the EU 
(Barysch 2008:3). I have strived to cover all the relevant aspects of the analytical framework, 
but I cannot firmly guarantee that I have not missed out on relevant information, simply 
because the empirical analysis is so encompassing. The advantage of such an extensive 
analysis is of course that the basis for stating an argument concerning how the external energy 
security policy can be explained becomes more valid, but it is important to make a reservation 
about the possibility of a complete data collection. This is especially relevant for the level of 
intensity and the way this has been determined with different standards of measurement, most 
notably the number of instruments and the content of the arrangement. Furthermore, an 
important method of data collection has been to look through all of the press releases 
concerning energy over the last seven years to determine how often the different producers 
figure in EU policy, as well as the different instruments these reflect. Yet with the method of 
structured and focused comparison I feel confident that the standardisation of data collection 
has been focused enough to avoid big shortages of information.  
Moreover, the data on several of the instruments are based on statistical data, and in 
several instances aggregated data has been presented, pertaining to regions. Some reflections 
around measurement validity are therefore merited: firstly, not all of the data has been of the 
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best quality. This has been duly noted when relevant. Secondly, the producers that are regions 
often have an aggregated measure for the indicators utilised here; as such one gets a less 
nuanced picture. Nevertheless, for the sake of simplicity and standardisation I have regarded 
this as necessary. Lastly, regarding the levels pertaining to the indicators, as well as the level 
of intensity; they have been subject to my judgement. Based on the information gathered 
through the data collection I have set a limitation as to where the different levels should be 
placed, but I cannot rule out that these may be skewed, or that there are other ways of 
determining the levels. These reflections also point to another important aspect, namely the 
reliability of the study. I have included relevant data in the appendix, as well as documented 
the way I have collected the data, and where I have collected it from. This should be 
satisfactory according to the requirement of replicability.  
Even though the systematic expected pattern could not be confirmed by the 
comparative analysis this study has contributed to shed light on some possible explanations 
for the way the EU has sought to enhance its energy security, and more generally to 
characterise the external energy security policy of the EU at a time when energy security is 
high on the agenda in Europe. Moreover, it has shown that the EU has related itself differently 
to various producers. As such, the EU has been able to show some flexibility in its energy 
relations. Whether or not this flexibility has been useful and ultimately enhanced the EU´s 
energy security is a task for future research.  
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Appendix  
Pipeline connection  
 Mediterranean region 
Trans- Mediterranean pipeline: Algeria- Tunisia- 
Italia (Slovenia) 
 Medgaz: Algeria- Spain 
 Maghreb- Europe gas pipeline: Morocco- Spain 
Green Stream: Libya- Italy 
Gulf region 
None to the EU 
Russia  
Brother Hood: Russia- Ukraine- Hungary  
Transbalkan : Russia- Ukraine- Balkans  
Finland Connector: Russia- Finland 
Yamal: Russia- Belarus- Poland- Western Europe 
Union Soyuz Export Line: Russia – Kazakhstan – 
Ukraine – Slovakia – Czech Republic –Germany – 
France 
Northern Lights: Russia- Ukraine- Slovakia- Austria- 
Germany 
Norway  
Statpipe: Norway- Germany 
Norpipe: Norway- Germany 
Europipe I and II: Norway- Germany 
Langeled: Norway- Great Britain 
Vesterled: Norway- Great Britain 
Franpipe: Norway- France 
Zeepipe: Norway- Belgium 
Caspian region  
None to the EU 
 
The criterion for inclusion is that the pipeline is physically connected to members of the EU. 
Unfortunately I have not been able to acquire meaningful information for comparative 
purposes regarding the participation of European Companies in the development of these 
pipelines. On a general level, European companies are sometimes part of the Consortium that 
develops and builds the pipeline, and other times they are operators of the European part of 
the pipeline.    
 
Sources: Theodora (2008) and Liuhto (2009: 133) 
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Conflict level 
 
 Interstate War (after 1945) Intrastate War 
(after 1945) 
Conflict 
level  
Russia:  1 (USSR) 6 (incl. 3 USSR) Medium  
Norway:  0 0 Low 
 
Gulf region: Interstate War Intrastate War Conflict 
level  
Bahrain 0 0  
Iran 1 5  
Iraq 5 9  
Kuwait 1 0  
Oman 1 1  
Qatar 1 0  
Saudi Arabia 2 0  
United Arab Emirates 1 0  
Total:  12 15 High 
 
Mediterranean region:  Interstate War Intrastate War Conflict 
level  
Morocco 2 0  
Lebanon 2 5  
Israel 6 1  
Jordan  3 1  
Egypt 6 1  
Algeria  0 2  
Syria 5 5  
Tunisia 0 0  
Turkey 3 2  
The Palestine*   1*  
Libya 1 0  
Total:   27 18 High 
*The continuing occupation of the Palestinian areas is not reflected in these numbers, so they do not describe the 
situation accurately.  
Caspian region: Interstate war Intrastate War  Conflict level 
Azerbaijan 1 0  
Kazakhstan 0 0  
Uzbekistan 0 0  
Turkmenistan 0 0  
Average score:    Low/medium* 
*The countries of the Caspian region was a part of the USSR between 1922 and 1991, and these numbers may 
therefore not reflect the exact number of wars, given that the name of the countries where finalised when they 
became independent in 1991. The numbers have to be seen in relation to the USSR numbers 
Source: COW (2011) 
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Foreign direct investment (FDI) 
EU27 FDI to the different countries, outflows in billion Euros 
 
 2007 2008 2009 Average in the 
time period:  
Russia 9,9 3,5 3,7 5,7 
Norway 18,2 26,3 0,0 14,8 
     
Egypt 1,6 10,1 2,3 4,6 
Israel 1,3 0,7 0,8 0,9 
Turkey 15,7 6,2 4,4 8,8 
Morocco 0,9 1,4 0,9 1,1 
Algeria    (1998- 2001, in 
million $) 266, 5 
 
Tunisia    (1994- 2003, in 
million $) 368, 63 
     
GCC 4,7 18,7 3,1 8,8 
Iran 0,2 0,1 - 0,1 0,2 
     
EU´s share of the 
total amount of 
foreign investment in 
the country 
    
Azerbaijan  Just over 50%   
Kazakhstan Around 54 %    
 
Sources: European Commission (2011a) for Russia to Morocco, GCC and Iran 
UNCTAD (2011) for Algeria and Tunisia  
Delegation of the European Union to Azerbaijan (2011) for Azerbaijan  
Delegation of the European Union to Kazakhstan (2011) for Kazakhstan 
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Actors, decision- making procedures and legal bases concerning 
external energy security 
The European 
Commission 
The European Council The European 
Parliament  
The  Council of the 
European Union 
The Commission is the 
executive arm of the 
European Union, 
responsible for policy 
development and 
administration 
 
Is a central driving force 
for the development of 
energy policy at 
Community level  
 
Initiates policy, guards 
the treaties and is the 
implementing body of the 
bulk of policy within the 
Union 
 
Energy directorate the 
most important one for 
energy policy  
 
With regards to security 
of supply policy it “does 
not have means 
comparable to those it 
has in energy markets 
and sustainable energy 
policies” (IEA 2008: 85)   
Made up of heads of state 
and government of 
member states as well as 
the Commission 
president 
 
 Under the Lisbon Treaty 
it has become more 
involved in the wider 
energy policy 
development in the EU; 
after several summits 
since 2006 the Council 
has provided more 
detailed indications about 
what Europe´s energy 
policy should be.  
 
According to the IEA, 
this is an indication of the 
growing relevance of 
energy policy to wider 
strategic considerations. 
(IEA 2008: 32). 
The members of the 
Parliament are elected 
directly by the citizens of 
the EU and are grouped 
in different political 
alliances or groups, and 
the introduction of the 
co- decision procedure 
referred to below has 
significantly extended the 
Parliament´s decision- 
making powers vis-á-vis 
the Council of the 
European Union  
 
In 1997 Matláry (1997: 
124) noted that the 
European Parliament was 
playing an increasingly 
important role in the 
energy sector  
 
 
The Council of the 
European Union and 
especially the councils of 
energy, transport and 
foreign policy ministers 
are comprised of 
members of national 
governments, and are 
relevant for energy 
matters.  
 
“Like the Parliament and 
unlike the Commission, 
the council has legislative 
powers” (Offerdal 2010: 
33).  
 
 
Policy development:  New energy proposals are always prepared on the basis of wide stakeholder 
consultations, and as well as consultation groups such as the Madrid Forum (for the gas market) and the Gas 
Coordination Group. Consultations between the different EU institutions such as the European Commission and 
committees of the European parliament relevant for energy issues also take place. The complete structure of the 
decision- making process is too complicated to elaborate shortly on here: normally the Commission proposes a 
policy, and the proposal works its way through the system with the Council and the Parliament at central stage, 
reading, amending, giving opinions and eventually adopting the policy, a process that is deemed the co- 
decision procedure. This procedure is utilised for most decisions on energy policy (Article 251 of the EC 
Treaty). (For an enlightening graphic presentation of the structure of the co- decision procedure the reader is 
referred to the IEA energy policy review of the EU (2008: 26). 
 
The legal bases of energy security policy: “all EU energy legislation is based on the EU treaties (including the 
EURATOM), since the creation of the Union” (IEA 2008: 25). Up until the ratification of the Lisbon treaty in 
2009, energy- related legislation has been introduced under a number of different legal bases, including 
environment (Art 175), external relations (various articles) and Trans- European Networks (Art 154). With the 
new Lisbon treaty, the EU´s competence has been enlarged and confirmed in relation to among other things the 
functioning of the internal market, security of energy supply and the interconnection of energy networks. In the 
development process, two principles have been highly respected; member states are responsible for their own 
energy mix, and indigenous energy resources are national, not European, resources.  
 
Sources: Matláry (1997: 106- 107, 113, 124), Offerdal (2010: 32- 33), IEA (2008: 18, 25, 27, 32). 
 
